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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES 
 
In response to the passage of the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and its lead cash assistance program Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), states have taken unique and divergent 
approaches to welfare policy implementation.  One popular approach to workfare 
delivery, known as privatization, involves contracting with non-profit and for-profit 
entities operating within the private sector.  The General Accounting Office reports that 
nearly every state is privatizing TANF services to some degree through third-party 
contracts, but very little is understood about why variation in contracting exists and the 
ramifications for the program outcomes of welfare recipients.  This dissertation initially 
explores the possible factors that influence welfare privatization decisions. Ordinary least 
squares regression estimations suggest that contracting patterns are significantly 
associated with levels of fiscal capacity, urbanization, African American caseloads, and 
non-profit presence. Secondly, this dissertation examines the potential ramifications of 
privatization on the TANF program outputs and outcomes of individual welfare clients. 
After exploring state-level patterns in privatization and performance, I estimate multi-
level models that simultaneously incorporate both individual-level and contextual-level 
variables providing the discipline with the clearest picture of how welfare clients are 
fairing under various administrative environments.  The results of the multi-level analysis 
favor the null hypothesis as the majority of privatization coefficients are statistically 
insignificant, indicating minimal direct ownership effects on the quality of TANF 
outcomes. That being said, there is inconsistent yet persistent evidence emerging from 
both the state-level and multi-level analyses suggesting that non-profit welfare delivery 
induces superior TANF work participation rates and employment outcomes. Privatizing 
welfare provision is not a panacea in that TANF outcomes are seldom improved under 
profit-seeking or non-profit arrangements, but an unwavering commitment to social 
missions and assisting the poor could put non-profits in a relatively superior position to 
transform welfare recipients into self-sufficient, fully employed members of society.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
 
“As a new century begins, the alternative to government direction and the employment of 
the public bureaucracy to carry out its commands is a fresh belief in the social 
beneficence and effectiveness of the marketplace… Depending on where one looks, 
virtually every public service is now considered a candidate for privatization, including 
public schools, public hospitals, social services, penal institutions, police and fire 
department, and transit systems.  All of these initiatives are proposed or implemented in 
the name of managerial efficiency and effectiveness.”  – Elliot Sclar (2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The perpetual search for bureaucratic effectiveness is leading governments and 
researchers to rethink traditional modes of public service delivery.  One popular approach 
to contemporary policy implementation, known as privatization, sheds direct public 
responsibility by integrating private-sector actors and market forces into formerly public-
based industries and services (GAO 1997; Winston 2002; Sanger 2003; Kemp 2007).  
Contracting bureaucratic activities with private, third-party providers has routinely been 
undertaken by governments as a potentially effective tool of governance, but has recently 
been expanding vigorously into new social policy areas involving human support services 
(Sanger 2003; Winston 2002).   
Private organizations have traditionally been employed to physically build and 
maintain public facilities like schools, roads, and prisons, but private entities are 
increasingly likely to teach students, supervise prisoners and assist welfare recipients 
(Sanger 2003).  As a scholarly community, we know that governments at all levels are 
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establishing privatized administrative arrangements when implementing human support 
policy, but we know little about how these arrangements are formed and the ultimate 
ramifications for bureaucratic functioning and performance.   
The broad concept of privatization involves market forces and private sector actors 
operating in public spheres.  Privatization as a governing strategy can take multiple forms 
and is thus studied in distinct ways (Donahue 1998).  For instance, scholars of 
international political economy examine privatization primarily in terms of the divestiture 
of material government assets to the private sector, shifting public industrial monopolies 
to the open marketplace of buyers and sellers.  Much of this research revolves around 
transitional economies in Asia and Eastern Europe that are “redefining the state”, shifting 
from centrally controlled to more market-based, liberalized economic systems driven by 
open supply, demand, and competitive choice among rival firms (Li and Rozelle 2000; 
Spulber 1997).  
Privatization in the American context seldom refers to the divestiture of physical 
government assets or whole industries, but more often to the contracting-out of publicly 
funded administrative activities to private, both non-profit and for-profit firms1.  These 
private sector entities then deliver public goods directly to citizens at the street-level, 
performing the day-to-day administrative functions of governmental services from road 
construction and refuse collection to prison maintenance and employment assistance 
(Kemp 2007; Van Slyke 2002; Hodge 2000).   
                                                      
1 In the American context of economic liberalism and free-market traditions, the federal government does 
not directly hold significant amounts of physical assets and industrial monopoly power.  Thus, privatization 
is observed largely in contractual administrative activities performed by for-profit and non-profit providers 
and funded with taxpayer dollars (Savas 1998).  
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While concepts and application of privatization may vary, the basic thrust of 
privatization research remains similar, linking market forces to performance, or superior 
system outputs (Winston 2002).  The global movement toward privatization as a tool of 
governance is informed by public choice theory predicting cost efficiency and quality 
improvement in economic or administrative outcomes. According to familiar 
microeconomic arguments, when industry is subjected to open competition and informed 
consumer choices, the highest quality of goods and services are provided at the lowest 
cost, hereby increasing individual and societal levels of wealth, prosperity, and overall 
standard of living (Friedman 1962; Savas 1998; Boyne 1998; Kemp 2007).  It is 
government that hinders efficiency and effectiveness with non-competitive, monopolistic 
power and political favoritism, and the beneficent power of the free market’s “invisible 
hand” will ultimately cure economic and social ills (Savas 1998; Boyne 1998). 
The lure of free-market gains has led countries with transitional economies to 
privatize state owned enterprises, such as the agriculture and textile industries in China, 
with the hopes of increasing economic productivity and performance at the system-level, 
increasing aggregate production yields or GDP (Li and Rozelle 2000;  Ito and Krueger 
2004).  In America, which already has an established market-based economic system, 
privatization is manifested in private sector entities undertaking the administrative 
responsibilities of public policy implementation, with the expectation of improving 
bureaucratic service quality at the street-level (Kemp 2007; Brudney 2005; Sclar 2000; 
Boyne 1998; Savas 1998; Savas 1988; Osborne and Gaebler 1992)2.   
                                                      
2 The term “street-level” was coined by Lipsky (1980) and refers to operations taking place on the front-
lines of public service provision (i.e. garbage collection, mail delivery, medical care, employment 
assistance), the actors undertaking/receiving service provision (organizational management, employees, 
and clients being served), and the local environment in which they function.   
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Privatization has a storied history of public-service provision in the United States, 
and has been widely embraced in recent decades among political elites and the mass 
citizenry alike in an era of “entrepreneurial government” that demands efficiency, 
accountability, and performance from government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992)3.  
American policymakers are increasingly responding to contemporary fiscal stress and 
demand for smaller, leaner, yet more productive government by exploring the 
introduction of market-based structures into the administration of various public policies, 
with an eye toward producing superior program results (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; 
Winston 2002; Brudney et al 2005).   
Even with the heightened popularity of privatization as a means to deliver effective 
outcomes in public services, the implications of privatization for bureaucratic 
performance remain unknown and strikingly understudied, especially in the social policy 
arena.  One school of thought argues that privatizing human support provision will open 
up competition and choice among potential service providers, producing superior 
outcomes for all program clients and society more generally (Kemp 2007; Savas 1998; 
Donahue 1998).  An opposing line of reasoning asserts that human support services are 
rife with ambiguity, complexity, and market failure, and that privatized entities will be 
unable to deliver support services more effectively than government agencies (Van Slyke 
2002; Heinrich 2001; Hodge 2000).   
                                                      
3 Osborne and Gaebler’s book entitled “Entrepreneurial Government” highlights the public backlash 
against centralized and inefficient government controlled bureaucracies, and how elites have responded by 
embracing innovative bureaucratic practices reflecting the American entrepreneurial spirit and focus on 
improving performance.  The authors argue that governments should “steer not row” as they are better 
suited to developing goals and monitoring activities rather than undertaking day-to-day service delivery at 
the street-level. 
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This dissertation endeavors to provide an original and comprehensive examination of 
variation in privatized administrative structures, and the quality of program outputs and 
outcomes they produce concerning welfare reform policy in America4.   
 
The Evolution and Devolution of Welfare Privatization 
Although less developed than European and Scandinavian countries, America is a 
country with an established and encompassing welfare state that subsidizes multiple 
collective functions including public education, medical care, transportation, and elderly 
pensions.  Redistributive efforts at the federal level also provide support to impoverished 
populations in the form of “means-tested” cash assistance or income maintenance 
programs and other human support services to the needy, such as food stamps 
(Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program), medical care (Medicaid), or housing 
assistance (Public Housing Program) to eligible low-income individuals and families5.   
Poverty governance and direct relief in America has made a complete administrative 
circle from an unassuming yet continually involved governmental role in the early years 
of the nation, to a more expanded and centralized public approach throughout much of 
the 20th century.  In recent decades, welfare policy authority has been returned to states, 
localities, and the private sector, reducing the role of the federal government and public 
agencies in welfare implementation (Winston 2002; Nightingale and Pindus 1997).  
Governments continue to direct and finance redistributive cash assistance programs, but 
                                                      
4 I undertake a two-part analysis that first examines patterns in welfare contracting across states.  Secondly, 
I utilize variation in privatization to explain client outcomes and bureaucratic performance (i.e. 
understanding the effectiveness of privatized ownership in providing welfare services).   
5 Means-tested programs differ from universal entitlements or social insurance in that benefits are 
redistributed exclusively to eligible target populations defined by the amount of income or material assets 
they own.  Cash assistance, food stamps, housing assistance, and Medicaid represent redistributive 
programs that allocate benefits based upon “means” as opposed to universal social insurance programs such 
as Social Security or Medicare that are available to everyone irrespective of material assets.   
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welfare retrenchment in the 21st Century means America’s poor are increasingly likely to 
face stringent program rules, punitive punishment for program non-compliance, and more 
likely to be served by non-governmental for-profit and non-profit welfare providers 
(Sanger 2003; Winston 2002; Nightingale and Pindus 1997). 
Prior to the onset of the modern American welfare state in the early part of the 20th 
Century, supportive social welfare systems involving public-private partnerships were 
indeed present but were best described as minimalist, highly diffused and inconsistent 
across jurisdictions (Katz 1996; Trattner 1999).  There were no binding, equalizing 
statutory guarantees to cash assistance at the federal or state level as the social safety net 
remained relatively localized, casual, and characterized chiefly by private sector 
volunteerism.  During the first century of the nation, “various forms of voluntary 
assistance developed through the church, mutual-benefit societies, and private 
philanthropy, supplementing a very modest assumption of government responsibility” 
(Sanger 2003, p. 13). 
Although dampened in relation to families, churches, and civic associations 
operating in the private sector, governmental bodies in America have always been 
involved on some level in efforts to alleviate poverty (Katz 1996; Trattner 1999).  For 
instance, following the Revolutionary War, areas such as New York City, Boston, and 
Philadelphia directed substantial amounts of public dollars to assist growing numbers of 
impoverished people.  Although racial minorities were statutorily excluded from material 
benefits most local areas instituted some form of publicly financed poverty relief rooted 
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in English poor laws (Katz 1996)6.  Taxpayer funds were oftentimes allocated to 
privatized arrangements such as local families and churches in order to provide moral or 
material nourishment after publically auctioning off the needy to the lowest bidding 
private caretakers (Katz 1996).  These early forms of poverty relief involved more 
affluent families directly aiding poor individuals and dependents, most especially 
younger children, in exchange for direct governmental reimbursement or other personal 
economic incentives for their philanthropy (Katz 1996; Trattner 1999)7. 
“Outdoor relief” in the form of material benefits provided directly to poor families or 
affluent third-party caretakers eventually evolved during the 19th Century due to the 
changing American landscape characterized by increasing population size and mass 
immigration (Trattner 1999).  Outdoor relief strategies and public auctioning to more 
affluent families, churches, and civic associations became challenged politically and 
practically by both population increases and geographic mobility that invited displaced 
paupers from other cities and immigrants from other countries.  The needy were not only 
multiplying but also were more likely to have grown up somewhere else and popularity to 
assist these “unworthy” external arrivals waned (Trattner 1999)8.  Responding to new 
                                                      
6 According to historian Michael Katz, early Americans borrowed four principles from English precedent 
when handling poverty populations.  One, that poverty and poor relief are public responsibilities.  Two, that 
poverty governance is “profoundly local” in nature.  Third, that public aid would only be granted after 
exhausting the resources of potential caretakers such as “parents, grandparents, adult children, or 
grandchildren”.  Lastly, children could be apprenticed or trained by overseers in order to instill work ethic 
and occupational skills.   
7 Direct payments to caretaking families were sometimes accompanied by or substituted with tax subsidies 
or special write-offs for charitable philanthropy. 
8 The “worthiness” of the poor has remained an enduring political consideration that shapes public policy 
choices.  The deserving poor have primarily included the elderly, children, and disabled populations.  The 
undeserving poor have historically included able-bodied persons, minorities, immigrants, or transplants 
from other cities.  There is also a modern ideological dimension to welfare deservingness.  Conservatives 
emphasize individual-level factors (worth ethic, education, life choices, etc.) to explain economic success 
and failure and thus individuals are seen as unworthy of generous public assistance.  Liberals emphasize 
contextual-level or structural factors (globalization, suburbanization, discrimination, etc.) to explain 
inequality and thus perceive the poor as more worthy of material assistance and government protection.   
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social and political realities, throughout the 19th Century, counties and municipalities 
gravitated toward more impersonal “indoor relief” systems that required destitute 
individuals to reside within local workhouses, poorhouses, or almshouses in order to 
receive public aid (Trattner 1999; Katz 1996).   
Public dollars supported poorhouse functions that afforded material benefits to the 
needy but America’s social welfare initiatives remained casual, inconsistent and largely 
in the realm of private sector actors.  Walter Trattner explains the enduring adherence to 
privatized welfare work when he writes,  
“From the start, care of the needy in America was a public responsibility.  However, 
over the years private citizens, either individually or in groups, undertook the 
providing of aid and services to the dependent… By the late 19th Century welfare 
work had become more of a private or voluntary matter than a public one… public 
assistance had been substantially curtailed or in many cases even abolished.” 
(Trattner 1999, p. 214). 
 
Informal local control of wholly privatized human support systems eventually 
evolved firstly with the Progressive Movement in the opening decades of the 20th Century 
and secondly and more dramatically with the Great Depression and election of Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt to the American presidency.  Around the turn of the century, American 
progressives concerned primarily with public health and work safety issues began 
trumpeting the potential downside of rapid industrialization, urbanization, and unfettered 
capitalism, and as a result “After 1900, welfare capitalism became a national movement.” 
(Trattner 1999, p. 195).  Laborers were increasingly being employed with minimal job 
security by powerful industrial barons in generally unsafe and inhumane factories, while 
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materially deficient families were oftentimes residing in deplorable housing conditions in 
crowded (and unsafe) tenements (Trattner 1999).  The plight of private labor interests 
during the early years of mass industrialization was eventually addressed with public 
policy responses.  Beginning with compulsory injury compensation laws and later with 
unemployment insurance mandates across states, human support services started taking 
on an aura of formal and consistent benefit as opposed to informal and inconsistent 
charity (Katz 1996; Trattner 1999).   
While worker protections were being codified across the states, establishing 
encompassing governmental safety nets for impoverished families was another matter 
entirely and would not come to fruition until massive unemployment, destitution, and 
unparalleled demand for social services associated with the Great Depression (Katz 
1996).  Poverty and seeking public assistance has routinely been accompanied by 
negative stigma regarding laziness, improvidence, or engrained dependency, but with 
unprecedented stock market collapse and subsequent colossal unemployment, the 
traditionally unsympathetic poverty frames began to shift in a more compassionate 
direction.  According to historian Michael Katz, “By 1930, massive, swelling 
unemployment had destroyed (temporarily as it turned out) these easy stereotypes, and 
people everywhere spoke of the “new” employment:  a mass of respectable, hard-
working family men unable to find work.” (Katz 1996, p. 218)9. 
                                                      
9 Poor individuals and families have historically faced negative perceptions and “easy stereotypes” about 
their desperate economic condition (Katz 1996).  The poor more than other populations are perceived to be 
lacking in moral fiber and proper work ethic among other individual shortcomings.  While certain 
systematically disadvantaged populations, such as widowed mothers, the disabled and younger children, 
have been perceived as being more deserving of material benefits, other vulnerable populations do not 
operate under feelings of sympathy and generosity.  The 20th Century experienced the “racialization” of 
social welfare policy as African Americans gained full citizenship rights and began participating in the 
American welfare state.  Media imagery increasingly portrayed the poor in unsympathetic frames and 
portrayed welfare as a primarily African American program for shiftless ghetto populations (Gilens 1999).  
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The Great Depression fundamentally altered American social policy toward greater 
government involvement in welfare delivery.  In the mid 1930s, the Roosevelt 
Administration initiated the New Deal Era, in which the priorities and responsibilities of 
the federal government expanded to confront the emerging challenges of 
industrialization, urbanization, and widespread penury in America.   The economic 
troubles and unwavering political demands of the poor were eventually realized in federal 
social welfare legislation, codifying redistributive efforts at the national-level with a 
program known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), operating under 
the auspices of the Social Security Act of 1935.  While representing a dramatic 
centralizing shift in America’s approach to poverty policy, redistributive efforts and 
governmental control at the national-level remained tempered until the rapid 
liberalization of cash assistance in the mid-1960s associated with Lyndon Baines 
Johnson’s “War on Poverty”. 
The federal government eased program eligibility requirements and vigorously 
expanded the AFDC client-base including newly enfranchised African Americans, as part 
of the Great Society initiatives of the Johnson Administration and enduring Democratic 
Congressional majority (Piven and Cloward 1971; Katz 1996; Gilens 1999)10. This noted 
expansion of the public sector into redistributive income maintenance programs 
continued throughout the Johnson and Nixon administrations, as only minor efforts to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
In turn, Americans tend to exaggerate the actual number of African Americans on public assistance and 
tend to have a “racially coded” perception of welfare.  Indeed, whites who perceive African Americans as 
“lazy” and “undeserving” are the least supportive of social welfare spending (Gilens 1999).  Racial 
attitudes are intimately linked to social policy attitudes in contemporary America.   
10 Piven and Cloward argue that expansion in direct relief afforded by national elites during the New Deal 
and Great Society Eras never would have occurred without sustained rioting and acts of “insurgency” by 
poor and minority populations that threatened the stability of the broader political system.  In other words, 
government authorities are only willing to dispense material relief as a tool of “social control” when the 
disgruntled poor tangibly threaten the country’s order.  See Fording  (1997; 2000) for empirical evidence of 
an insurgency link to welfare benefit levels across the states.   
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reform AFDC were undertaken.  In other words, “between 1962 and 1974, federal 
legislation transformed the nature of service delivery across the nation.  New programs 
expanded the federal government’s role as a provider of social services, and a variety of 
forces accelerated federal spending along its existing tracks: social security and aid to 
families with dependent children.” (Katz 1989, p. 268).  AFDC continued to effectively 
centralize the rules and funding structure of the American income maintenance system, 
retaining the program’s entitlement status.  Private organizations, such as charities, 
churches, and non-profit groups continued human support services during this time, but 
were doubtless secondary actors in terms of redistributive AFDC cash assistance 
programs.  According to E.S. Savas, during this more progressive phase of American 
welfare policy, “The private, nonprofit, charitable organizations that historically had been 
dealing with troubled people were transformed into auxiliaries of the state” (p. 275).  The 
diminished role of the private sector was short-lived.   
In response to widespread perceptions that hemorrhaging AFDC benefit rolls were 
comprised of a dependent, irresponsible underclass that selfishly exploited guaranteed 
government handouts, a philosophical concoction of “new federalism”, “workfare”, and 
“neoliberal paternalism” has driven welfare policy making at the federal-level in recent 
decades (Gilens 1999; Winston 2002; Winston 2004; Soss et al. 2001; Fellowes and 
Rowe 2004; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011)11.   
                                                      
11 The perception that poor individuals readily commit welfare fraud and improperly collect undeserving 
welfare benefits was typified by Ronald Reagan’s allegory about a “welfare queen” from the Southside of 
Chicago.  Reagan alluded to an unnamed woman who collects welfare benefits while driving an expensive 
Cadillac and living lavishly off the government dole.  According to the original New York Times story, on 
the campaign trail Reagan says that, “She has eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve Social Security cards 
and is collecting veteran's benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands. And she is collecting Social 
Security on her cards. She's got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of 
her names. Her tax-free cash income is over $150,000.”  (New York Times February 15th, 1976 “Welfare 
Queen Becomes Issue in Reagan Campaign”).  
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New federalism stresses the virtues of state and local control and guaranteed that 
welfare reform would be administered by states, localities, and the private sector (Conlin 
1998).  Workfare guaranteed that clients would be required to seek and achieve 
employment in conditional exchange for material benefits (Mead 1997).  Neoliberal 
paternalism guaranteed that punitive sanctions for misbehavior and hastily placing clients 
into readily available low-wage employment would trump focusing on improving human 
capital, including educational options or vigilant attention to employment barriers and 
targeted skills training (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).   
The latest welfare reform movement has sought and succeeded in streamlining the 
responsibilities of the federal government and government generally, while embracing 
bureaucratic innovation operating at sub-national levels of government.  Streamlining the 
activities and policy responsibility of the federal government has induced “devolution” in 
social welfare provision, putting direct policymaking authority into the hands of states 
and localities (Gainsborough 2003; Beller 2005; Kim and Fording 2010).  Decentralized 
policy autonomy was also coupled with a decided shift toward workfare, effectively 
requiring welfare recipients to seek and achieve employment in conditional exchange for 
receiving monetary benefits (Winston 2002; Soss et al. 2001; Fellowes and Rowe 2004).  
Under workfare reforms, citizens no longer enjoy a statutory guarantee or entitlement to 
welfare benefits, but instead are obligated to fulfill rigorous program requirements and 
make progress towards self-sufficiency in order to collect cash assistance.   
Dramatic reorganization of social welfare policy, characterized by retrenchment and 
a renewed embrace of welfare privatization was set into motion with the election of 
Ronald Reagan and a first-wave of meaningful reform legislation signed into law in 1988, 
13 
 
known as at the Family Support Act (FSA).  The FSA established the Job Opportunities 
and Basic Skills (JOBS) program requiring states to initiate workfare programs for needy 
families that centered on the education, skills training, and job placement instead of mere 
eligibility determination and timely benefit payments (Poole 2004; Gilens 1999; Mead 
1997).  States began taking distinctive administrative approaches under the new 
challenges of workfare implementation, but many of the national directives, especially 
those related to work participation requirements, were ultimately diluted by a 
Democratically controlled Congress, leaving status-quo bureaucratic structures and 
practices largely in place (Poole 2004).  In short, the FSA, like other reform efforts before 
it, “imposed relatively modest federal requirements on states for client engagement in 
employment-related activities”, and did little to alter the fundamental direction and 
operation of AFDC (Sanger 2003, p. 34).  Indeed, by 1993 the welfare rolls remained at 
historically high levels and only one in five welfare recipients were enrolled in a 
government sponsored employment training, job readiness, or job placement program 
(Poole 2004).  
Discouraged by mushrooming welfare rolls and diluted federal efforts at reform, “the 
vogue for experimentation at the local level persisted.” (Mead 1997, p. 44).  Several 
states during the George H. W. Bush administration and early Clinton years, most notably 
Wisconsin headed by Republican Governor Tommy Thompson, applied for Federal 
AFDC Waivers to implement full-scale workfare innovations complete with rigid 
employment requirements and benefit time limits (Mead 1997).  Around this same time, a 
cohesive Republican majority stormed into the Congress and effectively set the national 
social policy agenda; a drastic overhaul of AFDC was on the horizon. 
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Reform efforts in federal welfare policy reached their zenith in 1996 when President 
Clinton signed into law the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), opening the floodgates of devolution and welfare privatization occurring 
over the past fifteen years.  PRWORA and its lead cash assistance program, Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), completely abolished the entitlement to welfare 
access found under AFDC, instituting binding work requirements and introducing 
penalties for non-compliance with TANF rules (Soss et al. 2001; Trattner 2000).  
Beneficiaries of cash assistance are required to seek and achieve employment, and can be 
banished from the TANF rolls if they fail to adhere to program requirements.   
Apart from formalizing stringent employment requirements and punitive sanctions 
for non-complying welfare clients, TANF facilitated welfare contracting by replacing the 
tightly centralized and routinized AFDC program structure with a more fluid policy 
framework, in which states and localities were granted increased autonomy in fashioning 
distinctive welfare policy rules and administrative networks (Soss et al. 2001). Federal 
directives under PRWORA stress a clear work-first approach without much legislative 
direction concerning administrative restructuring or particular policy rules.  Welfare 
policy in the 21st century is less concerned with providing guaranteed, uniform, publicly 
provided income maintenance than it is with placing low-income clients into employment 
and reducing the welfare rolls through whatever administrative means necessary (Sanger 
2003; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).   
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Opportunities, Motivations and TANF Contracting 
Both the flexibility and restrictiveness of program rules inherent in PRWORA 
legislation increase the administrative role of the private sector in delivering welfare 
services (Sanger 2003; Winston 2002; Mead 1997).  In short, states have the increased 
freedom to administer the TANF program in unique ways, but also face restrictive 
performance directives from the federal legislation that make privatization an ever-
appealing option.  
The impetus for welfare privatization in the contemporary era on one hand comes 
from the inherent flexibility of PRWORA legislation, which gives states the ability to 
pursue unique bureaucratic approaches outside of the public arena.  As Lawrence Mead 
puts it, “the new law (PRWORA)… does not spell out how localities should promote 
welfare work.  They may take a wide variety of approaches, provided only that they meet 
the (work) participation targets” (Mead 1997, p.  46).  PRWORA eased important 
restrictions in terms of welfare case management, enabling states to grant private entities 
the authority to determine program eligibility and compliance, areas that were once 
strictly under public control (Sanger 2003; Winston 2002).  For the first time, states have 
the ability to contract-out entire welfare offices or one-stop centers to private entities that 
administer the program from start (determining eligibility) to finish (case closure) 
(Winston 2002).  While TANF provides an opportunity for states and localities to 
increase the role of private organizations in welfare implementation, it by no means 
guaranteed this outcome.  TANF policy also generated motivations for states to pursue 
alternative methods of delivery. 
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Welfare devolution and sub-national policy autonomy were accompanied by a set of 
strict national performance standards focusing on work participation requirements for 
TANF clients along with general caseload reduction.  States have greater latitude in 
adopting and administering workfare policies than under AFDC; however, federal block-
grant financing affords a fixed-amount of TANF funds to states and is contingent upon 
performance in moving welfare recipients into the workforce12.  TANF mandates that 
after 24 total months in the program, welfare clients must participate in employment or 
work-preparation activities for a minimum of thirty hours per week in exchange for 
monetary support.  TANF Reauthorization in 2002 requires that fifty percent of non-
married welfare clients be participating in full-time work activities, and states can be 
penalized with reduced grants for not complying with federal work participation 
mandates.   
Moreover, TANF placed a lifetime limit of sixty months on cash benefits in order to 
curb long-term dependency (Soss et al. 2001; Sanger 2003; Winston 2004).  Once a 
welfare recipient receives cash assistance for five years, they are no longer allowed to 
participate in the TANF program and no longer eligible for cash assistance.  The statutory 
and subsequent administrative goals of TANF appear obvious and unambiguous.  Put 
welfare recipients to work, reduce the welfare rolls, and eliminate long-term dependency 
on public assistance in America.  The program goals of workfare are relatively simple 
and straightforward, improve the employability of welfare recipients and punish 
misbehavior, but the administrative tasks of accomplishing workfare objectives are 
                                                      
12 TANF abolished the federal “entitlement” to welfare financing, characterized by an open-ended 
matching-fund system in which the federal government subsidized state welfare operations by matching 
state contributions nearly dollar for dollar.  The new financing regime is based on “block grants” that afford 
the states a fixed amount of TANF dollars to spend on welfare administration, meaning that states now bear 
the full economic brunt of any “marginal” welfare costs exceeding the block-grant allotment.   
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anything but clear and straightforward.  The ultimate impact of workfare policies on 
poverty conditions and the long-term well-being of low-income Americans remains even 
murkier.   
Sustained supervisory client-case manager interaction operating under the strictest of 
workfare rules was foreign to many public welfare agencies, which had minimal 
experience turning welfare recipients into workforce participants (Sanger 2003; Mead 
1997).  In turn, states have responded to devolved policy autonomy and newfound 
challenges of low-income employment assistance by experimenting with fresh 
administrative approaches, creating an increased role for private entities in the delivery of 
TANF services (Sanger 2003; Crew and Lamothe 2003; Winston 2002).   
Given the opportunities and motivations to privatize welfare services, states have 
indeed heeded the call.  As of 2001, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that 
every state but South Dakota has instituted some form of TANF privatization, often 
contracting-out substantial portions of their TANF dollars to private, for-profit and non-
profit, service providers (GAO 2002).  Unfortunately, the popularity of privatized 
contracting has not attracted commensurate scholarly attention, and the public policy 
community still lacks definitive answers regarding the origins and effectiveness of 
welfare contracting.  In response to our dearth of knowledge, this dissertation seeks 
answers to three significant research questions.  
 
1. Why are states inclined to embrace welfare contracting?  
 
2. How does variation in administrative ownership affect bureaucratic performance and 
client program outputs and outcomes experienced at the street-level?  
 
3. Is privatized welfare provision administered equitably?  Or does privatized control 
have deleterious effects on the program outcomes of particularly disadvantaged 
clientele? 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The hunt for effective, entrepreneurial governance at the federal-level has 
coincidently reduced the responsibilities of the government itself, shifting policy 
authority downward to states and localities, opening the door for bureaucratic variation 
and innovation in the delivery of public services.  In recent decades, the utilization of 
private markets to deliver government services has increased markedly in the social 
policy arena, and the area of welfare administration more acutely, as a result of the latest 
wave of welfare reform legislation in 1996 (Sanger 2003).  In the contemporary welfare 
marketplace, both for-profit and non-profit providers routinely service program clients, 
while government agencies take on a secondary role or vanish altogether (Winston 2002; 
GAO 2002; Sanger 2003; Nightingale and Pindus 2007).  Public modes of welfare 
implementation performed by government providers are being replaced with 
contractually privatized methods of service delivery in the ever-evolving system of 
American federalism. Yet, the antecedents of privatized arrangements and the 
implications for bureaucratic performance and program outcomes remain an empirical 
puzzle in need of exploration.   
Chapter Two advances arguments put forth by advocates and critics of social 
service privatization, and reviews the extant empirical literature connecting privatization 
to administrative effectiveness.  Competing perspectives arise around the welfare 
privatization issue with advocates heralding free market virtues and opponents espousing 
the potential limitations of the marketplace, especially in the social policy arena of human 
support and charity to the impoverished.  Existing quantitative studies examining social 
policy privatization and policy outcomes are relatively sparse and the findings are mixed.  
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There is occasionally reported evidence of privatized successes in human support 
implementation, but there exists no definitive correlative relationships between privatized 
administrative structuring and superior policy outcomes.  The dearth of research devoted 
to privatization and welfare reform outcomes is even more pronounced and is addressed 
by this dissertation.   
Chapter Three explores the prevalence of welfare contracting across the American 
states for the year 2001.  Existing research seeks to understand why jurisdictions choose 
to retain governmental authority or contract public services with private sector providers, 
yet welfare contracting across states has not been systematically examined at this 
juncture.  Utilizing TANF privatization data from the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
I estimate cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models of welfare 
privatization at the state-level for the year 2001  This dissertation reports that Mississippi 
is over five times more privatized than the average state and that state-level patterns of 
welfare contracting are significantly associated with numerous explanatory variables, 
including levels of fiscal capacity, urbanism, non-profit presence, and African American 
TANF caseload levels. 
Chapter Four outlines the various quantitative methodologies and measures 
utilized in examining privatization and administrative performance in this dissertation.  
Previous research examining the link between privatization and performance in welfare 
programs is limited by case study methodologies and the exclusive use of aggregate data 
in statistical analyses.  After discussing an aggregate interstate approach to studying 
privatization and performance, I introduce a hierarchical methodology to welfare 
privatization studies that incorporates individual-level (client-level) data into welfare 
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privatization studies bringing necessary and proper methodological extension to existing 
research.  Multi-level models analyze both individual-level and higher-level contextual 
variables simultaneously providing the discipline with the clearest statistical picture of 
how privatization is potentially affecting welfare policy outcomes such as employment 
and earnings.   
Chapter Five discusses the results of the statistical estimations.  From the analysis 
it becomes readily apparent that privatization in TANF implementation is not a 
bureaucratic panacea as client TANF program outcomes are seldom improved under 
private, both non-profit and for-profit sector providers.  The analysis oftentimes returns 
statistically insignificant privatization coefficients, which suggests welfare clients served 
by private welfare providers are neither working more nor earning higher incomes, 
favoring the null hypothesis.  Direct effects of administrative ownership on TANF 
program outputs are not pronounced.  That being said, there is a persistent yet roundly 
inconsistent pattern of superior TANF outcomes among non-profit welfare delivery. 
Lastly, Chapter Six provides some synthesis and discussion of the dissertation, 
and suggests avenues for future research.  Under the decentralizing principles of “new 
federalism” (Conlan 1998), devolution and privatization in social welfare implementation 
has been on the rise for the past two-plus decades in America, yet remains understudied 
by researchers of welfare policy and public administration.  Calamitous economic 
collapse in 2008 and early 2009 has resulted in increased unemployment and the poor 
remain particularly vulnerable to economic decline (Bezruchka 2009; Austin 2008; Von 
Braun 2008).  At 15.1 percent in 2010, national poverty rates are the highest they have 
been in nearly two decades (Tavernise 2011), and citizen demand for human support 
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programs could potentially increase with joblessness and impoverished conditions of 
material hardship.  TANF rolls have remained relatively steady in recent years after an 
extensive period of welfare caseload decline (Casey 2011), and privatized welfare 
structures are likely continuing to service welfare clients13.  Thus, it behooves researchers 
to more thoroughly understand why states and localities are instituting various 
administrative approaches to welfare delivery, and how administrative ownership is 
influencing TANF program outputs and outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Adam Michael Butz 2012  
                                                      
13 Recent TANF data published by Legal Momentum demonstrates that TANF rolls rose by 0.8 percent 
from December of 2009 to December of 2010 (Casey 2011).  TANF rolls have essentially stayed constant 
(at around two million families) during the latest economic recession.  Millions of families continue to 
participate in the TANF program but demand for TANF has not escalated substantially during this latest 
economic downturn.  Food and medical assistance programs have risen meaningfully during the latest 
recessionary period, but cash assistance programs have not necessarily followed the trend.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Framework and State of the Literature 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the era of entrepreneurial government and new federalism, policy authority and 
responsibility for social welfare implementation has shifted downward to state and local 
governments, and these jurisdictions have openly accepted privatized contracting as a 
means to deliver human support services at the street-level (Sanger 2003; Crew and 
Lamothe 2003; Winston 2002).  The most frequently touted rationale for administrative 
privatization revolves around familiar microeconomic arguments that private markets, 
opening up competition among rival providers and choices among consumers, improve 
service quality and reduce the costs of service provision14. 
In short, proponents of privatization argue that “the long-term well-being of society 
will be maximized if economic decisions are left mostly to the marketplace” (Savas 1998 
p. 12), and thus open, competitive contracting with private sector providers is one avenue 
that boosts government performance and improves public services while at the same time 
reducing the size and control of government generally.  Proponents of privatization claim 
                                                      
14 Social-choice theory is essentially a standard microeconomic rational-choice framework applied to 
government officials, bureaucratic agents, and the mass populace (Pack 1987).  Private firms subjected to 
rival competitors and client choice will rationally seek improved quality and production at the lowest costs, 
so that the government will continue contracting with these entities.  The livelihood of the private agency 
and its employees is dependent upon its performance and ability to make profit or create goodwill, thus 
private organizations will exude maximum effectiveness and will ultimately improve the administrative 
functioning of stagnant, monopolistic government bureaucracies (Savas 1998).   
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that government agencies operate as perverse monopolies, ensuring survival and 
budgetary resources without facing competitive rivals or mercurial customer preferences, 
and are thus unmotivated to perform at optimal levels (Savas 1998; Donahue 1998).  
Whereas, profit-seekers and non-profits operate alongside potential rivals and without the 
stifling organizational constraints of government statutes, and are thus free to perform 
public duties with maximum flexibility and effectiveness (Savas 1998; Donahue 1998; 
Kemp 2007).   
Opposing points of view stress the potential drawbacks of privatized administration, 
especially in the social policy arena that serves particularly vulnerable low-income 
populations (Van Slyke 2002; Morgan and England 1988).  These advocates argue that 
adequately competitive markets of providers will rarely exist in the market for charitable 
human support services, and that complex supervisory activities aimed at disadvantaged 
low-income families are seldom enhanced under privatized administration.  Moreover, 
the goal of pursuing atomized corporate enrichment and shareholder value could 
undermine more collective, altruistic goals of providing charitable support services to 
impoverished families and communities (Stone 1983).  
Under social service privatization, “the poor may suffer” because private, especially 
profit-seeking firms, seek internal enrichment at the expense of selfless actions and 
sustained relationships with the local community (Morgan and England, 1988).  As Stone 
eloquently writes, “The market atomizes society, emphasizes material acquisition, and 
caters to immediate gratification.  Consequently, there is a risk that use of the market for 
welfare ends may loosen the bonds of community, and citizens may no longer harbor 
social concerns” (Stone 1983).  Cash assistance programs are specifically catered towards 
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impoverished populations that seek charitable generosity and supervisory case 
management, which may impede corporate goals of maximizing shareholder value and 
earnings expansion.  In turn, the quality of social services that require self-sacrifice and 
cooperation with the local community could suffer as a result of individualistic financial 
self-interest (Morgan and England 1988).   
 
 
LINKING PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE 
 
 
The Nature of Private Firms  
 
Numerous public administration researchers argue that the structural and 
distinctive internal organizational characteristics of private firms should maximize 
organizational performance (Kemp 2007; McConnell et al 2003; Donahue 1989).  
Ownership in private organizations is held by a single entrepreneur or few identifiable 
owners, trustees, or directors who have a clear, vested self-interest in improving their 
firms operations, procuring and renewing government contracts over rival firms while 
maximizing revenues and financial self-enrichment (Winston 2002; Savas 1998).  “An 
organization closely tied to the market can structure mandates to employees around the 
basic goal:  Increase net revenues” (Donahue 1998, p. 48). 
Private sector firms tend to be characterized by a relatively streamlined and 
decentralized organizational structure of adaptive decision-making and economically 
efficient daily operating procedures (Winston 2002; Savas 1998).  Private actors are at 
liberty to design innovative operational processes that will most readily increase revenues 
in the case of profit-seekers or maximize goodwill in the case of nonprofits (Drucker 
1990).  Profit-seekers and nonprofit managers have the organizational flexibility to 
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directly control production activities and unharness resource allocation, adapting to 
changing business climates through briskly expanding or reducing the workforce or 
swiftly manipulating core business functions to meet existing and foreseeable challenges 
(Kemp 2007; Winston 2002; Greene 2001; Savas 1998).  In short, private firms like all 
organizations are also bureaucratic and formalized but tend to exude directorial fluidity 
and flexibility in terms of both personnel (i.e. hiring and firing) and operating procedures 
that should lead to improved performance vis-à-vis government agencies (Sanger 2003).  
For instance, private organizations retain the ability to openly hire and fire 
employees, rapidly increasing capacity to meet demands or reducing excesses when 
necessary (Savas 1998).  Conversely, public organizations oftentimes encounter 
entrenched public employee unions and rigid civil-service requirements that impede 
flexibility in the hiring and firing of public employees (Brudney 2005; Sanger 2003; 
Donahue 1998).  According to Margret Sanger, “Contracting provides increased capacity, 
opportunities to draw on new sources of talent, and means to circumvent the constraints 
on reengineering that recalcitrant civil service systems impose” (Sanger 2003).  
Additionally, government agencies are oftentimes plagued by rigidity in terms of 
standard operating procedures and regulatory delays that routinely get the moniker of 
“red-tape” (Kemp 2007; Savas 1998).  Profit-seekers and non-profits, unhampered by 
burdensome constraints on reengineering, can more seamlessly operate void of statutory 
delays and can respond immediately to the changing task environments, thereby 
improving agency performance and theoretically the program outcomes for all program 
clients (Donahue 1998).   
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Ownership in government agencies, on the other hand is diffused across the 
broader tax-paying citizenry fostering the conditions for administrative stagnancy and 
inefficiency (Savas 1998; Donahue 1998).  When private sector organizations fail to 
perform adequately, the adverse effects of contract and revenue loss are felt 
disproportionately by the primary owners, shareholders, or trustees who in turn have an 
undeviating economic interest to remain in business and maximize personal financial 
security.  In other words, “the costs and benefits of managerial decisions are felt more 
directly by the decision maker, whose own rewards are often directly at stake” (Savas 
1998 p. 76).  Under governmental control and diffused organizational ownership, rewards 
and failures are less immediate and apparent.   
American citizens, the “owners” of government agencies, lack direct involvement 
in day-to-day administrative activities and are not rewarded with maximized profits for 
optimal performance.  Thus, individual citizens lack any compelling economic interest in 
improving the functions of collective government agencies (Donahue, 1998). 
Monopolistic and potentially ineffective government-based social service operations will 
only marginally affect individual taxpayers because only a fraction of the citizenry 
utilizes means-tested human support programs.  Most citizens never participate in means-
tested welfare programs and are entirely detached from the street-level operations of 
welfare offices.  
On another front, any increased costs of government inefficiency will be spread 
across all taxpayers, and diluted control ensures that individual lobbying efforts for 
collective bureaucratic improvement are likely unfruitful (Donahue 1998).  Harvard 
policy analyst John D. Donahue laments that, “In the public sector, ownership comes 
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with citizenship and its inalienability makes a concentration of ownership rights 
impossible… The potential for chronic inefficiency, then, is a special peril for collective 
endeavors” (Donahue 1998, p. 50-51). 
Moreover, government agencies could perversely be rewarded for producing 
inferior outputs.  “When a private company performs poorly, it tends to go out of 
business; when a public agency performs poorly, it often gets a bigger budget.  
Paradoxically, the budget can grow even as customer dissatisfaction grows;  in this 
respect a rising crime rate is good for a police department, a housing shortage is  good for 
a housing agency, and an epidemic is good for a health department” (Savas 1998, p. 79).  
One can extend this logic to public welfare agencies in that more poverty and less 
employment among low-income families is potentially a good for the existence and 
expansion of collectively owned human support bureaucracies.   
Political rather than economic considerations and diluted organizational 
ownership among government agencies should hamper the pursuit of quality 
improvement and optimal program outcomes in policy implementation. As John D. 
Donahue puts it, “At best, activities [of government agencies] will drift out of alignment 
with the public interest in a more or less random way.  A city government is probably 
more likely to repave Park Street, even when Maple Street gets more traffic and has more 
potholes, than is a private company to make blue sweatshirts when customers are 
clamoring for red ones” (p. 51).   
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POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF SOCIAL SERVICE CONTRACTING 
 
 
Market Failure 
 
  Although many herald the performance gains that should robotically follow 
administrative privatization, a substantial number of policy scholars and advocates 
espouse the potential pitfalls of taking such actions.  One set of arguments rests on the 
notion that “perfect” and hence efficient, effective markets will rarely exist in the social 
policy arena, and that “market failure” will provoke inferior and ineffective outcomes for 
program clients.  There is some doubt that private firms will face sufficient competition 
from rivals in the contractual bidding process or that competition will remain substantial 
after awarding an initial contract (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Gilman 2001; Sclar 
2000).  If adequate competitive pressures from rival firms are absent, private service 
providers will operate in an environment much like government monopolies, rarely if 
ever fearing contractual replacement by rivals and the motivation to improve 
performance will wane (Sclar, 2000).   
A second possible market failure can occur among consumers of TANF services.  
Market theories assert that consumers must have both perfect information and provider 
choice in order for the “invisible hand” to be activated and maximum service quality to 
be realized; however, consumer information and choice are often inadequate and 
unfeasible in the market for human support services (Sclar 2000).  Welfare program 
clients or “customers” are relatively void of the resources needed to make informed 
consumer choices or seek viable alternatives, and often are beholden to one particular 
local service provider (Gilman 2001).   
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In populous metropolitan settings, TANF clients may be free to choose among 
multiple one-stop centers when seeking cash assistance.  Unfortunately, TANF contracts 
generally cover an entire county and although there are potentially several one-stop 
centers in metropolitan areas, they are all likely owned by the same corporate or public 
provider and are likely offering similar social service options (Sanger 2003).  Open 
competition takes place in the contractual bidding process among rival providers but does 
not necessarily extend to competition for customer traffic after contracts are awarded 
(Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).  More physically isolated rural clients will more than 
likely be limited to only one facility for support services.  The inability of welfare clients 
to make informed decisions among meaningful choices should undermine the motivations 
of private firms to enhance service quality at lower costs (Sclar 2000; Warner 2004).   
 
Complexity and Ambiguity in Human Support Services 
 
Another set of arguments critical of privatization hinges on the type of services 
being provided.  In the provision of hard services such as asphalt laying or garbage 
collection, administrative outputs are easily observed and measured.  In other words, 
governments and citizens can ascertain without much difficulty if trash has been collected 
or if roads have been paved in a quality and cost-effective manner (Hodge 2000).  When 
hard services are performed, the providers’ objectives are clearly outlined (i.e. pick up 
garbage or pave roads) and there is scant room for flexibility or discretion in street-level 
activities, meaning that third-party vendors are more readily monitored and held 
accountable by government officials.  Social services, on the other hand, are known as 
“soft” services in that they are directed at a human-based clientele where complexity and 
ambiguity in service provision abounds (Van Slyke 2002).   
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Social service administrators on the ground are expected to handle human 
subjects, and in the case of welfare reform, aid these impoverished program clients 
toward fruitful employment and ultimate self-sufficiency.  The programmatic tasks of 
hard services are substituted with more complex, nuanced and arguably more challenging 
endeavors that involve interpersonal attention and more front-line decision making by 
case managers.  Front-line administrators of the TANF program must educate 
disadvantaged clients on program rules, ascertain extensive details into work histories 
and barriers related to child-care, transportation, and substance or domestic abuse. Then 
they must seek to address the various barriers, assist with job searches, and closely 
monitor attempts to find employment (Sanger 2003; Winston 2002).  As David Van 
Slyke puts it, “social services present a unique challenge for public and nonprofit 
managers.  This policy area consists of programs with goals and outcomes that are not 
easily defined and measured, clients with varying degrees of tractable and intractable 
problems, and different levels of client motivation to receiving treatment… many social 
service programs require a level of continuous care.”  (Van Slyke 2002). 
Interpersonal supervision directed at a relatively disadvantaged low-income 
clientele does not bode particularly well for privatized profits and shareholder value, and 
it is uncertain that private firms can undertake these administrative tasks with greater 
effectiveness than government agencies.  One pressing concern is that private, especially 
profit-seeking firms will undertake “creaming”, directing disproportionate attention and 
resources at those clients most likely to succeed in the program while hard-to-serve 
clients with debilitating barriers receive inferior attention and outcomes (Gilman 2001).  
In the pursuit of survival and profit maximization, private firms may center attention on 
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clients with the least amount of barriers in an attempt to improve their performance 
numbers and the bottom line (Gilman 2001).  Low-income individuals with debilitating 
barriers to self-sufficiency require supplemental charity and occupational skills training, 
and providing extra resources to clients is not kind to shareholder value.  Thus, service 
quality could theoretically be less equitable among for-profits and services for 
disadvantaged clients would suffer the most (Gilman 2001; Bendick 1989). 
 
 
PROFIT-SEEKING VERSUS SOCIAL MISSIONS 
 
 
 Profit-seekers and non-profits both operate under private direction within a shared 
private sector milieu characterized by stiff competition and scarce resources distinct from 
monopolized governmental control, but there exists significant organizational distinctions 
between these two privatized ownership models that could potentially alter their 
effectiveness in providing welfare services to low-income populations.   
As the name aptly suggests, non-profit organizations are uninterested in 
profiteering motivations and maximizing shareholder value, the basic tenets of economic 
self-interest that underlie for-profit ventures (Drucker 1990).  The “owners” of non-profit 
organizations do not stake exclusionary claim to corporate risks and earning potential as 
traditionally observed in the for-profit scenario.  Non-profit organizations are uniquely 
registered with state governmental authorities and receive favored IRS tax status if they 
abide by the basic “nondistribution constraint” principle of non-profit ownership 
(Heinrich 2000), that earnings and donations remain shared organizational resources to be 
funneled into strengthening organizational activities instead of the pockets of owners 
(Drucker 1990; Wolf 1999). Non-profit directors and managers earn salaries alongside 
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staffers or street-level volunteers but maximizing income and distributing financial 
rewards among a few select owners is anathema to  non-profit existence (Wolf 1999).  
Indeed, non-profits are statutorily required to retain and re-invest earnings within the 
organization, potentially strengthening organizational functioning relative to profit-
seekers that distribute profits among owners and shareholders.   
Non-profits largely provide niche services aimed at curbing particular societal 
needs.  In other words, they are charitable organizations by their very existence and 
adhere to a social mission of societal improvement and assistance (Drucker 1990).  Some 
non-profits focus on improving the earthly environment and food sustainability issues, 
others center on education and research services, while still others center on poverty or 
social environments, assisting the needy or undertaking a variety of human support 
services to the impoverished (Drucker 1990).  For the sake of this dissertation, non-profit 
entities involved with welfare reform implementation must share at least three baseline 
characteristics described by Thomas Wolf (1999, p. 21). 
 
1.  They must have a public service mission 
2. They must be organized as a not-for-profit or charitable corporation 
3. Their governance structures must preclude self-interest and private financial gain. 
 
Although non-profit organizations compete fiercely for government contracts and 
operate alongside profit-seekers sometimes blurring organizational differences in the 
open welfare marketplace (Sanger 2003), non-profits center disproportionately on 
achieving a charitable social mission with an enduring dedication to being effective 
human change agents (Drucker 1990; Wolf 2000; Lipsky 1998).  Distinguished scholar of  
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management Peter F. Drucker speaks to the transformational goals of non-profit 
organizations when he writes,  
“The non-profit organization exists to bring about a change in individuals and in 
society…  It is not that these institutions are “non-profit”, that is, that they are not 
businesses.  It is also not that they are “non-governmental”.  It is that they do 
something very different from either business or government… Its product is a 
changed human being.  Non-profit institutions are human-change agents.  Their 
“product” is a cured patient, a child that learns, a young man or woman grown 
into a self-respecting adult; a changed human life altogether.” (Drucker 1990, p. 
3) 
 
Non-profits are motivated disproportionately by social missions and altruism as 
opposed to profit maximization or shareholder value, and a relatively selfless 
organizational posture should be exuded in the actions of front-line paid staffers and 
unpaid non-profit volunteers.  Satisfaction among profit-seekers is received in larger 
paychecks and promotions while satisfaction in non-profits is more readily achieved with 
good works and meaningful societal improvement.  “Although successful business 
executives have learned that workers are not entirely motivated by paychecks or 
promotion – they need more – the need is even greater in non-profit institutions.  Even 
paid staff need achievement, the satisfaction of service… After all, what’s the point of 
working in a non-profit institution if one doesn’t make a clear contribution?”  (Drucker 
1990, p. 181) 
In terms of welfare reform in America, non-profits likely play a critical role as 
governments experiment with workfare initiatives aimed at altering poor people’s 
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behavior and ambitions, activities that non-profit organizations relish undertaking 
(Lipsky 1993; Sanger 2003).  Welfare reform’s principal purpose is to transform 
individual welfare recipients into fully employed, self-reliant members of society, and 
thus non-profits can potentially fill a supportive, transformative niche left open by profit-
seeking entities, whose main ambitions are profit and shareholder interests over 
charitable guidance (Drucker 1990; Wolf 1999).  The pursuit of profit trumps an external 
focus on broader social missions and charitable generosity, and as a result non-profit 
organizations could potentially be a boon to needy welfare clients, while profit-seekers 
may be less suited for human support activities among the impoverished.   
 
 
THE EXTANT EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
 
Proponents of privatization herald the improved quality and cost efficiency that 
should be immediately realized when market forces are injected into government 
sponsored activities (Savas 1988).  As appealing as the abstract arguments for privatizing 
public services may be on the surface of public choice theory, the effect of privatization 
on bureaucratic performance and client outcomes remains an entirely different matter, an 
empirical question in need of objective analysis.  There is simply no assurance that 
privatized organizational forms produce services of higher quality and lower cost.  In 
turn, scholarship operating under the banner of “new public management” has begun the 
analytical task of linking privatization to program outcomes15.   
                                                      
15 See Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2000) for an introduction to the empirical strategies of “new governance” 
that expounds upon the “science” of street-level administration in terms of explaining and predicting 
“outcomes” or bureaucratic “performance”.  If we can isolate the factors the improve/hinder bureaucratic 
outcomes then we can theoretically improve the functioning of public services and government. 
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Scholarly pursuits linking privatization to bureaucratic performance outside of the 
social policy arena is substantial, but the primarily case-study methodologies are limited 
in generalizability and the empirical evidence is decidedly mixed.  For instance, Boyne 
(1998) performs a meta-analysis of several quantitative studies examining privatization 
and administrative outcomes across various activities including garbage collection, 
asphalt laying, and fire and police protection. The evidence reveals that privatized 
contracting oftentimes reduces the costs of service provision, but does not necessarily 
improve service quality. Cost reduction may come at the expense of quality, as 
underbidding on service contracts is eventually felt by a strained labor force.  Other 
studies do find that privatization improves quality while at the same time reducing costs 
in routine maintenance services such as refuse collection and asphalt laying (Bendick, Jr., 
1989; Donahue 1989), but the limited nature of the quantitative evidence and a focus on 
hard services leaves any empirical generalities on shaky ground.   
Administrative research in the social policy arena is relatively sparse, but a number 
of studies do support the purported benefits of privatization.  Rosenau (2003) finds that 
privatized medical care facilities yield efficiency gains, inducing more quality medical 
services at lower overall program cost. Heinrich and Fournier (2004) find that patients in 
substance abuse programs serviced by for-profit and non-profit providers are less likely 
to relapse into drug abuse and more likely to be employed.  Heinrich (2004) confirms that 
private sector providers in substance abuse programs were more successful at employing 
program clients, but finds that drug abuse rates were similar across both for-profit and 
government service providers.  
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Other studies are not so sanguine toward the prospect of privatization in social policy 
administration, finding that the performance improvement of privatization in human 
services, such as job-training programs or prison management, are minimal or non-
existent as public agencies routinely outperform their privatized peers (see Heinrich 
2000; Hodge 2000).  For instance, a growing body of research examining prison 
privatization consistently uncovers minimal performance gains.  Gaes (2005) reports that 
recidivism rates were similar across public and private facilities.  Performing a recent 
meta-analysis of twelve peer-reviewed studies, Lundahl et al. (2009) report that publicly 
run facilities achieved safer prison environments and had fewer prisoner complaints and 
the authors ultimately conclude that “prison privatization provides neither a clear 
advantage nor disadvantage compared with publically managed prisons.  Neither cost 
savings nor improvements in quality of confinement are guaranteed through 
privatization.” (Lundahl et al. 2009, p. 392).  Similar to the null findings for workforce 
development programs, there is no guarantee that privatizing prison facilities will result 
in superior performance. 
These researchers argue that the promise of privatized performance gains rarely 
materialize because private organizations lack the ability to consistently undertake the 
complex tasks of human or “soft” service delivery with greater effectiveness than public 
entities.  In areas of routine infrastructure maintenance that involve large capital outlays 
for equipment, such as refuse collection and asphalt laying, governments can more 
readily expect improvement from contracting with third-party providers.  The 
administrative tasks and goals of hard services are highly programmatic, desired 
outcomes are physically tangible and easily measured, and local governments can avoid 
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directly purchasing expensive waste removal equipment and large quantities of asphalt 
(Hodge 2000; Donahue 1998).  Administrative activities that involve human clients 
directly, such as welfare case management or public safety, are more ambiguous (and 
arguably complex) and it is not clear that governments benefit through economies-of-
scale or savings from avoiding capital investment in heavy equipment.  Human support 
services in particular have a decidedly low-income, comparatively disadvantaged 
clientele, whose demand for attention and charitable resources can diminish privatized 
profits and eventually undermine efforts to assist the poor.  It is also not clear that a 
natural market of competitive buyers and sellers for low-income support services would 
emerge without government intervention manufacturing a marketplace through social 
welfare program implementation.   
At its core, TANF operates as a charitable program that provides cash assistance so 
that low-income families can survive month to month.  In this paradoxical privatized 
situation the “service” that welfare providers offer to welfare customers is cash assistance 
and distributing cash benefits is not traditionally a lucrative business model.  Profit-
seekers are not generally in the business of disbursing charitable benefits and supportive 
income maintenance to the impoverished, but they are in the business of employment 
support services and can hence profit from government contracts that emphasize 
corporate rewards for placing low-income people into employment (Soss, Fording, and 
Schram 2011).  Private organizations are welcome to garner government contracts and 
operate TANF workfare offices that service low-income clients, yet the question remains.  
Can private providers administer TANF in a superior fashion, ultimately improving the 
well-being of America’s impoverished populations? 
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With these contradictory theoretical arguments and mixed empirical findings in mind 
it becomes apparent that the scholarly community still lacks the ability to consistently 
predict the effects of privatization on performance for social services generally, and for 
welfare service provision specifically. 
 
Welfare Contracting 
 
As discussed above, the shift toward privatized contracting in the delivery of welfare 
services came in response to PROWRA legislation that embraced innovative workfare 
policies and unique service arrangements at sub-national levels of governance.  Fifteen 
years after welfare reform, we understand that states and localities are taking the 
opportunity to contract various aspects of welfare administration with private service 
providers, yet little remains known about how privatization varies systematically across 
jurisdictions, and the consequences of privatization for client outcomes and performance 
management.   
The few studies that exist on welfare privatization are generally informal, qualitative 
case studies of privatized implementation within specific states and localities, or 
administrative manuals instructing states on how to contract-out welfare services in hopes 
of achieving effective performance (Curtis and Copeland 2003;  Liebshutz 2000; 
Stevenson 2003; Breaux, Duncan, and Keller 2002; Iverson 2000; Pavetti, Wemmerus, 
and Johnson 1999).  While these studies often provide in-depth descriptions of 
bureaucratic structures and the potential effects of welfare privatization, none focus 
specifically on linking privatization to performance outcomes and none systematically 
examine variation in privatization and performance across a large number of cases, 
thereby hindering any generalizablity of scientific knowledge.  Van Slyke notes that 
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“more recently, there has been an increase in researching the government-nonprofit social 
service contracting relationship, but much of the work has been conceptual, prescriptive, 
and case specific rather than empirical and generalizable based on primary data 
collection” (Van Slyke 2002, p. 3) 
Existing case studies although limited methodologically are largely unkind to welfare 
privatization.  While Sanger (2003) and Mead (1997) do find that private workfare 
providers offered innovation in Milwaukee by successfully moving welfare recipients off 
public assistance and into employment, Sanger (2003) also reports mixed results in that 
minimal performance differences were discovered among private and public providers in 
Arizona and New York.  Similarly, the GAO (2002) reports that private sector providers 
in Texas, California, and New York City failed to meet performance goals related to 
work participation, and were unsuccessful at improving the daily operations of the 
workfare bureaucracy.  In all of these sites, evidence suggests that government agencies 
are performing adequately alongside private TANF providers (Sanger 2003).   
One published study undertakes a large-N quantitative approach to examining the 
relationship between administrative ownership and performance outcomes across 24 
“Regional Workforce Boards” (RWBs) within the state of Florida (Crew and Lamothe 
2003).  The authors echo the findings of previous case studies.  Regions utilizing public 
actors in TANF implementation performed on par and often more proficiently than 
private (both for-profit and non-profit) service providers.  Interestingly, government 
agencies were found to provide welfare services of equitable or superior quality across 
several aggregate performance measures, such as work participation rates and average 
client earnings.  In summation, the authors assert that, “The findings… undermine the 
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claim that private sector organizations can provide welfare-related services more 
efficiently and effectively than can public organizations” (p. 12).  While this singular 
piece of quantitative evidence lends credence to the notion that privatization in welfare-
to-work initiatives will do little to improve the program outcomes of low-income welfare 
clients, it only represents one quantitative study of privatization in TANF implementation 
and ultimately fails to examine the program outputs of individual participants.  More 
rigorous and comprehensive tests are warranted.    
 
 
THE CASE FOR UTILIZING CLIENT-LEVEL DATA 
 
 
Previous quantitative undertakings employ the county or county equivalents as the 
level of analysis to measure both privatization (i.e. administrative ownership) and 
program outputs (see Crew and Lamothe 2003).  While this unit-of-analysis is perfectly 
logical for measuring administrative ownership that operates largely at the county level, I 
argue that utilizing the individual-level outcomes of welfare clients will provide the 
clearest picture of how administrative actions are affecting actual clients participating in 
the program.  Individual-level data also generates distinguishing analytical leverage over 
aggregate measures in several regards.   
Studies of social policy privatization that examine aggregate performance measures 
can fall prey to inferential bias known as the “ecological fallacy” because these 
researchers are making inferences about the outcomes of program clients from aggregate 
outputs, measured at the state, county, or agency level for instance.  Relationships 
between client characteristics and program outcomes observed in the aggregate may 
simply not extend to the individual-level, and we remain uncertain until individuals are 
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specifically examined.  The outcomes of chief concern to administrative scholars of 
human support implementation operate at the client-level, and policy outputs occur 
firsthand among individuals, not states, counties, or regional workforce boards.  Thus, 
when studying the impact of organizational form on bureaucratic performance in human 
service delivery, the outputs of interest are most appropriately measured at the individual-
level (Ingraham and Lynn 2004). Aggregate measures average-out the individual 
variation in client outcomes occurring at the street-level and in the process may encumber 
the scientific aspiration of accurate causal inference. 
  Another advantage of employing client-level data rests on the predictive side of 
the empirical analysis.  When aggregate outcome and explanatory measures are analyzed, 
the individual-level factors of clients that presumably influence eventual administrative 
outputs are largely ignored.  Data on program clients has the advantage of including an 
elaborate set of individual-level predictors, creating an improved ability to control for the 
distinctive traits of participating clients that can determine program outcomes. This 
ability will afford key insight into the client-level reasons that individuals vary in their 
TANF outcomes, while more completely isolating the independent effect of higher-level 
contextual measures on bureaucratic performance. 
A final example of the analytical leverage inherent with client-level data is found 
in the unique hypotheses related to the potential effects of privatization that can be tested 
among exclusive subsets of TANF clientele.  In short, the individual-level data can be 
disaggregated according to diverse client characteristics, allowing for the examination of 
interactive effects with privatization.  For example, opponents of privatization often 
argue that private firms will cream the clients with the fewest barriers to success, leaving 
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hard-to-serve clients with inferior access, attention, and ultimately program outcomes 
(Gilman 2001; Nightingale and Pindus 1997).  Through subsetting the clients along hard-
to-serve lines, such as racial identity and educational attainment, we can better 
understand how these particular client types are fairing in various administrative 
environs.  We can only begin to dissect these unique relationships by moving beyond 
aggregate measures in welfare studies.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Welfare reform legislation coupled with public desire to streamline government 
invited private sector organizations into the delivery of public assistance programs.  
Although profit-seekers and non-profits are routinely operating TANF offices in an age 
of new federalism, the academic community lacks an understanding of how 
administrative ownership affects program outcomes.  Public choice and microeconomic 
theories assert that private organizations can deliver improved quality and cost efficiency 
in human support services.  Competing perspectives among administrative scholars 
emphasize that social welfare policy is rife with market failure and complex 
administrative tasks and that ultimately competitive markets can have deleterious effects 
on client well-being.   
The extant empirical literature that endeavors to answer questions about the 
efficacy of privatization abounds with methodological limitations and anecdotal 
speculation.  Case studies provide in-depth description of particular administrative 
arrangements but limit the generalizability of findings.  Aggregate measures and cross-
sectional approaches improve generalizability but ignore variation taking place among 
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individual levels of analysis.  Existing research in TANF implementation fails to 
incorporate individual-level data into empirical analyses leaving any quantitative 
regularities on unsteady ground.  In the following chapters, this dissertation initially 
explores why jurisdictions choose to contract welfare services with private providers, and 
then seeks to broaden our limited knowledge concerning the effects of privatized 
ownership on program effectiveness in welfare implementation.  Chapter Three examines 
patterns in welfare privatization across the American states.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Exploring the Determinants of TANF Contracting 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Before this dissertation examines how welfare privatization potentially affects 
program outcomes, I seek to understand why states are taking various administrative 
approaches to TANF implementation.  An abundant literature investigates the predictors 
of state and local contracting decisions and with good reason.  Prior to any bureaucratic 
arrangement influencing administrative functioning and program outputs, the decision to 
“make or buy” service provision must be undertaken by government actors (Brudney 
2005; Boyne 1998; Greene 1996).  Because of the recent dramatic changes in welfare 
policy rules and administrative structuring taking place across the American landscape, it 
is imperative that the discipline begin to unlock the puzzles as to why sub-national units 
are implementing specific bureaucratic arrangements under TANF.   
PRWORA allowed states to afford private entities, for the first time, the potential 
authority to determine program eligibility and in effect manage the operation of whole 
welfare offices.  However, states and localities ultimately choose to direct TANF 
resources and administrative authority to private providers.  The budding embrace of 
privatization in welfare implementation is evident, yet the factors that explain the 
presence or absence of privatization across states and localities remain unknown.   
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Through shifting to a system of potentially privatized service delivery, federal reform 
legislation grants researchers an exclusive opportunity to explore the patterns in 
privatized welfare contracting occurring across sub-national jurisdictions that are of 
interest to citizens and policymakers alike.  In the wake of PRWORA, states received 
TANF block grants formulated upon historical spending levels and were afforded 
extensive leeway in constructing and funding unique arrangements of workfare providers.  
States not only have more opportunities to contract with private welfare operators, but 
statutory work participation requirements embedded in PRWORA yield additional 
motivation to experiment with the private sector (Sanger 2003; Winston 2002).   
While scholars have conducted studies of contracting across multiple policy areas, 
such as refuse collection, prisons, and health care facilities (Bel and Fageda 2007; 
Brudney 2005; Price and Riccucci 2005; Boyne 1998; Ferris, J. M. 1986), interstate 
variation in welfare contracting remains unstudied at this juncture.  This section of the 
dissertation represents a groundbreaking attempt to systematically explore why states 
vary in their administrative responses to an ever devolving and diversified welfare policy 
regime.   
 
 
MEASURING TANF PRIVATIZATION 
 
 
  The outcome variable of interest to this chapter ideally captures a state’s 
proclivity toward privatizing TANF administration.  Throughout this dissertation, TANF 
privatization is conceptually defined as the extent to which private sector actors are 
involved with the implementation of state TANF programs.  Private organizations can 
potentially be involved with one or several aspects of TANF administration including 
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eligibility determination, case management, data management, community outreach or 
any combination of various workfare functions (Winston 2000).  Operationally, minimal 
systematic data exists on TANF privatization across space or time, however, a 2003 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report published the total-value of privatized TANF 
contracts as a percentage of total TANF spending for the year 200116.  Although 
regrettably only available for one year, 2001, the TANF privatization measure from the 
GAO offers untapped insight into state-level welfare contracting patterns and will serve 
as the foundation for cross-sectional ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimations.   
Univariate statistics found in Table 3.1 illustrate that Washington D.C. and 
Mississippi contracted the greatest proportion of TANF funds to private entities (74 and 
71 percent respectively), while only one state, South Dakota, retained pure governmental 
control.  Several states did privatize significant portions of their TANF budget, but the 
majority of states in 2001 ultimately privatized less than 15 percent of total TANF 
outlays.  Welfare implementation in 2001 was disproportionately undertaken by 
government actors as public agencies received the lion’s share of TANF funding.  With 
Washington D.C. excluded from the analysis the average state privatized 13.52 percent of 
its TANF dollars, with a standard deviation of 14.04 (N = 50).  With both Mississippi and 
Washington D.C. excluded the average TANF privatization level falls to 12.53 percent 
and the standard deviation declines to 11.21 (N=49)17. 
 
(Table 3.1 about here) 
 
                                                      
16 The “total TANF spending” denominator in this measure includes both federal block grant dollars and 
required state “maintenance of effort” (MOE) funds.  The numerator consists of privatized spending 
allocated to all non-governmental, both nonprofit and for-profit entities.  
17 The median and mode both equal 9 percent and these statistics arguably represent more accurate 
indicators of the central tendency of TANF privatization in 2001.   
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THE UNIQUE CASE OF MISSISSIPPI 
 
 
 Washington D.C. is an obvious outlier at 74 percent TANF privatized and is 
necessarily excluded from the regression estimations because it lacks statehood and 
therefore lacks values for the state-level independent variables.  The analysis presented 
below must also account for the state of Mississippi.  With 71 percent of TANF funds 
appropriated to private entities, Mississippi is approximately 30 percent more privatized 
than the four next most privatized states (Wisconsin-43%, Idaho-43%, New Jersey-42%, 
and Pennsylvania-39%), and Mississippi is approximately 57 percent more privatized 
than the average state in 2001 (71 – 13.5)18. 
Mississippi is the only state in 2001 that has a majority of TANF funds 
appropriated to private entities, and therefore works to skew the privatization distribution 
rightward.  Figure 3.1 presents the frequency distribution of TANF privatization with all 
50 states included.  The modal category of TANF privatization falls between 5 and 10 
percent (16 states), with the second highest category falling between 0 and 5 percent (13 
states).  Mississippi lies at the far end of the distribution at 71 percent privatized.  
According to Breaux et al. (2002), two forces dually contributed to Mississippi’s 
disproportionate reliance on private welfare delivery, one political and one practical.  
Firstly, Republican Governor Daniel Fordice was an ardent philosophical conservative 
and long-time ideological champion of privatization in government services and strongly 
urged the heavily Republican legislature to adopt privatized workfare approaches in the 
wake of PRWORA.  Secondly, the Mississippi legislature is only briefly in session for a 
maximum of 90 days a year and thus the assembly was racing against the clock to 
                                                      
18 Mississippi has more than 5 times (5.26 times) the amount of welfare privatization than the average state 
in 2001. 
48 
 
implement the TANF block grant.  With a mix of non-profit and for-profit providers 
already established from implementation of the Workforce Investment Act, privatizing 
TANF became an appealing administrative option.  “Faced with a tight timeline and an 
executive interest in privatization, DHS officials concluded that privatization of several 
TANF components offered the solution” (Breaux, et. al. p.4). 
 
(Figure 3.1 about here) 
 
In response to the Mississippi outlier that can potentially affect statistical 
relationships and possibly bias coefficient estimates in a single-year 50 state analysis, I 
present three separate OLS regression models.  Initially, I perform an estimation for all 
50 states using the raw percentage of privatized TANF funds found in Table 3.1 as the 
dependent variable.  Secondly, utilizing the same raw privatized TANF spending 
measure, I simply drop the Mississippi outlier from the analysis leaving a total N of 49 
states.  Thirdly, I perform a logarithmic transformation (base 10) of the original TANF 
privatization dependent variable attempting to reign in extreme values while still 
including all 50 states in the analysis.  Figure 3.2 displays the log (base 10) TANF 
privatization distribution for all 50 states.  The log transformation unquestionably 
produces a more “normal” distribution, and can therefore aid in satisfying OLS 
assumptions of normally distributed errors and constant error variance over the entire 
range of values. 
 
(Figure 3.2 about here) 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
What factors might potentially explain variation in TANF contracting patterns 
across states?  Why are states more or less likely to direct TANF funds to private firms?  
The antecedents of TANF contracting across states are borrowed largely from 
privatization research by Boyne (1998), Brudney (2005), and Price and Riccucci (2005) 
and include three primary sets of explanatory variables.  These scholars argue that a 
multivariate blend of economic, social, and political variables can potentially predict the 
presence or absence of privatized contracting in public policy implementation across 
states.   Also included are two supplementary hypotheses that are germane to welfare 
politics specifically and may further explain why states are inclined to  privatize TANF 
dollars.  All premises are discussed further below. 
 
 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EXPLANATIONS OF CONTRACTING 
 
Service Supply and Urbanism 
 
 According to public choice theory, it is not organizational form necessarily, but 
rather perpetual marketplace competition in service supply and the prospect of failure that 
ultimately yields performance gains (Brudney 2005; Savas 1998; Boyne 1998).  In turn, 
when state agencies are deciding how much of their TANF dollars to contract-out, they 
should consider the competitive environment and only privatize substantial amounts of 
resources when sufficient competition among rival providers exists (Brudney 2005; Sclar 
2000; Savas 1998).  Potential replacement by rival firms coupled with economic desire 
for financial self-enrichment should maximize organizational operations and 
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administrative outputs.  When private entities openly compete with each other in a 
transparent government contracting process, program costs are theoretically more likely 
to be reduced and quality more likely to improve, and thus privatization in competitive 
environments should be a more appealing option in “make or buy” decisions.  Utilizing 
proxies from past research (see Brudney 2005), the log of total service business 
establishments, log of total non-profits, log of total state population, and levels of 
urbanism are hypothesized to be positively related to TANF contracting19.   
 The log of service business establishments and log of non-profits represent the 
“purest” measures of marketplace competition giving a numerical estimate of possible 
providers and the potential for healthy economic rivalry.  State population size and 
urbanism represent more indirect measures of service supply but are often utilized in 
contracting studies as potential proxies for competition.  Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs) have been found to privatize more often than rural areas due to the geographic 
density of for-profit and non-profit providers.  Central-city and suburban areas likely 
have heightened levels of competition due to the proximity of established networks of 
service providers, and there is exists quantitative evidence that urban areas privatize 
services more than rural areas (Warner 2003).  Additionally, many profit-seekers pursue 
the largest contracts and largest potential pools of welfare clients in the name of corporate 
expansion (Greene 1996; Sanger 2003; Warner 2003).   Urban areas oftentimes have 
concentrated levels of social service demand, and cities required abrupt responses to 
PRWORA legislation to fulfill capacity of workfare provision.  Metropolitan areas also 
                                                      
19 Log of state population is admittedly not an ideal proxy for marketplace competition.  This variable more 
than likely is capturing several different indicators beyond the presence of multiple providers such as 
aggregate social service demand and propensity for policy innovation.  It is oftentimes included in studies 
of administrative contracting and for exploratory purposes is included in the analysis presented here. 
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have the largest welfare pools and in turn the most lucrative social service contracts, and 
thus private entities are motivated to seek out contracts in populous and urbanized 
environments (Sanger 2003; Warner 2003).   
H1: States with larger populations, more urbanized populations, greater numbers of 
service establishments, and greater number of non-profits will contract-out a greater 
proportion of TANF funds to private entities. 
 
 
Fiscal Conditions 
 
 Another set of antecedents informed by past research centers on the fiscal 
conditions of states that can provide motivation to privatize social services and free-up 
state resources (Greene 1996; Kodrzycki 1998; Brudney 2005).  Fiscal pressure on 
governments and the motivation to assuage such pressures comes from two-sides of the 
coin.  On the one hand, states require revenues to run government-sponsored operations, 
while on the other hand, they must deal with citizen demand for services. 
States must confront deleterious social conditions and assist citizenries by raising 
tax revenues and providing public services that potentially drain state fiscal resources.  
When states must craft and implement social policy in the face of heightened social needs 
or demand for public services, levels of fiscal stress rise.  In the TANF context 
specifically, the financing structure shifted to block grants awarding states a fixed-
amount of welfare funds, and further mandated that states allocate “maintenance of 
effort” (MOE) funds that reflected previous welfare effort.  In short, the generous 
unlimited proportional matching entitlements found under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) has been replaced by a financing system that potentially 
adds fiscal stress on state budgets, as states must now bear the financial brunt of any 
52 
 
welfare client that extends beyond the fixed federal grant20.  States with a greater capacity 
to raise tax revenues will feel less fiscal strain than those states with a reduced capacity 
and will not have the same pressure to pursue innovative cost-cutting measures such as 
privatization in TANF implementation.  When state governments have a reduced capacity 
to generate tax revenue, they are more apt to pursue bureaucratic efficiency and 
privatization is one probable solution to doing “more with less” (Brudney 2005 and 
Greene 1996).  This research employs an index measure of fiscal capacity developed by 
Yilmaz et al. (2007) that analyzes a state’s “revenue capacity” relative to its “expenditure 
need” for outlaying public expenditures.  States with higher fiscal capacity index scores 
generally have an expansive tax revenue base and lower levels of social need, whereas 
states with lower fiscal capacity scores generally have a smaller revenue base and greater 
levels of expenditure needs21. 
H2: Fiscal capacity will be negatively related to TANF contracting.  States with greater 
fiscal capacity will contract-out fewer TANF funds to private entities. 
 
 
Although the Yilmaz fiscal capacity index does encompass social needs to a 
certain degree, this dissertation also includes more direct measures of social service 
demand.  States with a greater level of program demand for cash assistance programs 
should be more likely to contract-out services, exploring innovative and efficient ways of 
                                                      
20 Admittedly, most states realized financial windfalls in the years following PRWORA due to declining 
welfare rolls, but nonetheless fixed TANF block grants could potentially stress state budgets if significant 
numbers of eligible clients entered TANF programs.  States with weaker fiscal capacity are likely to be in 
perpetual search for efficient delivery systems and other ways to assuage budgetary pressure, and thus I 
argue privatization is more likely in these stressed environments even though TANF likely did not 
negatively impact many state budgets in 2001. 
21 The Yilmaz et al. fiscal capacity index measure includes several indicators of tax revenue capacity or the 
ability to raise revenues (income tax capacity, tax effort, etc.) and relates those indicators to a state’s need 
for expenditures. The “expenditure need” denominator includes an index of “workload factors” including 
indicators like number of public school children, poverty rates, and unemployment rates.  Higher values on 
the fiscal capacity index indicate stronger revenue capacity and less need for expenditure.  See further 
explanation of the index measure at (http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311384_fiscal_disparities.pdf). 
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serving program clients.  States with lower levels of social service demand should feel 
less fiscal pressure and less desire to seek third-party administration.  In the welfare 
policy literature, two measures routinely capture service demand.  These include the state 
poverty rate and ratio of welfare recipients to total population, both of which should be 
positively associated with TANF privatization.   
H3: Program demand and poverty levels will be positively related to TANF contracting.  
States with higher poverty rates and higher ratios of TANF recipients will contract-out a 
greater proportion of TANF funds to private entities. 
 
 
 
POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS OF CONTRACTING 
 
 
Public Employee Strength 
 
A second set of variables that may explain variation in TANF contracting is 
endorsed by both Boyne (1998) and Brudney (2005), and relates to the strength of public 
employees.  The American Federal Association of State, County and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) vocally deplores privatization efforts, perceiving the movement 
to privatize public services as a threat to their occupational well-being and the quality of 
life for impoverished Americans (McEffee 2006).  Public unions argue that private 
entities in social welfare implementation will voraciously “profit off the poor” rather than 
deliver improved quality and bureaucratic efficiency, and will doubtless attempt to resist 
privatization efforts (Berkowitz 2001 and Brophy-Baermann 2006).  States with a 
stronger base of public employees should encounter heightened resistance to 
privatization, and thus the strength of public employees should be negatively associated 
with TANF contracting.   
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For the sake of parsimony in a 50-state analysis, this paper employs one 
consistent measure of public employee strength found in past research, the ratio of 
government employees to total state population.  Although this measure does not tap into 
the power of public sector unions directly, researchers argue that it is a valid indicator of 
the relative strength of public employees to oppose privatization efforts.  Furthermore, a 
consistent negative association between public-employee ratio measures and 
administrative contracting is found in the literature, while union-based measures have 
decidedly mixed effects (Boyne 1998 and Brudney 2005).  Thus, this research 
hypothesizes that a state government’s full-time equivalent (FTE) employment per 1,000 
population will be negatively related to TANF contracting. 
H4: Public employee strength will be negatively related to TANF contracting.  States 
with a higher percentage of full-time government employees will contract-out fewer 
TANF funds to private entities. 
 
 
Ideological Considerations 
 
A consistent theme in the research on “make or buy” decisions and contracting 
involve ideological factors that can enhance or impede privatization efforts (Brudney 
2005; Price and Riccucci 2005).  The trend toward privatization in public service 
provision in recent decades has been ignited by conservative elites, such as Ronald 
Reagan and Newt Gingrich, championing the involvement of the private sector in public 
affairs and policy implementation at the expense of government control.  As E.S. Savas 
puts it, “adherents of this world view understand that collective action does not 
necessarily mean government action… it means free markets, localism, voluntarism, and 
deregulation” (p. 14).   
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This suggests that privatization has an ideological dimension supported by 
conservative philosophical desire to reduce the size of government and increase the 
influence of the private sector.  Although several liberal Democratic legislators eagerly 
signed onto PROWRA in 1996, others on the left remained openly skeptical of the 
conservative reform measures, arguing that effective service provision for the 
impoverished can only be achieved through direct and sustained government 
involvement.  170 members of the House of Representatives and 24 Senators, 
overwhelmingly Democrat, voted against final passage of PRWORA (Library of 
Congress) and openly voiced concerns over the policy reforms.  For instance, New York 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan claimed that imposing time limits on welfare benefits 
and removing direct public responsibility for the poor represented “the most brutal act of 
social policy since Reconstruction”, and that these approaches would “invite an urban 
crisis unlike anything we have known since the 1960s” (Rector 2006).  Progressive 
citizens and lawmakers emphasize structural or contextual reasons for poverty, while 
conservatives largely perceive the poor as responsible for their own plight due to 
pathological behaviors or lack of ambition, and thus liberals are more likely to espouse 
governmental responses to public assistance that achieve equity and widespread social 
insurance.   
When states are deciding to contract-out TANF funds, the policy preferences of 
state government actors should shape the acceptance and prevalence of privatized 
administration.  Ideological conservatism embraces the free market ideals of competition 
and innovation that undergird administrative privatization, while liberal ideology tends to 
focus on equity and public accountability in provision that is more readily achieved with 
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direct government involvement.  This research hypothesizes that the ideological 
liberalism of state governments (see measures provided from Berry, et al. 1998) will be 
negatively related to the percentage of TANF funds directed at private service providers22 
23.   
I also include one additional political variable found in past research, the party of 
the state governor (Price and Riccucci 2005).  Governors act as state executives, 
overseeing state-level bureaucracies and certain gubernatorial actors, such as Tommy 
Thompson in Wisconsin, have taken a lead role in reforming welfare services and 
introducing unique bureaucratic arrangements to welfare provision (Mead 1997).  State 
officials in charge of contracting decisions may operate at the local or regional level, but 
are ultimately beholden to state-level agencies that disperse TANF grants to localities and 
take marching orders from governors.  Republican governors are hypothesized to 
embrace privatized welfare contracting because of an ideological proclivity to favor 
decentralization and private markets in the implementation of social policy.  Democratic 
governors are assumed to be more ideologically liberal and should likely pursue more 
equitable and charitable approaches that favor direct government involvement. 
 
                                                      
22 The ideological orientation of state governments is constructed from five indicators that combine 
 ideology scores of governors and state legislators of both parties, weighted by the proportional 
composition of the respective parties in the state legislature.  The ideology scores of state legislators are 
derived from interest group ratings (Americans for Democratic Action and the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization Committee on Political Education) of U.S. Congressmen 
(based upon some assumptions about ideological congruence between state and national policymakers).  
These ratings range from 0-100 with a score of 0 indicating pure conservative voting positions in Congress 
and 100 representing a strictly liberal voting record.  The ideology scores of governors are derived from the 
average ideology score of state legislators of the same party (based upon some assumptions about 
ideological congruence between state legislators and governors that share party identification).  Higher 
values on the index indicate more liberal orientations.  
23Since state and local policymakers are making contracting decisions, the “government ideology” measure 
is more theoretically pleasing to the analysis.  However, an additional measure for “citizen ideology” from 
Berry, et al. was also explored in the multivariate models but was insignificant to the estimations.   
57 
 
H5: The liberalism of state governments and Democratic governorships will be 
negatively related to TANF contracting.  More liberal state governments and Democratic 
governors will contract-out fewer TANF funds to private entities than relatively 
conservative states and Republican governors. 
 
 
 
ADDITIONAL EXPLAINATIONS OF TANF CONTRACTING DECISIONS 
 
 
Racial Politics 
 
An established body of political science research documents the unhealthy connection 
of African Americans to the welfare state.  At the individual-level, negative stereotypes 
of blacks as “lazy” and “undeserving” have been found to incite paltry welfare spending 
preferences among white Americans (Gilens 1999).   In other words, racial considerations 
are cognitively linked to redistributive welfare policy in the minds of white Americans, 
and when whites think negatively of blacks, support for the welfare state declines.  
Research in state policy adoptions has consistently demonstrated that a greater presence 
of African Americans leads to diminutive monetary benefits and increasingly punitive 
program rules (Key 1949; Hero 1999; Soss et al. 2001; and Fellows and Rowe 2004).  I 
argue that these racial considerations can extend to TANF administration in that states 
with more low-income minorities should be interested in shedding direct public 
responsibility for the especially marginalized, disadvantaged minority poor away from 
government and embrace private sector solutions.   
The “social construction” of African Americans as it regards to welfare policy is 
based on “cultural characterizations or popular images” of negative racial stereotypes that 
potentially have “a powerful influence on public officials and shapes… the actual design 
of policy” (Schneider and Ingraham 1993 p. 2).  Under this theoretical perspective, the 
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beneficiaries of redistributive welfare programs may not be worthy of government 
guarantees and direct governmental administrative control.  “Elected officials will find it 
easy to cut welfare policies when the poor were constructed as lazy or shiftless and were 
often believed to be minorities who were responsible for their own plight” (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993).  Similarly, elected officials could find it easier to privatize social services 
and shed public responsibility, resources, and accountability away from government 
when the beneficiaries of welfare programs are disproportionately African American.  
Just as state governments reduce benefit levels and institute stringent program rules in the 
presence of African American populations, state governments should be less interested in 
public accountability and equity and more interested in efficient handling when 
minorities are the disproportionate beneficiaries of cash assistance programs.   
H6: The percentage of a state’s TANF rolls comprised of African Americans will be 
positively related to TANF contracting. 
 
 
Lower-Class Mobilization 
 
Research in state welfare policy has consistently found that when lower-class 
citizens are mobilized and participate actively at the ballot box, they are rewarded with 
generous cash benefits and eased program requirements (Avery and Peffley 2005;  Hill, 
Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995).  Interest groups representing poor individuals, 
such as the Welfare Information Network, have published works documenting the 
potential pitfalls of “profiteering off of the poor”, most notably decreased client attention 
and service quality in the dogged pursuit of corporate income (Yates 1998).  When 
individuals with depressed socioeconomic status are mobilized, participating in 
legislative advocacy and in the voting booth, it is in the electoral interest of policymakers 
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to react with policy “responsiveness” to powerful interests, favoring a greater role for 
governmental implementation over privatized approaches (Avery and Peffley, 2005 and  
Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson, 1995). 
H7: Voter turnout among lower-class citizens will be negatively related to the proportion 
of TANF funds allocated to private service providers 
 
 
State-Level Privatization Model: 
 
У(Privatization)s = β0 + β1(Population)s + β2(Business)s + β3(Nonprofits)s +  
β4(Urbanism)s +  β5(PubEmployee)s  + β6(Ideology)s  +  β7(Governor)s +  β8 (Caseload)s 
+  β9(Poverty)s + β10(Capacity)s +  β11(Mobilization)s +  β12(Race)s   +  ɛ 
 
s = state     
 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
The estimations of TANF contracting across the American states for the year 
2001 are found in Table 3.2.  A brief overview of the results suggests that patterns in 
TANF contracting are determined by at least four variables:  levels of fiscal capacity, 
urbanism, African American welfare caseloads, and non-profit presence.  Due to 
Mississippi’s extremely high value on the TANF privatization variable, the discussion of 
the results will center on the Private2 model that excludes Mississippi and the LogPriv 
model that examines a logarithmic transformation of the original 50 state privatization 
analysis.   
An interesting initial observation of the results in Table 3.2 is the lack of 
significance among several familiar variables thought to be associated with government 
contracting decisions.  The strength of public employee measure is insignificant in every 
model along with the state ideology variable and state governorship variable.  Liberalism 
60 
 
among state governments and Democratic control of state governorships does not yield 
fewer TANF contracts just as governmental conservatism and Republican governorships 
do not increase privatization, most likely highlighting the pragmatic nature of welfare 
privatization as an all-purpose administrative strategy, embraced by both liberal and 
conservative governments alike.  The slope coefficients for the gubernatorial party 
variable are negative in every model indicating less contracting when Democratic 
governors are elected into power, but are ultimately insignificant to the estimations.   
Previous research has failed to uncover any consistent ideological link to 
administrative contracting decisions, and scholars such as Price and Riccucci (2005) have 
documented a counterintuitive positive association between liberalism and administrative 
contracting in areas such as prison privatization.  The evidence here largely confirms the 
notion that “current reform efforts have taken on pragmatic dimensions at the state and 
local level” (Sanger 2003, p. 17), and that the politics of TANF privatization seemingly 
extend beyond conventional left-right ideological divisions.  
Directing attention to the statistically significant independent variables in the 
Private2 model in Table 3.2, States are seemingly less likely to privatize TANF funds 
when they have greater fiscal capacity.  As hypothesized, the unstandardized slope 
coefficient is negative indicating that states with higher values on the Capacity index are 
less likely to contract-out TANF funds to private providers and more likely to keep 
welfare services in-house.  Another way to interpret the Capacity variable is that states 
with weaker fiscal capacity are more apt to privatize TANF services.  The slope 
coefficient of -.189 means that increasing the fiscal capacity index by one unit decreases 
TANF privatization by .189 percent.   
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(Table 3.2 about here) 
 
 
In order to put the beta coefficients into more substantive analytical context, I 
calculated standardized beta coefficients for the Private2 model24.  As evidenced by the 
beta coefficients for the Private2 model in Table 3.2, fiscal capacity has the largest 
substantive impact on TANF privatization levels relative to the other statistically 
significant independent variables, urbanism and African American caseloads 
(standardized coefficient = -.425)25.  A beta coefficient of -.425 in this scenario 
represents a .425 standard deviation decrease in TANF privatization for every standard 
deviation increase in fiscal capacity.  What does this signify for predicted TANF 
privatization levels exactly?  The average state in 2001 had 12.53 percent of TANF funds 
allocated to private organizations, with a standard deviation of 11.2126.  Thus, .425 
standard deviation units of the TANF privatization dependent variable is equal to 4.76 
percent (.425 * 11.21 = 4.76 percent).  This figure tells us that for every standard 
deviation movement on the fiscal capacity index, TANF privatization is predicted to 
change by 4.76 percent. 
The average state in 2001 had a fiscal capacity index score of 101.96 with a standard 
deviation of 20.57.  Thus, increasing the fiscal capacity index by one standard deviation 
to 122.53 decreases privatized spending levels to 7.77 percent (12.53 – 4.76).  A two 
standard deviation increase on the fiscal capacity index reduces predicted TANF 
                                                      
24 Standardized coefficients are based upon the standard normal distribution (mean = 0; standard deviation 
= 1), and represent the standard deviation unit change in the dependent variable for a one standard 
deviation movement in the independent variable holding all other independent variables constant.  For 
instance, a standardized beta of .562 means that for every standard deviation increase in the independent 
variable, the dependent variable increases by .562 standard deviation units.   
25 The fiscal capacity beta coefficient is larger in the Private1 model when Mississippi is included in the 
analysis.  Mississippi scores lowest on the fiscal capacity scale and was also the most privatized state.   
26 The mean and standard deviation figures exclude both Washington D.C. and Mississippi. 
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privatization levels to 3.01 percent (12.53 – (4.76)*2).  In the same vein, decreasing the 
fiscal capacity index by one standard deviation from the mean predicts an increase in 
TANF privatization levels to 17.29 percent (12.53 + 4.76), while decreasing the index by 
two standard deviations pushes TANF privatization upward to 22.05 percent (12.53 + 
(4.76)*2).  Put another way, moving a theoretical state from two standard deviations 
below mean fiscal capacity to two standard deviations above the mean decreases 
predicted TANF privatization levels by 19.04 percent in total (22.05 – 3.01).  Figure 3.3 
illustrates the predicted change in TANF privatization levels when decreasing/increasing 
by different standard deviations from the fiscal capacity mean holding all other variables 
constant27.   
 
(Figure 3.3 about here) 
 
 
An opposing point of view argues that privatization should accompany fiscal 
capacity because policymakers will respond to public employee demands for continued 
employment when public budgets are stressed (see Pallesen 2005).  Although there is 
some past empirical support for the notion of increased contracting with fiscal capacity, I 
argue that this research uncovers an inverse relationship between fiscal capacity and 
TANF contracting exists for several potential reasons.   
Cash assistance programs represent a relatively modest portion of state budgets and 
the influence of established public welfare bureaucracies has arguably been weakened by 
reorganization and social service retrenchment associated with conservative reforms such 
                                                      
27 Negative privatization values are predicted three standard deviations above the fiscal capacity mean, and 
are recoded as zeros because privatization levels cannot fall below zero in reality. 
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as the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) and PRWORA.  Moreover, the majority of 
Americans hold unfavorable views toward redistributive income maintenance programs 
(Gilens 1999), thus when policymakers confront fiscal constraint they may be more apt to 
remove direct government involvement in unpopular redistributive activities, in turn 
embracing private sector solutions to welfare administration.   
Secondly, TANF contracting is more prevalent in more urban and presumably more 
competitive states.  As seen in Table 3.2, the urbanism slope coefficient is positive and 
significant both when Mississippi is removed from the analysis (Private2 model) and 
when the original privatization dependent variable takes on a logarithmic transformation 
(LogPriv model)28.   Increasing a states urban population by one percent point in the 
Private2 model, increases the proportion of TANF funds devoted to private entities by 
approximately 0.29 percent (.291, p < .05).  The urbanism slope coefficient is 
numerically larger than the fiscal capacity coefficient in the Private2 model (.291 versus 
.189), but the standardized beta coefficient suggests that the influence on TANF 
privatization is marginally weaker than fiscal capacity. 
The beta coefficient for the urbanism variable is .392 meaning that a one standard 
deviation increase in the urbanism measure yields a .392 standard deviation unit increase 
in TANF privatization.  The standard deviation of the privatized TANF spending variable 
is 11.21, thus .392 standard deviation units of the TANF privatization dependent variable 
is equal to 4.39 percent (.392 * 11.21 = 4.39).  For every standard deviation increase in 
urbanism, TANF privatization is predicted to rise by 4.39 percent.  The average state in 
                                                      
28 The urbanism slope coefficient is positive but lacks statistical significance in the initial 50 state analysis 
that includes Mississippi.  Mississippi scores on the lower end of the urbanism measure but is by far the 
most privatized state in 2001.  A statistically significant urban connection exists both when Mississippi is 
removed from the analysis (Private2 model), and when the original 50 state privatization measure 
undertakes logarithmic transformation (LogPriv model).   
64 
 
2001 had 66.98 percent of the population residing within a census defined Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA), with a standard deviation of 12.73.  Thus, increasing state 
urbanism by one standard deviation to 79.71 percent urban increases privatized TANF 
spending levels to 16.92 percent (12.53 + 4.39).  Increasing urbanism by two standard 
deviations predicts a privatized TANF spending level of 21.31 percent (12.53 + 
(4.39)*2).  Thus, moving two standard deviations below mean urbanism to two standard 
deviations above increases TANF privatization by 17.56 percent (21.31 – 3.75).  Figure 
3.4 illustrates the predicted change in TANF privatization when increasing/decreasing by 
different standard deviations from the urbanism mean29. 
 
(Figure 3.4 about here) 
 
 
Admittedly, the urbanism variable is likely capturing much more than the geographic 
presence of multiple potential service providers.  Because the arguably more numerically 
valid measures of marketplace competition (i.e., the log of service business 
establishments and log of non-profits) were insignificant to the Private1 and Private2 
estimations, it is unclear that policymakers are responding to the potential presence of 
multiple providers specifically, or rather responding to other underlying factors present in 
more urbanized states.   
One likely explanation for a significant urbanism connection is that states with 
physically concentrated urban populations needed to respond to PRWORA with 
increased capacity to administer workfare services among concentrated demand.  Welfare 
                                                      
29 Negative TANF privatization values are predicted three standard deviations below the urbanism mean, 
and are recoded as zeros because privatization levels cannot fall below zero. 
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entitlement offices were transformed into employment centers overnight and one logical 
and practical way of briskly ramping up social service capacity involves contracting with 
the private sector (Savas 1998; Brudney 2005).  Apart from the necessity to undertake 
service capacity among concentrated urban populations, another possible explanation for 
an urbanism connection is that private vendors actively seek out prime metropolitan 
markets with the largest contracts and largest pools of welfare clients (Sanger 2003).  
Due to this desire to enter metropolitan markets there are likely more opportunities open 
to metropolitan officials when deciding to contract out.  Multiple rival potential providers 
will increasingly battle over lucrative metropolitan contracts, and urbanized states have a 
full menu of local non-profits and profit-seekers at their immediate geographic disposal 
(Warner 2003).   
Next, concurrent with established research in race and welfare politics, states with 
higher percentages of African Americans on the welfare rolls are also more likely to 
contract out TANF services to private organizations.  The African American caseload 
slope coefficient is positive and statistically significant in all three OLS estimations.  
Even though African Americans are oftentimes associated with urbanism and “ghetto” 
poverty (Wilson 1996), the racial variable remains significant when urbanism and a 
battery of additional control variables are included in the OLS estimations.  This suggests 
that there is an independent effect of race on welfare contracting decisions.  Just as 
African American populations can shape TANF policy adoptions (see Soss et al 2001), 
racial effects seemingly extend to TANF administrative structuring. 
The beta coefficient in the Private2 model suggests that while race matters to welfare 
contracting decisions, it has less influence than either fiscal capacity or urbanism.  The 
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beta coefficient for the African American caseload variable is .303 meaning that a one 
standard deviation increase in the racial caseload measure yields a .303 standard 
deviation unit increase in TANF privatization.  The standard deviation of the TANF 
privatization measure is 11.21, thus .303 standard deviation units of the TANF 
privatization dependent variable is equal to 3.40 percent (.303 * 11.21 = 3.40).  The 
average state in 2001 had 35.42 percent of their TANF caseload comprised of African 
American clients with a standard deviation of 27.71.  Thus, increasing the African 
American TANF caseload by one standard deviation to 63.13 percent black increases 
expected TANF privatization levels to 15.93 percent (12.53 + 3.40).  A two standard 
deviation increase to 90.84 percent African American elevates TANF privatization to 
19.33 percent.  As visually evidenced in Figure 3.5, moving from two standard deviations 
below the African American caseload mean to two standard deviations above increases 
TANF privatization by 13.6 percent (19.33 – 5.73).  Not only does racial caseload 
composition have a nontrivial statistical effect on TANF privatization levels, it 
additionally appears to have a nontrivial substantive impact.   
Considering the well-documented racial connections to the American welfare state, 
this evidence could suggest that state governments are attempting to shed direct public 
responsibility for this historically disadvantaged group that is inextricably linked to 
welfare policy by unflattering undertones of “dependency” and “laziness” in the minds of 
citizens and policymakers (Soss et. al. 2001; Gilens 1999; Schnider and Ingraham 1998).  
A summary of the predicted change in TANF privatization percentage across differing 
levels of fiscal capacity, urbanism, and racial caseloads are found in Table 3.3. 
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(Figure 3.5 about here) 
(Table 3.3 about here) 
  
Lastly, the slope coefficients for the log of total non-profits measure are positive 
in every estimation in Table 3.2 and the variable achieves statistical significance when 
the TANF privatization dependent variable takes on a logarithmic transformation 
(LogPriv model).  The significant slope coefficient of 1.15 means that a one unit increase 
in the non-profit log measure predicts a 1.15 unit increase in the TANF privatization log 
measure.  This suggests that privatizing welfare funds in part is a matter of numerical 
convenience that seemingly follows existing patterns in non-profit presence across states.  
When more non-profits operate within states, more non-profit organizations are 
performing administrative workfare duties30.   
 
For-profit and Non-profit Contracting Models 
The same study by the GAO (2002) additionally published the percentage of 
privatized funds devoted to both non-profit and for-profit organizations, also for the year 
2001. These measures represent the next stage of the contracting decision when 
                                                      
30 I performed an estimation with regional controls for the Northeast, Midwest, South, and West (West = 
reference category) and uncovered no significant statistical relationships.  Nor does the inclusion of 
regional controls change the substantive findings reported in Table 3.2.  The Northeast variable was 
positive (Beta = 7.65) and narrowly misses statistical significance (p < .124).  The Northeast region houses 
multiple high privatization states (New Jersey, Pennsylvania, etc.) but regional competition or policy 
diffusion are not confirmed in the analysis.  I also included a MS dummy variable in the model to directly 
account for Mississippi in the model.  This affects the analysis in several meaningful ways.  The MS beta 
coefficient is expectedly large, positive, and highly significant (Beta = 52.24, p < .001), and the R-squared 
jumps to .619.  With the MS dummy included in the estimation, both urbanism and black caseloads remain 
significant predictors of TANF privatization but the fiscal capacity variable no longer achieves statistical 
significance (p < .147).  The fiscal capacity variable still has the largest predicted standardized beta 
coefficient (-.31) but the null hypothesis that fiscal capacity is unrelated to TANF privatization cannot be 
rejected.  The significant fiscal capacity connection reported in Table 3.2 can seemingly be attributed to 
MS alone (it is not surprising to report that MS scores lowest on the fiscal capacity index).  Future research 
will need to confirm that fiscal stress yields increased TANF privatization.  See Table A6 in the Appendix 
for OLS regression results for this alternate specification. 
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jurisdictions choose the particular types of private organizations that will deliver services.  
The data shows that states overwhelmingly preferred to contract-out services with non-
profit providers.  On average, state and local officials devoted approximately three-
fourths (74.45 percent) of privatized funds toward non-profit organizations, leaving the 
average state with just 26.55 percent of privatized funds afforded to for-profit firms.   
National non-profits along with less well-known local non-profits have established 
“social missions that commit them to improving the well-being of disadvantaged 
populations, and many have been doing this work for a long time” (Sanger, 2003 p. 49).  
Non-profits and faith-based groups historically provide charitable services to 
disadvantaged families and this trend continues with contemporary TANF administration.   
Table 3.4 highlights the findings for the ForProfit and NonProfit models that 
predict the percentage of total TANF spending directed at for-profit or non-profit 
organizations.  The ForProfit estimations are void of significant explanatory variables.  
Not only were for-profits frequented less by TANF government contractors generally in 
2001, but the regression model attempting to explain variation in for-profit privatization 
cannot account for for-profit contracting levels across states.  These models suggest that 
the decision to contract with for-profits occurs at random.  While this is all but assuredly 
not the case, future research will have to continue searching for the determinants of 
profit-seeking TANF arrangements across states.   
 
 
(Table 3.4 about here) 
 
 
Not overly surprising considering the original distribution of the dependent 
variable, the NonProfit model in Table 3.4 largely resembles the original general TANF 
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contracting models.  Similar to Private2 model in Table 3.2, levels of urbanism and fiscal 
capacity predict levels of non-profit contracting for reasons likely consistent with the 
prior state-level analysis.  States with larger urban populations and states with lower 
fiscal capacity are more likely to utilize non-profit contracting than comparatively rural 
states and states with greater fiscal capacity.  The African American caseload variable is 
positive in the NonProfit model suggesting a positive association with non-profit 
contracting levels but falls outside of accepted levels of statistical significance.  African 
American TANF caseload levels are significantly associated with welfare contracting 
generally, but  do not explain levels of non-profit contracting specifically. 
One particular variable rises to the explanatory forefront in the NonProfit model, 
the log of total non-profits.  When greater numbers of non-profits are in operation, 
welfare funds are more likely to not only be privatized but those privatized dollars are 
more likely to be directed at non-profit organizations.  The beta coefficient of .914 means 
that for every standard deviation increase in the log of non-profits, TANF privatization is 
expected to increase by .914 standard deviation units.  The average state in 2001 had 
13.43 percent of total TANF outlays directed at non-profit organizations, with a standard 
deviation of 16.9031.  Thus, .914 standard deviation units of the TANF non-profit 
privatization variable is equal to 15.45 percent (.914 * 16.90).  Increasing one standard 
deviation on the log of non-profits measure from 3.81 to 4.20 increases non-profit TANF 
outlays to 28.88 percent of total TANF spending (13.43 + 15.45).  Increasing two 
standard deviations on the log of non-profits measure elevates non-profit TANF outlays 
to 44.33 percent of total TANF spending.  In 2001, the presence of non-profit 
                                                      
31 The average state in 2001 had 3.71 percent of TANF outlays directed at profit-seeking organizations, 
with a standard deviation of 5.63. 
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organizations within a state is the strongest predictor of non-profit contracting and 
movement along the log of non-profit measure has a significant substantive impact on the 
levels of non-profit contracting in particular.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Studies examining the prevalence of contracting are numerous; however, most of 
these studies center on hard services such as refuse collection, asphalt laying, and 
construction projects, and few incorporate quantitative analyses across a large number of 
cases.  With privatization increasing in the social policy arena it is imperative that policy 
researchers begin explicating the antecedents and patterns of contracting decisions 
occurring across the American states.  This dissertation represents the first and only 
existing scholarly endeavor directed at understanding the reasons why states choose to 
privatize TANF funds. 
 The quantitative analysis first and foremost highlights the difficulty in modeling 
privatized TANF spending generally.  Two points are known with complete certainty.  
One, states have disproportionally chosen public agencies over private entities in the 
implementation of TANF in that the majority of states privatized 15 percent or less of 
their total TANF outlays in 2001 (GAO 2002).  Secondly, states have disproportionately 
chosen to contract-out TANF funds with non-profit organizations as opposed to for-profit 
firms (GAO 2002).  Welfare privatization operates largely among national non-profit 
organizations such as Goodwill Industries or Catholic Charities and lesser-known 
community-based non-profit networks that traditionally focus on serving low-income 
populations (Sanger 2003). 
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The OLS regression estimations from this chapter offer evidence that TANF 
contracting patterns in 2001 are significantly driven by at least four independent 
variables:  fiscal capacity, urbanism, racial composition of caseloads, and non-profit 
presence.  Fiscal capacity is inversely related to TANF privatization and displays the 
strongest explanatory impact according to standardized beta coefficients.  More fiscally 
stressed states are more likely to privatize TANF dollars than fiscally healthy states.  The 
evidence also suggests that states with more urbanized populations, states with more 
African Americans on welfare, and states with more non-profit organization are inclined 
to utilize the private sector in welfare reform implementation. 
The results presented here once again corroborate the indelible racial connection 
to the American welfare state, in that states with sizable African American welfare 
populations are more likely to privatize welfare funds.  This could possibly mean that 
altruistic policymakers believe in the ability of the private sector to deliver quality 
services, and are attempting to assist historically disadvantaged blacks by providing the 
highest possible quality workfare service.  Another scenario is that policymakers in 
heavily black states are purposefully attempting to lessen direct public responsibility for 
this marginal population that disproportionately participates in public assistance 
programs.  Welfare is not a politically fashionable program and blacks are oftentimes 
associated with “undeserving” welfare receipt and “dependency” on cash assistance 
programs in the eyes of white Americans (Gilens 1999).  The risks of weakening public 
accountability and inequitable program treatment that potentially accompany privatized 
motivations appear worthwhile when African American constituencies demand social 
services. 
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Lastly, utilizing modified measures from the GAO report, I attempted to model 
the particular non-profit and for-profit contracting decisions of states with marginal levels 
of success. The predictors in the for-profit estimations were wholly insignificant, while 
the non-profit estimations largely mirrored the earlier privatization analysis.  In the non-
profit models, the original statistically significant racial effect observed in Table 3.2 
disappears, and the log of non-profits measure increases in explanatory power.  The beta 
coefficients in Table 3.4 suggest that non-profit presence has the strongest affect on non-
profit contracting levels in 2001.  The average state in 2001 had 11.64 percent of total 
TANF funds allocated to non-profits.  Moving from two standard deviations below the 
mean of the log of non-profits measure to two standard deviations above boosts non-
profit contracting by a robust 22.96 percent (34.60 – 11.64).   
Future research should center on observing and collecting more extensive TANF 
contracting data.  The GAO measures examined in this chapter were collected a decade 
ago and currently represent the only systematic TANF contracting data available across 
states.  TANF has been reauthorized several times by Congress and the implementation 
of cash assistance programs remains highly decentralized, meaning that states and 
localities are likely continuing to experiment with unique welfare delivery systems that 
involve private sector actors.  The delivery of cash assistance programs are arguably 
increasing in importance with the latest economic downturn experienced in late 2008 and 
early 2009 resulting in heightened unemployment and poverty levels.  It behooves social 
policy researchers to examine how TANF administration is evolving and currently 
operating in the face of magnified social needs.     
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Additionally policy researchers should begin examining variation in privatization 
within states where unique mixes of public and private networks oftentimes administer 
welfare programs.  “Second-order devolution” potentially extends policy authority and 
contracting decisions downward to counties and local governments, and these 
jurisdictions are often in charge of contracting welfare services, resulting in meaningful 
variation in service arrangements within states (Gainsborough 2003; Beller 2005; Fording 
and Kim 2010).  Examining patterns of TANF contracting across states is an appropriate 
first step in the empirical analysis, but these efforts should be complimented by studies 
that examine patterns in contracting that are taking place below the state-level.   
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Note:  Source, General Accounting Office (2003).  The cell values indicate the total value of   
TANF spending awarded to private entities as a percentage of total TANF outlays including  
mandatory maintenance of effort (MOE) funds. 
  
Table 3.1.  TANF Privatization Across the American States, 2001 
State Privatization (%) State Privatization (%) 
Alabama 5 Nebraska 20
Alaska 4 Nevada 11
Arizona 9 New Hampshire 9
Arkansas 11 New jersey 42
California 7 New Mexico 1
Colorado 11 New York 9
Connecticut 12 North Carolina 2
Delaware 15 North Dakota 7
Florida 4 Ohio 16
Georgia 10 Oklahoma 4
Hawaii 3 Oregon 1
Idaho 43 Pennsylvania 39
Illinois 18 Rhode island 8
Indiana 9 South Carolina 16
Iowa 2 South Dakota 0
Kansas 2 Tennessee 31
Kentucky 3 Texas 8
Louisiana 20 Utah 8
Maine 9 Vermont 29
Maryland 11 Virginia 6
Massachusetts 9 Washington 20
Michigan 6 Washington D.C. 74
Minnesota 21 West Virginia 13
Mississippi 71 Wisconsin 43
Missouri 7 Wyoming 3
Montana 8  
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Table 3.2.  Determinants of TANF Privatization Across the American States, 2001
IVs Private1       S.E.         Private2        S.E.           S.β.         LogPriv      S.E   
Competition 
Log-Pop 
Log-Bus 
Log-Nprof 
Urbanism 
 
 -34.73       (28.57)        -21.96        (16.86)      -.861          -1.37        (1.16) 
  1.38         (1.77)            .778          (.655)         .221           .455        (.383) 
  27.86       (19.21)          13.71       (10.28)        .484           1.15*      (.653) 
  .128         (.192)            .291*        (.181)         .392           .009*      (.005)
PubEmploy 
FTE PerCap 
 
 -.004         (.006)          - .029          (.021)       -.172          -.001        (.001) 
Politics 
GovtID 
Governor 
 
  .081         (.086)             .007         (.065)         .041           .003        (.003) 
 -4.13         (4.14)           -.117         (3.34)        -.027          -1.43        (5.59)
Capacity 
FiscalCap 
 
 -.297**     (.143)           -.189**     (.092)        -.425          -.007*      (.004)
Demand 
CasePop 
Poverty 
 
 -.305         (.228)           -.116         (.212)        -.219          -.011        (.008)   
 -1.14         (.836)           -.637         (.601)        -.568          -.015        (.028) 
Mobilization
UC-Turnout 
 
  .086         (.099)             .127         (.080)         .246           .001       (.004)
Minority 
AA-Caseload 
 
  .173*       (.102)             .146*       (.083)         .303           .006*      (.003)
N 
R2 
    50                                   49                                                50 
  .354                                .446                                             .492 
Note:  OLS coefficients in bold, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  The Private1 dependent 
variable is measured as the total percentage of TANF funds awarded to private providers and all 50 
states are represented.  The Private2 model drops Mississippi from the analysis.  The LogPriv 
dependent variable is measured as the log (base 10) of the original Private1 measure.  **p < .05; *p 
< .10.   
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Table 3.3.  Predicted Change in TANF Privatization Percentage 
Across Levels of Fiscal Capacity, Urbanism, and Race, 2001 
Std. Dev. FISCAL URBAN RACE 
3 0 25.71 22.73 
2 3.01 21.31 19.33 
1 7.77 16.92 15.93 
Mean  12.53 12.53 12.53 
-1 17.29 8.14 9.13 
-2 22.05 3.75 5.73 
-3 26.81 0 2.33 
                  Note:  The cell values represent the predicted percentage of privatized TANF  
                     funds for a given level of fiscal capacity, urbanism, or black caseloads. 
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Table 3.4.  Determinants of Non-Profit and For-Profit TANF Privatization Levels 
Across the American States, 2001
IVs NonProfit     S.β.            LogNP            ForProfit             LogFP 
Service Supply 
Log-Pop 
 
Log-Bus 
 
Log-Nprof 
 
Urbanism 
 
 -.277          -.121              1.98                  7.39                     2.14 
(.194)                               (1.02)                (9.82)                 (1.24) 
  0.31            .068              .697                  7.92                    1.01 
(.126)                               (.705)                (7.32)                 (.846) 
 .253*           .917              1.89*              -10.17                  -2.11 
 (.136)                              (.965)               (10.67)                (1.31) 
 .003*           .284              .018*                .031                    .023 
(.001)                               (.009)                (.088)                 (.014) 
PubEmploy 
FTE PerCap 
  
-.009           -.338             -.001                 -.004                    .002 
(.021)                               (.002)               (.014)                  (.002) 
Ideology 
GovtID 
 
Governor 
 
-.001            -.009             .003                   .065                    .008 
(.001)                               (.004)               ( .046)                  (.006) 
-.023             .144              .014                 -1.72                   -.220 
(.051)                               (.228)               (2.36)                  (.318) 
Capacity 
FiscalCap 
 
-.004*          -.441             -.019**            -.065                   -.002 
(.002)                                (.007)              (.064)                  (.009) 
Demand 
CasePop 
 
Poverty 
 
-.002             .166              .074                  6.43                    .435 
(.003)                               (.136)               (3.92)                   (.541) 
.015              .425              .041                 -.189                    .013 
(.009)                               (.466)               (.406)                   (.057) 
Mobilization 
UC-Turnout 
 
.002              .242              .006                  .065                    .002 
(.001)                                (.005)              (.064)                  (.009) 
Minority 
AA-Caseload 
 
.001              .118              .003                  .012                    .005 
(.001)                                (.004)              (.044)                  (.006) 
N 
R2 
  50                                      50                    50                        50 
.318                                   .387                 .276                     .321 
Note:  OLS coefficients in bold, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  The NonProfit dependent variable 
is measured as the percentage of total state TANF spending awarded to non-profit providers.  The LogNP 
dependent variable is measured as the log (base 10) of the original NonProfit variable.  The ForProfit 
dependent variable is measured as the percentage of total state TANF spending awarded to for-profit 
providers.  The LogFP dependent variable is measured as the log (base 10) of the original ForProfit variable.  
**p<.05; *p<.10.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Privatization and Performance:  Methodologies and Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
     Past research discussed in Chapter Two has begun exploring the link between 
privatization and administrative performance, but much of this research examines hard 
services such as garbage collection and undertakes limited case-study methodologies.  
Research into human support privatization is relatively sparse, which presents a 
disservice because privatization into social services has more vocal critics and arguably 
less theoretical possibility for administrative success.  In response, this section of the 
dissertation brings expansion to quantitative studies of social policy privatization and 
performance.  In this chapter, I detail the methodological approaches, including data and 
measures, which will be used to study privatization and performance in welfare 
implementation.  After discussing the dimensions of bureaucratic performance as it 
relates to welfare reform, this chapter outlines both an aggregate statistical approach 
across the American states and a multi-level approach within a single state.  The multi-
level analysis centers on the state of Florida in which a mixture of TANF providers 
operate welfare services, and will provide a clear picture of how program clients are 
faring in the welfare marketplace. 
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CONCEPTUALIZING AND OPERATIONALIZING PERFORMANCE 
 
Adequately conceptualizing and measuring bureaucratic performance, especially in 
human service delivery, is anything but black and white.  Reforming prisoners, educating 
schoolchildren, and employing welfare recipients is not analogous to routinized tasks like 
collecting garbage or paving roads, but burgeoning scholarship in public administration is 
enlightening the discipline.  Research operating under the title of “new governance” or 
“new public management” suggests that we can (and should) attempt to analyze unique 
administrative arrangements and the quality of the results that they produce, in an effort 
to improve government functioning and public well-being (Heinrich and Lynn 2000; 
Ingraham and Lynn 2004).  Just as we can judge the performance of economies in terms 
of the outputs produced, such as GDP, inflation, and stock market returns, we can 
scrutinize public policy implementation in terms of the program outputs and outcomes 
produced by front-line workers and experienced by the clients they service.  A better 
understanding of why agencies and individuals achieve various outcomes can eventually 
lead to knowledge of best practices that will maximize bureaucratic effectiveness for 
clients and taxpayers in policy implementation at the street-level.   
In short, the “new governance” framework borrows from theories of political 
economy and conceptualizes performance as the quality or superiority of outputs 
achieved by administrative organizations and the clients serviced through policy 
implementation (Ingraham and Lynn 2004).  Thus, the dependent variables of interest in 
implementation studies can be defined and measured at either the organizational-level 
(aggregate outputs of agencies, counties, or states) or at the individual-level (client based 
outputs).  The specific outputs or performance measures under scrutiny will vary with the 
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objectives or goals of specific policies being implemented.  For instance, analysis of 
Head Start educational programs will examine outputs related to educational 
achievement, operationalized perhaps as standardized test or other aptitude test scores 
(See Currie and Thomas 1995),  whereas, studies of substance abuse programs will 
inspect performance outputs related to sobriety and employment (See Heinrich and 
Fournier 2004). 
In the case of welfare implementation, the performance objectives of AFDC 
administrators had traditionally been to provide timely cash payments and undertake 
routine case management procedures.  Under TANF, the objectives clearly shifted from 
eligibility determination and income maintenance to a work-first approach (Soss et. al. 
2001;  Sanger 2003; Fellows and Rowe 2004).  Apart from explicitly promoting sub-
national policy autonomy, the stated goals (and subsequent performance objectives) of 
PROWRA legislation are to promote work and ultimate self-sufficiency through 
encouraging employment and responsible life choices, reducing dependence on public 
assistance.  Other policy goals including increasing rates of marriage and reducing out-
of-wedlock births are significant but doubtless secondary goals to employment and 
reducing chronic welfare dependency in America (Winston 2002).   
PROWRA mandated that clients receiving assistance beyond 24 months must be 
engaged in work activities that are tightly defined by federal legislation (i.e. vocational 
training, community service, or actual employment).  In order to curb long-term 
dependency, federal legislation also mandated that clients receive public assistance 
payments for no more than 60 months.  States did have wide latitude in relaxing the 
stringent national guidelines, exempting clients from work requirements or extending 
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time limits, but the fact remains that maximum federal block grant subsidies are based 
upon moving individuals off the roles and into employment (Sanger 2003).  For instance, 
PROWRA mandated that states have 25 percent of the TANF caseload participating in 
full-time work activities in 1997.  Federal work participation mandates increased to 40 
percent in 2000, then increased further to 50 percent in 2002 with TANF reauthorization.  
TANF policy guidelines related to work and self-sufficiency inform the actions of front-
line administrators and thus inform which dependent variables capturing administrative 
performance that will be explored in this section of the dissertation.   
Market theories assert that two sides of the performance concept exist, one based 
upon cost reduction and another based upon service quality improvement or the 
superiority of administrative service outputs (Brudney 2005; Boyne 1998).  Privatization 
should theoretically incite the highest quality service at the lowest cost, and current 
research demonstrates that public officials seek both quality improvement and cost 
efficiency when deciding to contract-out services (Brudney 2005).  State policymakers 
and citizen taxpayers desire better services at cheaper cost and administrative strategies, 
such as privatization, should reflect those interests.  It can be argued that analyzing 
service quality is relatively uncomplicated in that we can dissect the performance 
objectives of TANF and observe how the quality of these desired outputs, such as work 
participation and occupational earnings, vary across jurisdictions and clients32.  
The dependent variables capturing service quality indicators of administrative 
performance will be measured aggregately across states to examine general patterns 
                                                      
32 The primary difficulty in assessing service quality is in deciding which quality indicators to choose.  For 
instance, do we assess quality in terms of client employment status, earnings, marital decisions, sanctions 
or some combination of the innumerable output measures available?  In this dissertation I focus on work 
participation and employment-based outputs because of the interest in the ability of reform measures to 
move welfare recipients into the workforce.   
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across the whole of America, and also measured at the individual-level across TANF 
clients in multi-level models to ensure improved internal validity.  In the quantitative 
analysis, I choose to focus on employment-based TANF outputs that are of keen interest 
to both policymakers and taxpayers alike.  Four aggregate output and outcome measures 
are employed in a state-level analysis and include TANF work-participation rates,  
employment rates, average monthly earnings from employment, and sanction rates for 
non-compliance with program rules.  Client-level outputs will be employed in intrastate 
multi-level statistical models discussed in detail below and will include items such as 
individual TANF work participation, employment, monthly earnings from employment, 
closure due to employment, and sanction for non-compliance with program rules.   
Costing measures that capture the financial burden of providing services are 
unquestionably more convoluted and limited  Because of the redistributive and charitable 
nature of social welfare programs, it is on one front difficult to separate increasing 
administrative costs from increasing generosity associated with welfare provision.  In 
other words, showing that one state or agency has higher service costs than another may 
not be a sign of bloated inefficiency but an indication of supplementary resources 
purposefully being directed at human support administration.  
 On another front, costing measures are restricted to operate singularly at the 
aggregate level in that individual clients do not have direct costing-based outcomes.  We 
can ascertain if one client has superior employment, participation, or monthly earnings 
over another client, but have more difficulty ascertaining that one client “costs” more to 
service than another.  Furthermore, there is some evidence that the costing dimension of 
cash assistance programs is not as politically salient as benefit levels and access 
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boundaries, and that welfare costs may not follow the usual “race to the bottom” policy 
dynamics (Bailey and Rom 2004).  For all of these reasons, indicators of cost are tabled 
in the quantitative analysis in favor of more readily observable dimensions of program 
outputs related to work participation, employment, earnings, and sanction for non-
compliance with program rules33.  
 
 
INTERSTATE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 The first set of performance models is estimated at the state-level with aggregate 
measures of privatization and TANF outputs.  Although extending empirical analyses to 
the individual-level remains the ultimate goal of this research, exploring patterns in 
TANF privatization and performance across states will set the foundation for empirical 
extensions later in the dissertation.  Examining state-level variation in contracting levels 
and program outputs will offer nationwide patterns of administrative effectiveness across 
America, but causal inferences concerning individual clients are admittedly not optimized 
until TANF clients are introduced into the methodology as opposed to aggregate 
performance measures.   
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Data for TANF policy outputs and outcomes at the state-level come from the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Characteristics and Financial 
                                                      
33 The dependent variables appear to be capturing distinct TANF outcomes.  The work participation and 
employment status variable are moderately correlated (.31, p < .05), but any correlations among the 
sanction and earnings variables are statistically insignificant.  The sanction variable is negatively correlated 
with the work participation, employment status, and earnings variables (i.e. higher sanction rates are 
associated with less participation, employment, and lower earnings), but none of the negative correlations 
achieve statistical significance. 
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Circumstances of TANF Recipients for the fiscal year 2001.  The state-level data from 
DHHS is available across several years for all states, but the GAO privatization measures 
representing the primary independent variables of interest are only available for the year 
2001.  The TANF performance objectives examined at the state-level focus primarily on 
employment-related outputs, or how successful states have been in preparing and moving 
welfare clients into the labor force.  The TANF work participation rate is measured as the 
percentage of a state’s adult active TANF recipient population that is engaged in any of 
five (5) work-related categories34.  This particular program output has been used in past 
research to capture administrative “effectiveness” in TANF programs (Crew and 
Lamothe 2003), and has recently gained increased attention as TANF reauthorization 
mandates that 50% of single adult recipients be participating in at least 30 hours of work-
related activities.   
  Work preparation activities are meaningful, but entering paid employment is a 
particularly important first-step to achieving self-sufficiency, thus I include the 
percentage of active TANF cases that were engaged in paid employment in 2001. Along 
with employment, one must also have adequate earnings to eventually realize financial 
independence and security.  Thus, I include the state average monthly earnings from 
employment earned by adult TANF recipients as an indicator of how effective TANF 
administrators have been in moving clients into jobs that allow for comfortable living and 
social mobility.  The “carrots” of TANF public assistance program include incentives like 
professional employment assistance, transportation and child-care subsidies; however 
                                                      
34 The categories include “unsubsidized employment”, “work preparation”, “job search”, “job training”, 
and “other work activities”.  The “other” category is not specified but likely includes activities such as 
community service or another form of subsidized employment.  The average state in 2001 had a TANF 
participation rate of 48 percent with a standard deviation of 19.13. 
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TANF implementation also involves “sticks” or punitive policy tools meant to control the 
behavior and ensure compliance with stringent program regulations (Fellowes and Rowe 
2004).   
Thus, I include a measure of the TANF sanction rate for non-compliance with 
program rules to examine privatization and the punitive measures in welfare reform 
programs that punish clients for misbehavior (Meyers et al. 2006).  If administrative 
organizations are effective in treating TANF clients then fewer clients should be failing 
to comply with program rules.  When workfare programs operate effectively ideally more 
clients will be participating in work preparation activities, working full-time, and fewer 
clients will be sanctioned for non-compliance.  Although greater program compliance is 
an indicator of effective administration, the relationship between administrative 
ownership and sanctioning outputs can be complicated because of perverse economic 
incentives embedded in many performance-based contracts (Soss, Fording, and Schram 
2011).  Because TANF contracts are oftentimes based upon benchmarks related to 
employment outcomes and caseload decline (Winston 2002), for-profit organizations can 
perversely improve performance numbers through sanctioning clients more often, 
removing non-complying or difficult clients off the rolls completely so they will not 
count in the denominator of employment-based benchmarks (Soss, Fording, and Schram 
2011).  Because this dissertation lacks data on particular TANF contract details across 
jurisdictions the analysis cannot match contract incentives and sanctioning outputs, but 
nonetheless sanctioning can be a form of “creaming” and an administrative tool that 
improves employment-based performance numbers and improves the financial returns of 
profit-seekers. 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
TANF Contracting  
 
  State-level data on TANF contracting consists of the measures available from the 
GAO (2002) that represented the dependent variables in the contracting estimations 
discussed in chapter three.35  The TANF contracting measures (TVPrivate; NonProfit; 
and ForProfit) are now deployed as the primary independent variables of interest in 
models predicting TANF outputs across states.  For quick review, TVPrivate is measured 
as the percentage of total TANF spending contracted-out to private organizations, and 
represents the general privatization effort of states.  NonProfit and ForProfit capture the 
percentage of total TANF spending allocated to either non-profit or for-profit entities. 
The baseline expectation throughout the performance analysis is to observe a positive 
relationship at the state-level between levels of privatization and performance measures 
that include TANF work-participation, full-time employment, earnings from 
employment, and sanction rates.   
H1:   TANF privatization produces superior program outputs across states.  TANF 
contracting levels will be positively related to state work participation rates, full-time 
employment, average monthly earnings from employment, and exits due to employment, 
and will be negatively related to sanctions for non-compliance with program rules.  
 
 
Service Supply and Urbanism 
 
An explanatory variable of interest from the opening analysis on contracting 
decisions, marketplace competition, is also used to model administrative performance at 
                                                      
35 The GAO contracting data for the year 2001 includes  the “total value of TANF contracts as a percentage 
of total federal and state MOE expenditures” (TVPrivate), the “percentage of contracted funds with non-
profit providers” (NonProfit), and “the percentage of contracted funds with for-profit providers” 
(ForProfit). 
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the state-level.  Including controls for service supply is paramount to examine the 
independent effect of the privatization on TANF performance outcomes when controlling 
for marketplace competition.  That is to say we can observe the statistical impact of 
administrative ownership while variation in the competitive environment is held constant 
across space.  Proponents of privatization argue that administrative ownership matters to 
policy implementation not because of organizational form necessarily, but instead due to 
competitive forces and the prospect of failure, and that competition in the contracting 
process is the most important condition that predicts privatized success (Savas 1988, 
1998).  The proxies for marketplace competition from the contracting analysis in Chapter 
three are utilized in OLS regression models of privatization and performance.     
H2:  The log of service business establishments, log of non-profit organizations, log of 
state population,  and levels of urbanism will be positively related to participation rates, 
employment status, earnings from employment, and exits due to employment, and will be 
negatively related to sanctions for non-compliance 
 
 
While measures of privatized contracting and statistical controls for the competitive 
environment are of the upmost significance to performance analysis, they are not the only 
variables that theoretically matter to policy outputs.  Research in “new governance” 
argues that apart from administrative structuring, additional variables such as client 
characteristics, policy treatments, and the local task environment will also impact outputs 
(Ingraham and Lynn 2004).  In order to better isolate the independent effect of 
privatization and competition on state-level TANF performance, I will include further 
controls that are found in existing research on TANF caseload decline across states (see 
Ewalt and Jennings 2004).   
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Client Characteristics 
  
Characteristics of TANF clients are theorized to impact the probability of achieving 
program success.  I include state-level indicators of disadvantaged populations who 
should have a relatively challenging time participating in work-activities, finding 
employment with high wage levels, and exiting the program due to employment.   Two 
measures routinely operationalized in state-level studies of welfare policy adoptions and 
implementation outcomes, the percentage of a state’s TANF rolls comprised of African 
Americans and percentage of out-of-wedlock births among TANF cases, are included in 
the performance models.  
   The inauspicious connection of African Americans to the welfare state is well 
documented as discussed previously in Chapter Three, and current welfare reform 
research finds that this historically marginalized group resides in states with the lowest 
monetary benefit levels, the most stringent program rules, and are more likely to be 
sanctioned than non-black clients (Soss et. al. 2001; Kalil et al. 2002; Fellows and Rowe 
2004; Fording et al 2007).  African Americans have encountered historical occupational 
discrimination and lag behind other ethnicities in terms of education and skills training, 
and should hence struggle under employment based social services, achieving inferior 
TANF program outcomes vis-à-vis other demographic groups.  Single mothers do not 
face an equal history of discrimination but encounter persistent gender discrimination 
nonetheless, and handling the rigors of child-rearing should find it more difficult to gain 
meaningful employment and remain successfully in TANF program compliance.  
H3:  The percentage of African Americans and unmarried births among TANF cases will 
be negatively related to work participation, full-time employment, earnings from 
employment, and will be positively related to sanction for non-compliance 
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Policy Treatments 
 
    Next, the stringency of policy choices adopted by states, especially those related 
to work requirements and sanction policies, will guide the policy treatments undertaken 
by street-level administrators and should be related to the quality of employment related 
outputs.  In other words, states with more stringent work requirement policies (requiring 
immediate work preparation enrollment upon initial program registration for example) 
should have a greater proportion of TANF clients working and have more case closures 
due to employment than for other reasons.  States adopting stricter work requirements or 
sanction policies are sending a signal to front-line administrators that pursing 
employment outcomes and punishing misbehavior is prioritized over other objectives, 
and front-line workers should more vigorously pursue these approaches.  Existing 
evidence suggests that states with strict sanctioning policies are more likely to experience 
precipitous caseload decline (Rector and Youssef 1999; Mead 2000), and that relatively 
punitive states like Florida are likely to emphasize sanctioning penalties and more readily 
pursue sanctioning avenues (Fording et al. 2007).  On the other hand, because welfare 
grants are oftentimes reduced substantially upon initial program infractions, strict 
sanction policies increase the cost of non-compliance to welfare recipients and thus 
provide incentives for clients to remain eligible and participate more consistently in 
program activities.  Thus, instead of increasing sanction rates, strict sanctioning policies 
could potentially be associated with lower sanction rates and improved employment 
outcomes (Meyers et al. 2006).   
The work requirement variable is measured dichotomously, taking on a value of 0 
or 1, with 1 representing stricter states that require work before the 24-month federal 
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requirement, and 0 representing those states that retain the 24-month federal requirement.  
Because of the coding scheme I would expect a positive relationship between the work 
requirement variable and employment related outputs.  Alternatively, instilling stricter 
work requirements could make it more difficult for program clients to remain in 
compliance with program rules, and as a result could be sanctioned off the TANF rolls at 
a higher rate.  The sanction severity measure ranges from 0 to 100 and represents the 
percentage of TANF benefit reduction upon a first non-compliance offense.  States 
scoring 100 are deemed to be the strictest states in that 100 percent of the client’s welfare 
benefit is reduced upon first behavioral infraction, while states scoring zero or on the 
lower end of the sanction measure (i.e. benefit levels remain untouched upon first 
offence) are deemed more lenient. 
H4:  States with more restrictive work requirements and more stringent sanction policies 
will experience increases work participation, full-time employment, and higher sanction 
rates 
 
 
The Socioeconomic and Political Environment 
 
Lastly, the local socioeconomic and political environment should shape the 
opportunities available to TANF clients and the values of program administrators and 
influence eventual program outcomes.  In difficult administrative task environments, both 
clients and administrators should encounter more difficulty in achieving program success.  
Two state-level indicators of the socioeconomic environment, the unemployment rate 
(Ewalt and Jennings 2004) and poverty rate (Fording et al. 2006), should be negatively 
related to work participation, paid employment, earnings from employment, and 
positively related to sanction rates.  In softer labor markets employers will resist actively 
seeking potential job applicants to fill job openings and administrators will find it more 
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difficult to place clients into meaningful employment (Sanger 2003).  States with higher 
poverty rates could face similar challenges in that promoting work and self-sufficiency 
could be more difficult in poorer environments with fewer economic resources and 
opportunities for economic success.   
The political environment that administrators operate within should shape the values 
and priorities of local welfare offices and impact the outcomes of TANF clients taking 
part in the program (Fording et al. 2007).  More conservative state citizenries and 
governments likely have a greater preference for the neoliberal goals of moving welfare 
clients into low-wage employment, and punishing welfare clients that do not strictly 
adhere to program requirements.  Conservatism espouses individual-level reasons for 
poverty conditions, such as laziness or irresponsible life choices, and will thus administer 
individual-level remedies that improve work ethic and  impose swift punishment for 
breaking program rules.   Relatively liberal states should focus more on structural or 
contextual reasons for poverty, such as discrimination, suburbanization or globalization, 
in policy formulation and administer programs that prioritize equitable provision, benefit 
generosity, and skills training over immediate employment and sanction tendencies 
(Fording et al. 2007).  Thus,  liberalism among state citizens and governments should be 
negatively related to the state employment outputs and negatively related to sanction 
rates.   As an additional indicator of the political environment, I also include the party of 
the governor serving in 2001. 
H5:  The unemployment rate and poverty rate in a state will be negatively related to 
participation rates, earnings from employment, and exits due to employment, and will be 
positively related to sanction rates.   
 
H6:  Political liberalism and Democratic governorships in state governments should be 
negatively related to employment outcomes and negatively related to sanction rates. 
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State-Level Performance Model: 
 
У(Program Outputs)s  =  β0  +  β1(Privatization)s   +   β2(Business)s   +   β3(Nonprofits)s  
+ β4(Population)s + β5(Urbanism)s + β6(Race)s + β7(Unmarried)s + β8(Work 
Requirement)s    +   β9(Sanction Stringency)s   +   β10(Unemployment)s   +   β11(Poverty)s  
+  β12(Ideology)s   +   β13(Governor)s   +   β14(Mississippi)s +  ɛ 
 
s = state 
 
 
 
INTRASTATE ANALYSIS:  A HIERARCHICAL APPROACH  
TO STUDYING TANF PRIVATIZATION AND PEFORMANCE 
 
 
Studying aggregate performance measures can uncover meaningful patterns of 
policy implementation and bureaucratic performance across the American states.  Indeed, 
external validity is maximized through an exhaustive spatial approach that encompasses 
the fifty states, but in order to make more accurate causal inferences regarding the direct 
effects of privatization on client outcomes, data on individual program clients must be 
examined.  TANF outputs (employment, earnings, sanctions, etc.) at the street-level occur 
principally among individuals, not agencies, cities, or states and thus incorporating data 
on individual clients is methodologically appropriate.  In order to incorporate individual-
level data, this research employs an intrastate “hierarchical” methodology, known as 
multi-level modeling or hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), in which individual-level 
data are analyzed alongside higher-level contextual measures, such as TANF 
administrative arrangements.  In essence, HLM techniques allow the program outputs of 
individuals to be modeled simultaneously as a function of both individual client 
characteristics and measures at higher levels of analysis improving internal validity.   
HLM techniques have recently garnered popularity in social science research 
because of the distinctive ability to model outcomes with (linear and non-linear) 
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equations that estimate individual (level-1) and contextual (level-2) parameters 
simultaneously.  In education research, for example, scholars can  observe how pupil-
level achievement varies across pupil-level traits while also observing the independent 
and interactive effects of higher-level variables related to families, schools, or school 
districts36.  Administrative researchers of policy implementation and performance 
operating within the new governance framework recognize the hierarchical nature of 
relationships that are of interest to this research (Lynn, Hienrich, and Hill 2000;  
Ingraham and Lynn 2004).    
Under the new governance framework, administrative outputs (O) are conceived 
as a function of five sets of variables that include client characteristics (C), administrative 
structures (S), environmental factors (E), and other variables such as policy treatments, 
and managerial roles and actions.  This research is centered on examining variation in 
administrative structures (S), and understanding how privatized delivery arrangements 
interact with client characteristics (C) and the local environment (E) to impact TANF 
client outputs.  In the multi-level models constructed here, level-1 variables represent the 
outcomes and characteristics of TANF clients, while level-2 variables are measured 
across counties and capture the local administrative, economic, and political 
environments in which implementation takes place. 
In order to capture more direct measures of the independent variable of utmost 
concern, TANF provider type, one must observe variation in welfare contracting taking 
                                                      
36 HLM simultaneously estimates two models:  first, it estimates parameters among individual-level 
variables, while also estimating how individual-level outcomes vary across higher-level variables.  HLM is 
a methodological improvement because instead of aggregating individual-level data to higher levels (then 
performing an OLS regression), individual-level slopes and intercepts are allowed to vary randomly across 
higher levels of analysis.  Individuals  nested within higher-level contexts are likely to share specific 
unobserved characteristics with level-2 variables.  This violates the independence assumptions of non-
hierarchical OLS techniques and assumptions regarding the (random and normal) distribution of error 
terms, thus HLM should produce more efficient estimations. 
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place within states, where an exclusive blend of private and public agencies administer 
localized welfare services.  TANF service providers can operate at the county-level, and 
counties (not states) oftentimes have sole responsibility for TANF implementation and 
contracting decisions (Fording et al. 2007 and Winston 2002).   
Fourteen states have instituted significant “second-order devolution” (SOD), 
granting local officials broad discretion in the implementation of TANF policy (Kim and 
Fording 2010).  Eight states have undertaken complete SOD, granting counties or local 
governments sole authority over contracting decisions and program rules.  States such as 
California, New York, Ohio, North Carolina, and Wisconsin devolved policy authority to 
county governments (Kim and Fording 2010).  In nearly every case, the states afford 
block-grants to county governments, which then take on responsibility for administering 
and monitoring the TANF program.  Counties are free to establish unique administrative 
arrangements, and can oftentimes choose to impose a more lenient or restrictive set of 
program rules on welfare clients, ensuring that variation in street-level operations and 
program outcomes likely exist across states and localities  (Gainsborough 2003; Beller 
2005; Kim and Fording 2010).   
Another six states granted substantial policy authority to local advisory boards or 
“regional workforce  boards” (RWBs).  Much  like county governments under SOD, 
these entities have the authority to contract services with private sector providers, and 
oftentimes have the power to impose unique program rules and offer a unique menu of 
available services.  Local workforce boards operate in the wake of the WIA passed in 
1998 and are generally comprised of a mixture of local government officials and 
members of the local business and social service community (Kim 2010).  In some cases 
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the state government retained the power to determine eligibility and outline basic TANF 
program rules, but nonetheless local workforce boards enjoy wide latitude in constructing 
local bureaucratic arrangements, and local providers enjoy wide latitude in shaping day-
to-day operations at the street-level (Gainsborough 2003).  The existence of SOD means 
that any macro, interstate analysis must be extended through an intrastate approach that 
examines variation in privatized arrangements and individual client outcomes within 
states. Because welfare providers can vary at the county-level within states, undertaking 
an intrastate approach that examines sub-state differences is methodologically 
appropriate37.   
Florida represents one immediate state of interest for the intrastate HLM analyses.  
In the aftermath of PROWRA, Florida pursued extensive SOD, granting twenty-four 
Regional Workforce Boards (operating in 67 Florida counties) the autonomy to contract 
services to either private, public, or a mix of agency types, and allowed private entities to 
operate entire local welfare offices38.  The state of Florida retained the power to 
determine initial program eligibility, established uniform program workfare rules, and 
established uniform performance objectives across all counties.  
Florida’s general demographic diversity and pursuit of decentralized bureaucratic 
control results in meaningful variation in provider types and street-level operations, 
making this state a popular choice for welfare reform researchers39.  To date, all 
                                                      
37 One could feasibly pool administrative ownership data across multiple states and perform a multi-state 
analysis, but it would require the collection of localized provider type data to correctly match clients to 
welfare services.  Unfortunately,  county-level TANF contracting data are not readily available across 
space or time.   
38 The Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) did retain power to determine initial TANF 
eligibility.  Private entities in Florida are potentially in charge of all case management and monitoring 
activities but cannot determine who is initially eligible to participate in the program. 
39 The Florida TANF program is decentralized in many respects but remains centralized and uniform in 
several other respects that will allow for statewide controls in the analysis.  For instance, all providers must 
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systematic quantitative studies published on TANF privatization and performance 
examine Florida (Crew and Lamothe 2003; Fording et. al. 2007), and the ready 
availability of provider type data in Florida makes this state an ideal place to begin 
studying privatization and outputs across TANF clients40. 
 
Client-Level Data: Outcomes and Predictors 
 
 Data for individual TANF clients in Florida come from a generous database of 
cross-sectional administrative data compiled by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (DHHS) and includes six years of observations (2000-2005) for both 
open and closed TANF cases41.  Individual program outcomes for open TANF cases 
serving as the dependent variables in the multi-level models include participation in work 
activities, earnings from employment, and sanctions for non-compliance.  The work 
participation and sanction variables are all operationalized in a dichotomous fashion 
(meeting participation requirements (1) or not (0) and received sanction (1) or not (0)).  
Earnings from employment are measured continuously as the total income from work 
activities reported from the previous month in the TANF program. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
meet uniform performance goals established at the state-level, thus performance management is controlled 
for in the analysis.  In another dimension, localities are forbidden from changing basic TANF boundaries or 
treatments such as work participation requirements.  Local welfare offices can adapt innovative operational 
processes but cannot alter the basic framework of TANF rules.  TANF rules are constant across the state of 
Florida and thus are controlled for in the analysis.   
40 Data on the administrative ownership of  local TANF offices does not exist in any systematically 
organized way.  Fortunately, researchers studying Florida have collected sporadic ownership data at 
different points in time.  Privatization data in Florida is available for the years 2000 and 2001 from Crew 
and Lamothe (2003) and data for the year 2004 is available from Fording et al.  (2007).   
41 “Open” cases represent TANF clients that were currently participating in the Florida TANF program at 
the time of DHHS data collection.  “Closed” cases represent TANF clients who had previously participated 
in the TANF program, but were not currently receiving public assistance when the DHHS survey was 
administered.  Open and closed TANF cases were surveyed separately and represent two distinct datasets, 
but both clientele groupings answered a relatively similar battery of survey questions, allowing for 
continuity and comparisons to be made among these different types of TANF clients.  By examining open 
TANF cases, this research can better understand how current clients are fairing in the TANF program; 
whereas, examining closed cases will elucidate the reasons for case closure and earning potential after 
leaving the TANF program.  See the Appendix for descriptive statistics that highlight the consistency of the 
individual-level variables among the two datasets. 
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The dependent variables employed in the closed case multi-level models include 
reason for closure and earnings from employment.  Monthly earnings from employment 
are measured analogous to the open cases.  There are two closure variables.  The first 
represents closure due to employment or earnings and another relates to closure due to 
sanction for non-compliance.  Both are measured in a dichotomous fashion (1 if case 
closes for reasons of employment or earnings and 0 if otherwise; 1 if case closes due to 
non-compliance (sanction) and 0 if case closes for other reasons). 
Individual predictors of program outputs for both “open” and “closed” cases 
include race, gender, education, and marital status.  African Americans, Hispanics, and 
females have experienced a history of occupational discrimination and continue to face 
unique challenges to employment that might incite substandard program outputs (Fording 
et al. 2007; Kalil et al. 2002; Gooden 2000; Danziger et al. 2000).  Next, levels of 
education should predict program success in that clients with higher levels of education 
are theorized to have an easier time procuring employment and finding jobs that offer 
elevated wages (Kaushal and Kaestner 2001; Bos et al. 2002).  Lastly, clients that are 
married presumably have greater domestic stability and fewer burdens in their search for 
employment and likely have more successful program outcomes than single clients 
(Chase-Landsdale et al. 2003). 
Client race, gender, education, and marital status are operationalized as a set of 
dummy variables (African American (1) or not (0); Hispanic (1) or not (0); female (1) or 
male (0); Less than 12 years of education (1) or 12 or more (0); and single (1) or married 
(0)). 
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H7:  Client characteristics affect the TANF program outputs experienced by clients.  
African American, Hispanic, single, and female identity will be negatively related to work 
participation, earnings from employment, and closure due to employment, and positively 
related to sanction for non-compliance.  Education will be positively related to 
employment outputs and negatively related to case sanctioning. 
 
 
Operationalizing Administrative Ownership and Other Contextual Measures 
 
The provider type data used in this preliminary analysis are measured across 
counties in Florida and are measured from available and collected data for the years 2000 
- 2005 as an annual series of mutually exclusive dummy variables.  Crew and Lamothe’s 
ownership data are available for the years 1997-2001, thus the provider type and client-
level data align only for the years 2000 and 2001.  Data from Fording et al. (2007) are 
available for the year 2004.  Data for the years 2002, 2003, and 2005 were collected and 
coded by the author.  The analysis follows the basic 3-part coding scheme developed by 
Crew and Lamothe in which RWBs choose to retain governmental administration 
(Public), or contract out to either for-profit (ForProfit) or non-profit (NonProfit) 
organizations.  Public serves as the reference category throughout the analysis, thus the 
basic expectation is to observe higher quality work-related outcomes (more work 
participation, higher earnings, and more closure due to employment) and fewer punitive 
sanctions among clients served within for-profits and non-profits vis-à-vis public 
agencies42.   
                                                      
42 Provider type data is included for all years and Florida regions except for First Coast and Alachua in 
2002, 2003, and 2005.  Mirroring the mutually exclusive coding scheme of Crew and Lamothe each region 
and subsequent counties are coded either for-profit, non-profit, or public depending on which provider type 
was most prevalent in each respective fiscal year.  The vast majority of locales chose to contract 
exclusively with either for-profits, non-profits, or public agencies, but a minority did utilize a hybrid 
approach. For instance, a blend of providers operates in Miami-Dade but non-profits are most common 
from year to year and thus it is coded as non-profit throughout the entirety of the dataset.  I utilized a 
multifaceted approach to collecting TANF ownership data for the years 2002, 2003, and 2005 including 
internet archive searches, phone calls, and emails to local RWBs in the state of Florida.  When internet 
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Welfare contracting is pervasive and varied within the state of Florida over the 
2000-2005 time period examined in this study.  TANF privatization is not exclusive to 
any one geographic region in Florida, and privatization (especially with for-profits) has 
been increasing over the six years of observation in this dissertation.  In 2000 and 2001, 
government agencies operated TANF offices in nearly one in three Florida counties, but 
accounted for less than fifteen percent of welfare offices in 2004 and 2005.  Public 
welfare agencies oftentimes work in tandem with the Department of Children and 
Families and are primarily housed within local community colleges (Gulf Coast 
Community College in Bay County, St. Petersburg College in Pinellas County, and 
Pensacola Community College in Escambia County for example), or other institutions of 
higher learning (Florida Atlantic University in Palm Beach County).   
Next, a variety of non-profits operate TANF offices across the state of Florida.  
Approximately one-third of Florida counties contract with non-profit organizations, and 
that figure stays relatively steady across the 2000-2005 time period.  Catholic Charities 
and Goodwill Industries were awarded contracts over the six year period examined here 
in counties such as Miami-Dade, Broward, and Leon-Tallahassee.  Other locally-based 
non-profits operating TANF offices are the Florida Institute for Workforce Innovation 
(Highlands County), Workforce Connection, Inc. (Okaloosa and Walton Counties), and 
Experience Works (Duval, Baker, Putnam, and Nassau Counties).   
Several for-profit firms operate TANF offices in Florida, and for-profit 
contracting is found to be increasing during the 2000-2005 time period.  This is largely 
due to Affiliated Computer Services (ACS), the most prevalent for-profit workfare entity 
                                                                                                                                                                 
searches were unfruitful, I contacted the offices of the RWBs members primarily through email and 
directly inquired about administrative ownership for the years 2002, 2003, and 2005.   
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in the state of Florida.  By 2004, ACS operated welfare offices in approximately one-
third of Florida counties.  There is not much turnover in welfare providers from year to 
year in the state of Florida, but ACS has managed to successfully increase TANF market 
share across counties over the time period examined here.  Other profit-seeking firms 
operating in Florida include the Paxen Group (Pasco and Hernando Counties), Kaiser 
Group (Brevard County), and the Training Institute (Martin and St. Lucie Counties).  
Figure 4.1 illustrates TANF administrative ownership across RWBs in Florida over the 
2000- 2005 time period. 
 
 
(Figure 4.1 about here) 
 
 
 
In order to more completely isolate the independent and conditional effects of 
TANF administrative ownership, this analysis includes variables related to the local 
socioeconomic and political environment that should theoretically shape the 
administrative environment and the program outcomes of TANF clients.  Additional 
county-level socioeconomic control variables utilized in the HLM analysis include the 
unemployment rate (Ewalt and Jennings 2004), poverty rate (Fording et al. 2006; Kim 
2010), and the percentage of African American residents and the percentage of Latino 
American residents (Kalil et al. 2002). Secondly, the indicator of the local political 
environment is conceptualized as a traditional left-right ideological scale and is captured 
with data that were collected by the author and developed by Fording, Soss, and Schram 
(2007).  The county ideology measure is operationalized as the factor score from 
referenda results of eighteen ideologically relevant Constitutional Amendments from 
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1996-2004 in the state of Florida43.  The ideology scores range from zero to one, with 
higher values representing increased conservatism.   
H8:  Contextual variables influence TANF client outputs within the state of Florida.   
 
H8(a):  Privatized administrative ownership, for-profit and non-profit ownership, will be 
positively related to work participation, earnings from employment, and closure due to 
employment, and will be negatively related to the probability of sanction for non-
compliance with program rules.   
 
H8(b): The county unemployment, African American, and Latino populations will be 
negatively related to employment outcomes and positively related to sanctions.   
 
H8(c): Political conservatism will be positively related to both employment outcomes and 
the probability of sanction.   
 
 
Intrastate Hierarchical Logit Model: 
 
Level 1: Ln [Pic/1-P ic] (Program Outputs)  =  β0  +  β1(African American)iwr  +  
β2(Latino)iwr  +  β4(Gender)iwr   +  β5(Marital Status)iwr  +  β6(Education)iwr  
 
     Level 2: β0c = γ00  +  γ1(Public)wr  +  γ1(ForProfit)wr  +  γ2(NonProfit)wr  +  
γ3(Race)wr  +  γ4(Unemployment)wr  +  γ5(Poverty)wr  +  γ6(Ideology)wr  
 
iwr =  Individual client in workforce region  
wr =  workforce region 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  The empirical analysis initially explores state-level patterns in TANF 
privatization and performance, and additionally explores intrastate multi-level 
estimations that incorporate individual-level data.  Examining performance outcomes at 
the state-level provides substantial external validity and generalizability across America, 
                                                      
43 The Constitutional Amendments included several pertinent issues with clear ideological dimensions, 
such as preservation of the death penalty, transportation subsidies, universal public education , gun rights, 
animal cruelty, and the minimum wage.  The factor analysis combines the scores into a single index that 
ranges from zero to one, with higher numbers indicating increased political conservatism.   
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while multi-level estimations improve internal validity and statistical inference.  Now that 
the methodologies and measurements have been discussed, Chapter 5 of the dissertation 
examines the findings of the state-level and multi-level TANF performance models.  
Competing theoretical perspectives spar over the potential benefits and drawbacks of 
social service contracting and only objective empirical analysis can begin to unlock the 
true implications of the welfare marketplace as it concerns administrative performance 
and client well-being.  Case studies of TANF contracting and county-level quantitative 
evidence (Crew and Lamothe 2003) suggests that privatizing welfare services will fail to 
significantly improve the welfare bureaucracy.  Do these findings hold under different 
methodological conditions that involve patterns of performance across the American 
states and across TANF clients on the front-line service provision?  Chapter five begins 
to answer these empirical concerns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Adam Michael Butz 2012  
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Note:  Vertical-axis represents the percentage of RWBs with various TANF administrative arrangements     
for a given year.  Data for the years 2000 and 2001 come from Crew and Lamothe (2003).  Data for the 
year 2004 come from Fording et al. (2007).  Data for the years 2002, 2003, and 2005 were collected and 
coded by the author. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Privatization and Performance:  Analysis and Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  Chapter Five begins to unlock the empirical associations between TANF 
privatization and TANF program outputs and outcomes.  State-level patterns in 
privatization and performance are initially explored in route to multi-level models that 
include client-level data and contextual measures simultaneously.  The findings presented 
in this chapter suggest that TANF privatization is inconsistently and oftentimes 
insignificantly related to TANF program outputs concerning work participation, 
employment, sanctioning, and monthly earnings.  Throughout both the state-level and 
multi-level estimations, for-profit welfare administration seldom improves the outcomes 
of TANF clients, while non-profit administration is found to more frequently, yet still 
inconsistently, predict superior program results.  Although the effects are inconsistent, 
non-profit contracting is found to yield higher TANF work participation rates at the state-
level and yield more case closures due to employment at the individual-level.  The results 
presented here routinely contradict any alleged privatization panacea, but when 
privatization does yield improved outcomes they are more likely to occur among non-
profits than profit-seekers. 
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PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE ACROSS THE AMERICAN STATES 
 
The analysis begins with a set of state-level multivariate OLS regression models 
in which TANF performance measures are regressed on the TANF privatization variables 
first explored as dependent variables in Chapter Three.  As discussed in Chapter Four, the 
state-level dependent variables explored here are all measured for the year 2001 and 
include the TANF work participation rate, full-time employment rate, sanction rate, and 
average monthly earnings from employment.  Dependent variables related to TANF 
participation, employment, sanctioning, and monthly earnings will also be explored at the 
client-level in the multi-level models, so these specific state-level variables were chosen 
for consistency with the individual-level outcomes. 
For brief recap, the TANF privatization variables now serving as the independent 
variables of interest include TVPrivate, the percentage of TANF funds appropriated to 
private organizations.  NonProfit is operationalized as the percentage of TANF funds 
awarded to nonprofit organizations, and ForProfit is operationalized as the percentage of 
TANF funds devoted to for-profit firms.  The TVPrivate and NonProfit measures are 
highly correlated (r = .91; p < .001) and likely introduce multicollinearity into the 
regression models, thus I examine the TVPrivate and NonProfit/ForProfit variables in 
separate estimations.  The performance models for the generic TANF privatization 
variable are found in Table 5.1, and the models for the specific non-profit/for-profit 
variables are found in Table 5.2.  
 
(Table 5.1 about here) 
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(Table 5.2 about here) 
 
The estimations presented in this chapter utilize many of the same controls used 
initially to predict privatization levels in Chapter Three.  As discussed in Chapter Four, 
the state-level performance models presented in this chapter control for the competitive 
environment and urbanism, TANF client characteristics, welfare policy tools, and the 
political and socioeconomic environment.  The models also include a Mississippi dummy 
variable because of the uniquely high level of TANF privatization present in that 
particular state.  The coefficients for the control variables remain largely unchanged 
when the TVPrivate variable is substituted for the NonProfit or ForProfit variables, so I 
focus on the substantive findings from the initial TVPrivate models found in Table 5.1.   
 
TANF Privatization and State-Level Patterns of Performance 
Directing attention to the TANF privatization measures, the state-level OLS 
performance models in Tables  5.1 and 5.2 offer mixed results.  For the most part, the 
administrative ownership variables are statistically insignificant to the estimations 
suggesting that privatized welfare delivery only seldom affects the quality of TANF 
outcomes.  There is minimal evidence that general privatization levels (TVPrivate) or for-
profit (ForProfit) contracting yield consistently superior program results across states.  
The TVPrivate slope coefficients in Table 5.1 have the theoretically expected positive 
and negative signs in the Participate and Sanction models, but the coefficients are 
unexpectedly negative in the Employment and Earnings models indicating lower levels of 
TANF employment and lower monthly earnings.  Additionally, the TVPrivate slope 
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coefficients are statistically insignificant in every estimation in Table 5.1 meaning that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that privatization has zero effect on TANF work 
participation rates, full-time employment rates, sanction levels, or monthly earnings from 
employment.  There is little evidence of a privatization panacea in these initial aggregate 
performance models.   
Similar to the general privatization variable, increasing contracting levels with 
for-profit firms seemingly does little to improve patterns of TANF performance across 
states in 2001.  The ForProfit variable is statistically insignificant in the Participation, 
Sanction, and Earnings models in Table 5.2, and is unexpectedly negative and 
statistically significant in the Employment model suggesting that for-profit contracting is 
inversely associated with TANF employment rates.  The beta coefficient of -.518 is less 
than the beta coefficient for urbanism but is larger than the beta for the black caseload 
variable.  In other words, for-profit contracting levels have a larger substantive impact on 
TANF employment rates than the racial caseload but less impact than levels of urbanism.   
.518 standard deviation units of the dependent variable, TANF employment rate, 
is equal to 4.39 percent (.518 * 8.48), thus every standard deviation increase in for-profit 
contracting is associated with a 4.39 percent decline in TANF employment rate.  
Increasing one standard deviation from the for-profit contracting mean to 9.34 percent 
(mean = 3.71; standard deviation = 5.63) decreases the predicted TANF employment rate 
to 19.32 percent (23.71 – 4.39).  Increasing two standard deviations to 14.97 percent for-
profit reduces the expected employment rate to 14.93 percent.  Moving from two 
standard deviations below the privatization mean (i.e. those states with approximately 
zero for-profit contracting) to two standard deviations above lessens the predicted TANF 
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employment rate by a total of 17.56 percent (32.49 – 14.93).  Not only is profit-seeking 
administration largely insignificant to these state-level performance models, but for-profit 
contracting also predicts a lower expected TANF employment rate.  Indeed, states with 
the greatest amounts of TANF dollars contracted with for-profit firms including 
Maryland, Nevada, Arkansas, Mississippi, Wisconsin, and Texas experienced relatively 
lower full-time employment rates in 2001.  The highest full-time employment states 
frequently had fewer dollars contracted with for-profit firms (oftentimes at or near zero 
for-profit dollars) and included states like Illinois, Michigan, North Dakota, New Mexico, 
Connecticut, Minnesota, Virginia, and Alabama.  Figure 5.4 illustrates the predicted 
relationship between profit-seeking welfare delivery and TANF employment rates across 
states in 2001. 
 
 
(Figure 5.4 about here) 
 
 
On the other hand, the percentage of TANF funds awarded to non-profits does 
significantly predict superior employment-based program outputs as it relates to TANF 
work participation rates.  Controlling for several competing explanations including the 
competitive environment, policy tools, client characteristics, and the local political and 
socioeconomic environment, non-profit contracting remains positively and significantly 
associated with TANF participation rates in 2001.  This suggests that when more TANF 
funds are directed at non-profit organizations, clients are more likely to be participating 
in work-related or work-preparation activities. 
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The beta coefficient for the NonProfit variable in the Participate model in Table 
5.2 is .298 meaning that every standard deviation increase in non-profit contracting will 
yield a .298 standard deviation unit increase in the predicted TANF participation rate.  
The average participation rate in 2001 was 48 percent with a standard deviation of 19.13, 
thus .298 standard deviation units is equal to 5.70 percent (.298 * 19.13).  Increasing one 
standard deviation from the non-profit spending mean to 29.42 percent non-profit (mean 
= 13.43; standard deviation = 16.09) increases predicted work participation levels to 53.7 
percent (48 + 5.7). Increasing two standard deviations on the non-profit spending 
measure elevates the predicted work participation rate to 59.4 percent.  Moving two 
standard deviations below the non-profit spending mean (i.e. those states with essentially 
zero non-profit contracting) to two standard deviations above increases the expected 
work participation by a total of 22.8 percent (59.4 - 36.6).  Several states with the highest 
levels of non-profit contracting experienced healthy TANF participation rates including 
Wisconsin, Idaho, Montana, Washington, Illinois, Ohio, and Tennessee.  A few high non-
profit states including Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Vermont experienced relatively low 
TANF participation rates, but the participation trend favors non-profit welfare delivery.  
For instance, states like Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Oklahoma 
scored on the lower end of the participation scale and had very few of total TANF dollars 
contracted with non-profits.   Figure 5.5 illustrates the predicted relationship between 
non-profit contracting and TANF participation rates across states in 2001. 
 
 
(Figure 5.5 about here) 
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In these initial aggregate state-level models there is evidence that contracting 
welfare administration with non-profit entities could be to the advantage of low-income 
welfare recipients while profit-seeking welfare delivery might not be as advantageous, 
but without individual-level measures of program outputs, we are unsure that these 
aggregate relationships hold among  individual  clients. The next section of the 
dissertation examines the results of the multi-level models that incorporate both 
individual and contextual level variables into one comprehensive empirical analysis. 
Several control variables thought to be associated with TANF outcomes are 
insignificant to the estimations in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.  The Earnings model lacks 
statistically significant variables entirely.  None of the numerical measures of 
marketplace competition are statistically significant in any estimation.  State population, 
the number of service business establishments and number non-profit organizations are 
categorically unrelated to patterns of TANF performance.  Additionally, the state 
governorship variable is also insignificant to the models along with the unmarried TANF 
population variable.   Client characteristics as it pertains to the prevalence of unmarried 
TANF cases are not found to yield inferior outcomes at the state-level as predicted by 
theory.  While being unmarried might not influence TANF outcomes in adverse ways, 
single clients are examined in the multi-level models in the next section that include 
individual-level data and can more accurately estimate individual-level effects. 
Although inconsistent in their effects across models, control variables related to 
urbanism, client characteristics, policy tools and the political and socioeconomic 
environment significantly predict various indicators of state-level TANF performance in 
theoretically expected ways.  Urbanism matters to TANF employment rates, racial 
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characteristics matter to work participation and employment rates, policy tools matter to 
sanction rates, political ideology matters to participation rates, and the socioeconomic 
environment  matters to both work participation and sanction rates.  As with the 
privatization regression analysis presented in Chapter Three, standardized beta 
coefficients transform the OLS slope coefficients into a standardized scale based upon the 
standard normal curve (mean = 0; standard deviation = 1), and are analyzed to illustrate 
the substantive state-level findings throughout this chapter.  This section begins with a 
discussion of the control variables then discusses how TANF privatization is potentially 
affecting the quality of program outcomes across states.   
From examining the standardized beta coefficients in the Participate model in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the socioeconomic environment operationalized as the state poverty 
rate is estimated to be the single biggest predictor of TANF work participation rates in 
2001, followed closely by the black TANF caseload variable, and thirdly and less 
influentially by the political environment. While the political ideology variable is 
insignificant in several of the estimations along with the state governorship variable 
suggesting minimal political effects on TANF outcomes, the slope coefficient is negative 
and achieves statistical significance in the Participate model in Table 5.1.  This suggests 
that states with more liberal governments have fewer TANF recipients participating in 
work-related or work preparation activities, and more clients are participating in more 
relatively conservative environs.  Conservatives view poverty as driven primarily by 
individual shortcomings and are expected to put greater emphasis on improving work 
ethic and placing people into work preparation activities.  The beta coefficient of -.312 
indicates that the ideological substantive effect on TANF participation is less than the 
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effect observed for the poverty rate or the racial caseload, but still significant in the 
model.  The average state in 2001 had 48 percent of their TANF cases participating in 
work related activities with a standard deviation of  19.13, thus .376 standard deviation 
units is equal to 5.97 percent (.376 * 19.13).  Moving two standard deviations below the 
mean ideology score (i.e. relatively conservative states) to two standard deviations above 
decreases the predicted TANF participation rate by 23.88 percent (59.94 – 36.06), less of 
an effect than the poverty rate or black caseloads but substantively important nonetheless.  
Moving on to more influential factors in the Participate model, the negative and 
statistically significant Poverty slope coefficient in Table 5.1 indicates an inverse 
relationship meaning that states with higher poverty rates should predicatively experience 
lower participation rates.  But just how much lower exactly?  The beta coefficient of  
-.376 suggests that every standard deviation increase in the poverty rate decreases 
predicted TANF participation rates by .376 standard deviation units of the Participate 
dependent variable.  The average state in 2001 had 48 percent of their TANF cases 
participating in work related activities with a standard deviation of  19.13, thus .376 
standard deviation units is equal to 7.19 percent (.376 * 19.13).   
Moving one standard deviation above the mean poverty level to a 15.33 percent 
poverty rate (Mean = 12.11; S.D. = 3.22) decreases the expected participation rate to 
40.81 percent.  Increasing by two standard deviations to an 18.55 percent poverty rate 
yields a predicted TANF participation rate of 33.62 percent.  In total, increasing from two 
standard deviations below the mean poverty rate (i.e. low poverty states) to two standard 
deviations above decreases the predicted participation rate by a sizable 28.76 percent 
(62.38 – 33.62).  High poverty states that follow the predicted pattern of dampened 
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TANF work participation include states like Arkansas, West Virginia, and Mississippi 
that have poverty rates of  17.8, 16.6, and 19.3 percent respectively and realized TANF 
participation rates of 32, 30.5, and 25.9 percent respectively.   On the other hand, 
although New Hampshire is the lowest poverty state in 2001 and only experienced an 
average 44.8 percent participation rate, several other low poverty states such as 
Wisconsin, Iowa, South Dakota, and Nevada experienced relatively higher participation 
rates.   
Racial characteristics also matter significantly and consistently in both the 
Participate and Employment models in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.  The negative and statistically 
significant AA-Caseload slope coefficients indicate that fewer TANF clients are 
participating in work-related activities and fewer TANF clients are employed full-time in 
states with a greater percentage of African American welfare recipients.  The beta 
coefficient of -.373 in the Participate model in Table 5.1 is only slightly less than the 
beta coefficient for state poverty rate (difference of .003), and thus the substantive 
predictions for race essentially mirror the state poverty rate.  Moving from two standard 
deviations below the racial caseload mean to two standard deviations above decreases 
expected TANF participation rates by 28.56 percent (62.28 – 33.72).  A similar two 
standard deviation movement along the poverty rate variable decreases predicted 
participation rates by 28.76 percent, representing a scant 0.20 percent predicted 
difference between the poverty rate and the racial caseload variable.  Heightened levels of 
poverty and black TANF recipients are inversely related to work participation in roughly 
equal magnitude in Table 5.1.  Several heavily black TANF states like Maryland, 
Georgia, Mississippi, Delaware, and North Carolina score on the lower end of the TANF 
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participation measure, while states such as Montana, Idaho, Utah, Oregon, Maine, and 
South Dakota serve very few African American welfare recipients and experienced 
relatively high TANF participation rates.  Several heavily African American TANF states 
actually did experience healthy participation rates in 2001 including Illinois, Wisconsin, 
and Ohio but the overall trend is decidedly toward observing reduced TANF participation 
in heavily black TANF states. 
Racial caseloads are also a significant predictor in the Employment models in 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 displaying a consistent negative relationship with TANF employment 
rates.  Similar to the TANF work participation rate dynamic discussed above, fewer 
TANF clients are employed full-time in states with larger African American welfare 
caseloads.  The beta coefficient of -.367 indicates that every standard deviation increase 
in the black caseload measure is accompanied by a .367 standard deviation decrease in 
the TANF employment rate.  The mean TANF employment rate in 2001 was 23.71 with a 
standard deviation of 8.48, thus .367 standard deviation units is equal to 3.11 percent 
(.367 * 8.48).  Increasing one standard deviation from the mean black caseload measure 
decreases the predicted TANF employment rate to 20.60 percent.  Increasing by two 
standard deviations from the black caseload mean further reduces the expected TANF 
employment rate to 17.49 percent.  Moving from two standard deviations below the racial 
caseload mean to two standard deviations above the mean reduces the predicted 
employment rate among active TANF cases by a total of 12.44 percent (29.93 – 17.49).  
Somewhat similar to the TANF participation dynamic, high black TANF states like 
Maryland, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina experienced well below 
average full-time employment rates, with Maryland experiencing the lowest rate at just 
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5.7 percent employed.  Although the state with the highest full-time TANF employment 
rate in 2001, Illinois, was unexpectedly a relatively high black TANF state (82.7 percent 
African American), the trend was for low black states to experience heightened levels of 
TANF employment.  For instance, states like Hawaii, North Dakota, New Mexico, 
Washington, and Maine scored on the higher end of the full-time employment measure. 
Previous research finds that African Americans are more likely to be sanctioned 
off the welfare rolls at much higher rates (Kalil et al. 2002), but the aggregate state-level 
models presented here lack such racial connections to sanction rates.  There are fewer 
TANF clients participating in work activities and fewer employed TANF recipients in 
states with more black welfare recipients, but race does not matter significantly to 
sanction rates or monthly earnings across states in 2001.  
 
 
(Figure 5.1 about here) 
 
 
 
While racial caseloads do have a non-trivial substantive impact on TANF 
employment rates, the standardized coefficients in Table 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that levels of 
urbanism have a greater substantive effect than black caseload levels.  The state urbanism 
variable displays a consistently positive and statistically significant effect in the Employ 
models in Tables 5.1 and 5.2.  This suggests that urbanized states are likely to experience 
higher TANF employment rates among active welfare cases.  When more state citizens 
reside within metropolitan statistical areas, there are likely more opportunities for 
employment and thus more welfare clients are more likely to be working.   
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The standardized coefficient in Table 5.1 is .474 and .474 standard deviation units 
of the employment rate is equal to 4.02 percent (.474 * 8.48).  Thus, moving from two 
standard deviations below the urbanism mean to two standard deviation above increases 
the predicted TANF employment rate by a total of 16.08 percent (31.75 – 15.67).  Being 
in more urbanized states does not influence state TANF participation rates, but more 
TANF clients are employed full-time in more urbanized environments.  States with 
heavily urban populations such as Illinois, Hawaii, Michigan, California, and Connecticut 
experienced well above average full-time employment rates, whereas several less 
urbanized states such as Alaska, Wyoming, Nebraska, Montana, Arkansas, Oregon, and 
Kentucky routinely scored on the lower end of the TANF employment rate in 2001.  The 
most urban state in 2001, New Jersey, experienced an average employment rate of 24.2 
percent but nonetheless the TANF employment trend favors urbanization.  In Chapter 
Three levels of urbanism were found to be positively related to TANF contracting levels 
in multivariate OLS models, but contracting levels themselves do not track significantly 
with TANF employment rates. 
 
 
(Figure 5.2 about here) 
 
 
Next, examining the coefficients in the Sanction models in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
both the stringency of sanction policies and the socioeconomic environment matter 
significantly to TANF sanction rates across states in 2001.  The positive and significant 
SanctSeverity slope coefficients in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that when sanction policies 
are stricter, more TANF clients are sanctioned for non-compliance with program rules.  
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The standardized coefficients indicate that the strictness of state sanction policies has a 
larger substantive effect on sanction rates than the other two significant explanatory 
variables, the unemployment rate and the Mississippi dummy variable. 
The beta coefficient for the SanctSeverity variable in the Sanction model in Table 
5.1 is .321 meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the sanction severity scale 
yields a .321 standard deviation unit increase in the state sanction rate.   The mean 
sanction rate in 2001 was 8.45 percent with a standard deviation of 9.71, thus .321 
standard deviation units is equivalent to 3.12 percent (.321 * 9.71).  Increasing one 
standard deviation from the mean of sanction severity index elevates predicted sanction 
rates to 11.57 percent.  Increasing two standard deviations to states with the most severe 
sanction policies, increases predicted sanction rates to 14.69 percent (11.57 + .321).  At 
two standard deviations below the mean sanction severity scale (i.e. states with the least 
stringent sanction policies) the predicted sanction rate is 2.21 percent, thus moving two 
standard deviations below the mean sanction severity scale to two standard deviations 
above increases the predicted sanction rate by a total of 12.48 percent (14.69 – 2.21).    
The pattern between sanction stringency and sanction rates is evident.  
Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Florida are the three states with the highest rates of sanction 
in 2001 and each had adopted the strictest possible sanction policies (i.e. reducing the 
welfare grant by 100 percent on first sanction offense).  Six of the top ten sanctioning 
states instituted full welfare grant reduction on first sanction offense.  Several other states 
that had adopted the most stringent sanctioning posture score above the sanctioning 
average including Tennessee, Michigan, Kansas, Hawaii, and Nebraska.  Indeed, 
Wyoming and Iowa are the only two full-benefit reduction states to experience below 
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average TANF sanction rates in 2001.   States with the most lenient sanction policies 
including Vermont, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, North Carolina, Texas, Arkansas, Maine 
and Wisconsin also experienced the lowest rates of sanction.  The stringency of sanction 
policy choices seemingly affected patterns in sanction rates across states in 2001. 
While more stringent sanction policies predict higher sanction rates, the 
relationship between policy tools and TANF performance in 2001 is inconsistent.  The 
WorkRequire variable is statistically insignificant to the OLS estimations in Tables 5.1 
and 5.2 suggesting that stricter work requirements on welfare clients are wholly unrelated 
to work participation rates and welfare employment.  Get tough welfare sanction policies 
yield more sanctions for non-compliance, but on another front stricter work requirements 
are insignificant to the work participation and employment exits in these models.  The 
inconsistent policy-performance relationship across states for the year 2001 means that 
no definitive claims can be made at this juncture, but future research should be mindful of 
the potential effects of various policy choices.   
Finally, the socioeconomic context is also found to significantly affect TANF 
sanction rates in that the unemployment rate variable is found to have a statistically 
significant positive relationship with TANF sanction rates.  Although less significant 
substantively than sanction stringency, the beta coefficient of .258 in Table 5.1 means 
that sanction rates are predicted to increase .258 standard deviation units for every 
standard deviation increase in the state unemployment rate.  .258 standard deviation units 
of the sanction rate variable is equal to 2.51 percent (.258 * 9.71).  Thus, moving two 
standard deviations below the mean unemployment figure to two standard deviations 
above increases the sanction rate by a total of 10.4 percent (13.47 – 3.43).  This suggests 
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that clients residing within states with higher unemployment rates might find it more 
difficult to remain in full program compliance, and consequently are being punished 
more often by front-line administrators.  The unemployment rate measure is not found to 
significantly predict occupational outcomes related to work participation and full-time 
employment, but could potentially matter to welfare clients as it relates to their ability to 
remain in compliance with program rules.  Figure 5.3 illustrates the predicted change in 
sanction rate across levels of sanction severity and the unemployment rate for the year 
2001.  
 
(Figure 5.3 about here) 
 
Before delving into the state-level privatization findings and multi-level models 
presented in the next section of this dissertation, I offer one final observation concerning 
state-level patterns in TANF performance.  Stated simply, there is a pattern of 
pronounced inferiority with regards to TANF performance measures within the state of 
Mississippi in 2001.  The Mississippi dummy variable is negative and statistically 
significant in the Participate model in Table 5.2, indicating lower work participation 
rates among Mississippi TANF clients than recipients in other states.  The dummy 
coefficients for the Sanction models are positive and statistically significant in Tables 5.1 
and 5.2, indicating higher rates of sanction for Mississippi TANF clients in particular.  
The findings regarding TANF work participation and sanction rates should give the 
reader pause, especially considering the inordinately high level of welfare privatization 
found within the state (see Chapter Three). 
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PRIVATIZATION AND PERFORMANCE:  HIERARCHICAL RESULTS 
 
 
The results of the pooled multi-level estimations for the time period 2000 - 2005 
are arranged into six (6) tables44 45.  Tables 5.3 and 5.4 contain the baseline non-
interactive HLM estimations and reported odds ratios for both open and closed TANF 
cases.  Tables 5.5 – 5.8 contain the interactive estimations across traditionally hard-to-
serve clientele, including African American and low educated clients.  In short, the HLM 
findings suggest that privatized arrangements infrequently and inconsistently influence or 
improve the quality of program outcomes for both open and closed TANF cases in 
Florida.  Similar to the state-level analysis, there is inconsistent yet persistent evidence to 
suggest that TANF outcomes are relatively superior under non-profit welfare delivery, 
and inferior or unchanged under profit-seeking arrangements. 
Table 5.3 presents the results from the pooled HLM estimations for open TANF 
cases in Florida.  The individual-level (level-1) predictors are often statistically 
significant in expected ways.  Female, single, and low education status is negatively 
associated with participation in full-time work activities.  Additionally, female and low 
education TANF clients are predicted to earn less monthly income from employment in 
the initial models, and low education clients are associated with higher rates of 
                                                      
44 All hierarchical estimations were performed in HLM (version 6.06). 
45 It can be argued that pooling the entire TANF sample is methodologically inappropriate.  Because the 
TANF caseload is traditionally and disproportionately comprised of singe females, this group should 
exhibit unique program dynamics and be examined separately from male and married clients.  However, 
approximately one quarter of the Florida TANF clients are married in both the open and closed case 
datasets, providing sufficient variation for inclusion of a marital status variable in the final pooled models.  
Secondly, the HLM models were estimated separately for females only and the substantive results do not 
change.  The reason removing men from the datasets only has a negligible impact on the coefficients is 
largely because there are very few men in the datasets originally.  Women make up  93.3% and 92.5% of 
the open and closed TANF cases respectively, thus removing men does not meaningfully change parameter 
estimates.  There should be some caution in interpreting the highly skewed gender variable in the pooled 
models, but the other coefficients remain all but unchanged when men are removed from the sample.   
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sanctioning than more educated peers. While the Latino variable proves to be 
insignificant in the estimations, African American identity is negatively related to full-
time work participation and positively related to the probability of being sanctioned 
(.708; p <.05).   
Briefly turning to the level-2 measures in Table 5.3, we unexpectedly observe 
three negative and statistically significant coefficients for the ForProfit variable.  This is 
interpreted to mean that vis-à-vis the reference category (public agencies), clients served 
within for-profit settings are less likely to be currently employed (-.243; p < .05), less 
likely to be participating in full-time work activities (-.266; p < .05), and are also earning 
slightly less monthly income from work activities (-9.38; p < .05).  The NonProfit 
variable is statistically insignificant in every estimation in Table 5.3 suggesting that the 
program outcomes of NonProfit clients do not differ significantly from public agencies.  
While the employment outcomes of ForProfit TANF clients are relatively inferior, 
NonProfit administration is not found to benefit TANF clients, nor does it have 
deleterious effects on TANF clients relative to public agencies.   
 While the regression coefficients for monthly earnings can be interpreted in a 
straightforward manner, the coefficients for the logistic HLM estimations are not directly 
interpretable, thus odds ratios are calculated for the TANF work participation, 
employment and sanction models because these outcomes are measured in a dichotomous 
fashion46.  Odds ratios calculate the probability of one event occurring (i.e., participating 
                                                      
46 Odds ratios are utilized to indicate the “odds” of an event taking place relative to the “odds” that an event 
will not take place and is calculated as the probability of an event occurring (P) divided by the probability 
of an event not occurring (1 – P).  Because logistical regression coefficients represent the change in the 
“log of odds” and are not directly interpretable, odds ratios are often used to put coefficients into a 
substantive context.  An odds ratio of “1” indicates that one event is just as likely to occur as another.  An 
odds ratio > 1 indicates an event is more likely to occur than another, while < 1 indicates an event is less 
likely to occur.  For instance, an odds ratio of “1.60” means that the odds of one event occurring is 1.6 
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in full-time work activities) as opposed to another event occurring (i.e., not participating 
in full-time work activities) and will be used to discuss the substantive findings 
throughout the rest of the paper. 
Most of the statistically significant odds ratios presented in the work participation 
model (WorkPart) in Table 5.3 are less than one, indicating reduced odds of participating 
in full-time work activities.  Females, low educated, and single clients have a 47.5 
percent (1.00 - .525), 44.4 percent (1.00 - .556), and 54.4 percent (1.00 - .456) reduced 
odds of participating in full-time work activities relative to males, higher educated, and 
married clients.  The Latino variable is insignificant in the WorkPart model in Table 5.3, 
but the odds ratio of .783 for African American clients suggests that odds of participating 
in full-time work activities is 21.7 percent (1.00 - .783) lower than for non-African 
American clients.  The only statistically significant individual-level variable in the 
Employ model in Table 5.3 is education suggesting that less educated clients have a 41.8 
percent reduced odds of being currently employed than clients with a high school 
education.  
The odds ratios in the Sanction model in Table 5.3 indicate that those clients 
lacking a high school education are 1.10 times or 10 percent more likely to have had their 
case sanctioned for non-compliance than more educated clients.  A similar positive 
relationship is even more dramatic for female TANF clients, whose odds of being 
sanctioned for non-compliance are 42 percent greater than for male clients in the sample 
(1.42).  Concurrent with existing research, an even yet more dramatic sanctioning 
relationship is observed for African American clients.  Among open TANF cases during 
                                                                                                                                                                 
times more likely than another, or that the odds of an event occurring is 60 percent (1.60 – 1.00) more 
likely to occur than another event.   
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2000-2005 period in Florida, the odds of being sanctioned for non-compliance for 
African American clients are 103 percent higher or approximately two times (odds ratio = 
2.03 ; p < .05) greater than clients that are not African American.  Put another way, for 
every non-African American TANF client that is sanctioned in Florida during the 2000-
2005, there are approximately two African Americans sanctioned.  Although these racial 
findings for open cases presented here are stronger than those usually reported in TANF 
sanctioning studies, they do mirror those of Kalil et al. (2002), who find that blacks are 
nearly twice as likely to have their case sanctioned for non-compliance in Michigan.   
Turning to the odds ratios for level-2 county-level variables in Table 5.3, clients 
served by for-profit firms are predicted to have a 23.4 percent reduced odds of 
participating in full-time work activities (1.00 - .766), and a 21.5 percent reduced odds of 
being employed than clients served by public agencies.  For every five TANF clients 
working in public agencies there are approximately four clients working in for-profit 
administrative settings in Florida during the 2000-2005 time period.  On the other hand, 
the insignificant coefficients for the NonProfit variable suggest that clients are no more or 
less likely to be working under non-profit administration than in public settings.  There is 
scant evidence of privatized superiority in these initial models.  Figure 5.6 illustrates the 
reduced odds of participation and employment among profit-seeking welfare providers in 
the state of Florida. 
 
 
(Figure 5.6 about here) 
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Two other level-2 variables, the county percentage of African Americans and 
Latinos, are interestingly statistically significant in opposite directions in the WorkPart 
model.  The odds ratios predict that increasing one point on the county black percentage 
reduces the odds of participating in full-time work activities by 1.4% (1.00 - .986).  
Whereas, increasing one point on the county Latino measure increases the odds of 
participating in full-time work activities by 3 percent (odds = 1.03).  Similar to the work 
participation dynamic, increasing by one point on the Latino variable increases the odds 
of being employed by 2 percent (odds = 1.02) as observed in the Employ model. 
Turning to the Sanction model we observe two statistically significant contextual 
variables, the county unemployment rate and the county Latino measure.  Firstly, 
concurrent with the previous state-level analysis, the positive and statistically significant 
unemployment rate coefficient suggests that when TANF clients reside in high 
unemployment counties their cases are more likely to be sanctioned for non-compliance.  
The odds ratio suggests that every point increase in the unemployment measure is 
associated with a 24 percent increased odds of being sanctioned (odds = 1.24).  In Florida 
counties with greater unemployment, individual TANF clients are more likely to be 
sanctioned for non-compliance with program rules.  Secondly, the Latino measure is 
negative and significant indicating that increasing by one point on the county Latino 
measure decreases the odds of being sanctioned by 3 percent (1.00 - .970).  The findings 
in Table 5.3 suggest that among counties with a higher percentage of Latinos, TANF 
clients are more likely to be participating in full-time work preparation activities, more 
likely to be employed, and less likely to be sanctioned for non-compliance.  
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(Table 5.3 about here) 
 
(Table 5.4 about here) 
 
Table 5.4 contains the baseline HLM results and subsequent odds ratios of the 
HLM estimations for closed TANF cases in Florida.  Once again, the individual-level 
variables largely behave in an expected fashion.  Lacking a high school education is 
negatively associated with case closure due to employment or earnings, and less educated 
clients earn less monthly income from employment  (-37.77; p < .01).  Females also earn 
less monthly income, and are 1.87 times (odds ratio = 1.87) more likely to have their case 
closed due to sanction for non-compliance.    
Once again, the individual-level Latino variable proves insignificant to the 
estimations, but race continues to be a significant predictor in the models.  The odds that 
African American clients exit TANF due to employment are 21.3 percent less than for 
non-African Americans in this sample.  Put another way, for every five non-African 
American TANF clients exiting due to employment or earnings, there are fewer than four 
African American clients exiting due to employment.  Furthermore, African American 
identity is associated with a 19 percent increase in the odds of being sanctioned off the 
welfare rolls (odds ratio = 1.19).  This relationship is not as strong as the one observed 
among open TANF cases, yet remains consistent with the initial open cases findings and 
with existing research. The aggregate black caseload variable was statistically 
insignificant in the state-level sanction models estimated earlier in this chapter, but when 
individual African Americans are examined in multi-level models a strong statistical 
relationship with TANF sanctioning emerges. 
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One point of emphasis from the initial models is that African Americans 
consistently fare worse than other TANF clients in Florida during the 2000-2005 period 
examined here.  Black clients are less likely to be in full-time work participation, less 
likely to be employed and exit welfare due to employment, and are more likely to have 
their case sanctioned.  The state-level and multi-level findings of this dissertation further 
corroborate a substantial body of research that discovers intimate links between race and 
welfare policy in America.  Figure 5.7 visually depicts the percentage change in odds of 
program success for open and closed case TANF outcomes for African American clients. 
 
 
(Figure 5.7 about here) 
 
Directing attention to the level-2 contextual variables in Table 5.4 (closed cases), 
we yet again observe that privatized administrative environments do not seemingly 
impact TANF clients in consistently superior ways.  The ForProfit coefficients are 
statistically insignificant across all three closed case estimations meaning that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis that for-profit firms have no effect on the superiority of client 
outcomes. Clients served by profit-seekers are no more likely to exit TANF due to 
employment, are not earning more in monthly income, and are no more or less likely 
have their case closed due to sanction.  On the other hand, there is evidence in Table 5.4 
that suggests clients are achieving superior program outputs when served under non-
profit administration. 
The NonProfit variable is positive and statistically significant in both the Employ 
model and negative and statistically significant in the Sanction model in Table 5.4.  The 
odds that a client exits welfare due to employment or earnings is 43 percent greater when 
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served under non-profits vis-à-vis public agencies (the reference category).  Put another 
way for every 100 TANF clients exiting for employment under non-profits, only 
approximately 60 clients are exiting due to employment under public agencies.  
Secondly, according to the results of the Sanction model, TANF clients have a 23.6 
percent reduced odds of exiting welfare due to sanction for non-compliance vis-à-vis 
government agencies.   For every four clients sanctioned under government agencies 
there are approximately three clients expected to be sanctioned for non-compliance under 
non-profit ownership.  Figure 5.8 illustrates the predicted non-profit relationships.   
 
 
(Figure 5.8 about here) 
 
In the open case estimations, government agencies were found to perform on par 
or in a superior fashion vis-à-vis non-profit organizations and especially for-profit firms.  
In short, there was no evidence of superiority in privatized welfare delivery systems in 
Table 5.3.  In the closed case estimations (Table 5.4), public agencies continued to 
perform on par with profit-seekers.  This suggests that there is no privatization panacea as 
it pertains to for-profit welfare delivery in the state of Florida during the 2000-2005 time 
period.  However, there is evidence in the HLM models that non-profits are 
outperforming their government-controlled counterparts at least when it pertains to case 
closures.   
TANF clients served under non-profit administration are more likely to exit 
welfare due to employment or earnings, and are less likely to exit welfare due to sanction 
for non-compliance with program rules.  Although no definitive causal arguments can be 
put forth at this juncture, the evidence presented suggests that opening up welfare 
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delivery to non-profit organizations can potentially yield superior program outcomes for 
TANF clients.  Non-profit organizations have a storied history of providing services to 
low-income clientele and a particular adherence to compassionate social welfare missions 
that might be beneficial to poverty populations (Sanger 2003; Drucker 1990).  In the 
state-level analysis, states with greater non-profit contracting levels experienced higher 
rates of TANF work participation. The positive relationship between non-profit 
contracting and TANF work participation at the state-level did not extend to individual 
participation in the multi-level open case estimation in Table 5.3, but the evidence among 
closed cases in Table 5.4 suggests that at the individual level clients within non-profits 
are more likely to be exiting welfare due to employment and less likely to be sanctioned 
off the welfare rolls. The multi-level evidence is not overwhelming, doubtless, or 
definitively causal at this juncture but there is a persistent if not consistent pattern of 
superior outcomes associated with non-profit welfare delivery.   
 
 
PRIVATIZATION EFFECTS ACROSS DISADVANTAGED CLIENTELE 
 
 
There is a concern among critics of social policy privatization that certain 
disadvantaged clientele groups will be treated inequitably by private, especially profit-
seeking vendors, in an effort to “cream” the TANF pool, ultimately leading to inferior 
program outputs in the pursuit of profit maximization (Heinrich 2000; Gilman 2001; 
Sanger 2003; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).  Non-profits and government agencies 
should have less organizational and frontline focus on the bottom line and more attention 
directed toward client barriers and individual needs, and thus program outcomes among 
disadvantaged clientele should be relatively superior compared to profit-seekers.  For the 
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most part, this research uncovers few statistically significant interactive relationships 
between disadvantaged characteristics and privatized administrative environments.  The 
majority of interactive coefficients found in Tables 5.5 through 5.8 are statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that the outputs of the disadvantaged do not vary in 
systematically inferior ways across non-profit or for-profit welfare delivery systems.   
Although I cannot readily confirm that statistically significant differences exist 
across administrative arrangements, odds ratios of achieving various TANF outcomes are 
calculated for both African American and less educated clients, and can illuminate how 
these individuals are potentially fairing under various forms of administrative ownership.  
The interactive odds ratios presented in this section of the dissertation lack any definitive 
pattern of inferiority, as each administrative form is found to induce superior quality in 
any single facet of TANF performance. Definitive patterns of profit-seeking inferiority 
are absent as for-profit firms routinely outperform government agencies, but generally 
speaking, the TANF outcomes of the disadvantaged among non-profit organizations are 
superior relative to both government agencies and profit seekers, further corroborating 
the potentially beneficial impact of non-profits in delivering welfare to especially 
disadvantaged clientele. 
 
African American Clients 
 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 display the interactive racial estimations for open cases and 
closed cases respectively.  Program outcomes of African American clients are found to 
differ significantly across administrative arrangements, but there is limited evidence to 
suggest that privatizing welfare services invariably leads to inferior outcomes for this 
historically disadvantaged group of clients.  The interaction terms for open cases found in 
135 
 
Table 5.5 are oftentimes insignificant statistically speaking, but there remain some 
interesting findings in need of discussion.  The substantive interpretation of the 
interaction terms and accompanying predicted odds ratios reported in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 
is not obvious.  In order to properly interpret coefficients, interaction terms and odds 
ratios must be examined and calculated in relation to the baseline category (Public).  For 
instance, if we want to ascertain the predicted odds of work participation for black clients 
within for-profit firms, we must add together the ForProfit*Black coefficient and the 
baseline Black coefficient (i.e. blacks within government agencies).  After summing the 
two coefficients (-.540 + .281 = -0.26) the exponential function [exp(-.26)] provides the 
difference in odds (odds = .77) of success for black clients within for-profits.  The odds 
ratio of .77 for blacks within for-profits translates into a 23 percent decreased odds of 
participating in work activities (1 - .77).  This means that the outcomes of black clients in 
for-profits are unexpectedly improved relative to government agencies, in which blacks 
have a 42 percent decreased odds of work participation (1 - .58).  In other words, 
although blacks are less likely to be participating in work activities among for-profits 
than non-black clients (23 percent reduced odds), the odds of success are greater than in 
public settings, but the difference in odds does not achieved statistical significance.  
Let us next examine how the TANF participation outcomes of black clients within 
non-profit providers compare to the other administrative forms examined above.  The 
sum of the NonProfit*Black coefficient with the baseline Black coefficient equals (-.06) 
and [exp(-.06)] produces an odds ratio of .94, meaning that blacks within non-profits 
have a 6 percent reduced odds of participating in work activities (1 - .94).  This suggests 
that two dynamics are taking place for African Americans within non-profit 
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organizations.  One, with a mere 6 percent reduced odds of participation for blacks there 
is minimal substantive difference in participation outcomes between blacks and non-
blacks among this organizational form.  Second, in relation to both profit-seekers and 
public agencies, black clients are achieving superior participation outcomes among non-
profit providers in particular, and the interactive relationship does achieve statistical 
significance (see Table 5.5).  Black clients served in non-profit settings still have a 6 
percent reduced odds of participating in work activities but participation outcomes are 
especially inferior in for-profit and governmental settings.  The predicted odds ratios of 
black client TANF outcomes for open cases across administrative ownership 
arrangements are illustrated in Figure 5.9. 
Examining the odds ratios for the Employment and Sanction dependent variables 
for open cases in Figure 5.9, there is evidence that black clients are achieving superior 
employment and sanction outcomes under non-profits and for-profits compared to 
government agencies.  For instance, black clients are predicted to have a 12 percent (odds 
= 1.12) and 13 percent (odds = 1.13) increased odds of being employed under non-profit 
and for-profit providers respectively, whereas black clients within government agencies 
have a 7 percent decreased odds of employment (odds = .93).  This pattern of 
governmental inferiority holds for sanction outcomes among open case black clients in 
the 2000-2005 time period in that black clients are predicted to have a 75 percent 
increased odds of sanction under governmental administration, a 71 percent increased 
odds of sanction under non-profits, and a 65 percent increased odds of sanction under for-
profits.  There is minimal evidence of for-profit inferiority in the open case estimations. 
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The closed case interactive odds ratios for black clients across administrative 
arrangements are found in Figure 5.10.  With a 43 percent decreased odds, the predicted 
odds of TANF case closure due to employment or earnings is lowest among public 
agencies followed in inferiority by profit-seekers in which black clients have a 22 percent 
reduced odds of exiting TANF due to employment or earnings.  Alternatively, under non-
profit administration, black clients have a 16 percent increased odds of having their case 
closed for reasons due to employment or earnings, and the difference in odds between 
non-profits and public agencies achieves statistical significance.  These closed case 
findings suggest that while black clients are more likely to exit welfare due to 
employment or earnings under for-profit administration than under public administration 
(22 percent versus 43 percent reduced odds), non-profit TANF providers are found to 
outperform both for-profits and public agencies in terms of employment-based exits. 
Non-profit superiority in employment or earnings closure for black clients does 
not extend to superiority for closure due to sanction for non-compliance.  As observed in 
Figure 5.10, black clients within non-profit settings have a 14 percent increased odds of 
having their case closed due to sanction, whereas black clients have a 2 percent decreased 
odds of having their case closed due to sanction under government agencies.  Black 
clients are more likely to experience sanction case closure under non-profits than 
government agencies, but the odds of closure due to sanction is predicted to be highest 
within for-profit firms in accordance with theoretical expectations.  For the 2000-2005 
period, black clients have a 31 percent increased odds of having their case closed due to 
sanction under for-profit administration, more than under both non-profits and public 
agencies.  This could be evidence that profit-seekers in Florida are sanctioning black 
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clients more often in an effort to “cream” the TANF pool (Soss, Fording, and Schram 
2011), but the findings are not statistically significant and are inconsistent across open 
and closed cases.  Black clients are sometimes worse off under for-profits, especially in 
terms of case closure but any definitive or pronounced pattern of inferiority is absent 
from the analysis.  That being said, vis-à-vis non-profit organizations there is a pattern of 
profit-seeking inferiority in the interactive closed case estimations (Figure 5.10).  Black 
clients served under non-profit organizations are more likely to experience case closure 
due to employment or earnings. This could be evidence that non-profits are 
disproportionately more engaged with historically disadvantaged African American 
clients and more apt to “expend resources to serve segments of the public that would 
otherwise be seen as too costly or unprofitable to serve.” (Heinrich 2000, p. 3), but 
inconsistencies will not allow for conclusive inferences.   
Because of dichotomous measurement, odds ratios are required to interpret the 
work participation, employment, and sanction dependent variables, but what about 
predicted monthly income levels for black clients across administrative arrangements? 
The calculation and interpretation of the interactive monthly income coefficients is more 
straightforward, and the interactive income predictions for both open and closed cases are 
found in Figure 5.11.  In order to ascertain the predicted monthly income level for black 
clients, one must simply add the interaction term to the baseline Black coefficient.  For 
instance, open case black clients within for-profits are predicted to earn a mere 1.10 
dollars (-8.73 + 7.63 = -1.11) less than non-black clients (essentially zero substantive 
difference in monthly income levels).  Black clients within non-profits are predicted to 
earn slightly more at 11.82 dollars (-8.73 + 20.55 = 11.82).  While small in magnitude 
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black clients are predicted to do the worst under public agencies earning 8.73 dollars less 
monthly income than other clients.  This patterns continues with closed case black clients 
as observed in Figure 5.11.  Black clients are predicted to earn 38.87 dollars less in 
monthly income under public agencies, while earning 7.27 and 8.22 dollars more in 
predicted monthly income among for-profits and non-profits respectively.   
The HLM empirical findings to this point suggest that privatizing welfare 
administration is no panacea in that the superiority of TANF outcomes are often 
statistically insignificant and  inconsistent, but the findings also call into the question the 
presumed inferiority of profit-seeking firms to serve especially disadvantaged clientele.  
For-profits routinely outperform governmental ownership in terms of serving black 
TANF clients, while non-profits routinely induce higher quality relative to both 
government agencies and profit-seekers. This can be interpreted to mean that public 
policy scholars should remain critical of profit-seeking welfare delivery because for-
profits rarely outperform non-profit or public welfare delivery, not because they provide  
inequitable, unjust services to black clients with significant or magnified barriers. 
 
(Table 5.5 about here) 
 
 
(Figure 5.9 about here) 
 
 
(Table 5.6 about here) 
 
 
(Figure 5.10 about here) 
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(Figure 5.11 about here) 
 
Low Educated Clients 
What about the quality of program outcomes for another historically 
disadvantaged group of TANF clients, those clients lacking a high school education?  
Once again, the cross-level interaction terms in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 are largely 
insignificant statistically in the estimations, suggesting that the open and closed case 
TANF outcomes of less educated clients seldom vary meaningfully across administrative 
contexts.  When the interaction terms are significant, there is some evidence that low 
educated clients are fairing worse under for-profit arrangements and achieving relatively 
superior outcomes under non-profit administration.   
The for-profit interactions (ForPr*LTHS) are statistically insignificant in six of 
the seven estimations presented in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, including all three closed case 
estimations, suggesting that the outcomes of low educated TANF clients are no worse or 
better off under profit-seekers.  Similar to the for-profit interactive terms, the 
NonPr*LTHS coefficients are also largely insignificant in the estimations found in Tables 
5.7 and 5.8 suggesting that non-profit organizations are not particularly beneficial or 
detrimental to low educated clients.  However, as discussed earlier the interpretation of 
interactive coefficients and accompanying odds ratios is not obvious from the HLM 
tables.  One must examine interactive odds ratios relative to the odds of success within 
the baseline Public category (i.e. low educated clients within public agencies).  The 
predicted odds ratios of program outcomes for low educated clients across various 
administrative arrangements were calculated and are found in Figures 5.12 (open cases) 
and 5.13 (closed cases). 
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The open case interactive odds ratios in Figure 5.12 suggest that the TANF work 
participation and employment outcomes of low educated clients are improved among 
non-profit ownership relative to profit-seekers and public agencies.  For instance, low 
educated clients have a 34 percent reduced odds (1 - .66) of work participation under 
non-profits, while having a 43 percent (1 – .57) and 47 (1 - .53) percent reduced odds of 
participation within public agencies and for-profits respectively, but the difference in 
odds between non-profits and public agencies does not achieve statistical significance.  
The superiority of non-profits and relative inferiority of for-profits in serving low 
educated clients is more pronounced in the Employment model in Table 5.7.  Low 
educated clients have a 12 percent increased odds of being employed within non-profit 
settings, whereas low educated clients have a 33 percent and 58 percent decreased odds 
of being employed among public agencies and profit-seekers respectively.  The 
difference in odds between for-profits and public agencies is statistically significant. 
This pattern of improved work-based TANF outcomes among non-profits is 
confirmed further in Figure 5.13, which reports odds ratios for closed cases in Florida.  
For the 2000-2005 period, low educated clients do have an 11 percent decreased odds of 
case closure due to employment or earnings under non-profits, but these clients have a 
magnified 27 percent and 28 percent decreased odds of employment or earnings closure 
within public agencies and for-profit administration respectively.  These findings suggest 
that under non-profit administration they are potentially more likely to be employed and 
are exiting welfare due to employment relative to government agencies and profit-
seekers.   
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Non-profit superiority among low educated clients does not extend to TANF 
sanctioning outcomes.  As observed in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 the sanctioning outcomes of 
low educated clients are predicted to be relatively superior among governmental settings 
and unexpectedly within for-profits relative to non-profits.  Low educated open case 
clients (Figure 5.12) have a 21 percent increased odds of being sanctioned for non-
compliance among non-profits, while low educated clients have a 22 percent reduced 
odds of being sanctioned among for-profits and a 3 percent reduced odds of sanction 
within public agencies.  Low educated closed case clients (Figure 5.13) have a 3 percent 
reduced odds case closure due to sanction within non-profit settings, but have an 11 
percent and 14 percent reduced odds of sanction closure within public agencies and 
profit-seekers respectively, although none of the interactive sanction coefficients reach 
statistical significance.  There is evidence that the employment outcomes of low educated 
clients are markedly inferior among for-profit firms relative to non-profit organizations 
but sanctioning outcomes do not necessarily share a pattern of pronounced inferiority.   
Although inconsistent, especially as it pertains to sanctions, there is evidence 
from both the open case and closed case samples that non-profit welfare implementation 
can be advantageous to low educated clients.  Along with relatively superior 
participation, employment, and closure due to employment among non-profits, there is 
evidence that low educated clients are also earning more in monthly income as illustrated 
in Figure 5.14.  For instance, the NonPr*LTHS coefficient is positive and significant in 
the Earnings model in Table 5.7 suggesting that low educated clients served under non-
profits are earning more in monthly income.  The effect in relation to the baseline Black 
coefficient is equal to 29.85 dollars (40.01 - 10.16) or the equivalent of 30 dollars more 
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per month in employment income, and the interaction term reaches statistical 
significance.  This translates into nearly 360 dollars more in yearly predicted earnings for 
low educated clients served under non-profits.  On the other hand, low educated clients 
within for-profits are predicted to earn 15.91 dollars (-5.75 – 10.16) less in monthly 
income, worse than both non-profits and public agencies.   
We observe a similar pattern in the closed case predicted income values.  Low 
educated clients are predicted to earn less monthly income in every administrative setting 
but are predicted to earn the least amount among profit-seekers followed closely by 
government agencies, while achieving relatively superior earnings outcomes under non-
profit providers.  Low educated clients served under for-profits are predicted to earn 
54.99 dollars less in monthly earnings.  Similarly, low educated clients are predicted to 
earn 45.13 dollars less in monthly earnings under government ownership.  The earnings 
outcomes among non-profit organizations are relatively improved in that low educated 
clients are only predicted to earn 7.62 dollars less in monthly income.  The monthly 
earnings of disadvantaged clients are consistently improved under non-profit ownership 
relative to other administrative forms.  There is little evidence that for-profits have 
especially deleterious effects on low educated clients relative to government agencies, but 
there is some evidence that low educated clients are achieving superior outcomes under 
non-profit arrangements.  
 
(Table 5.7 about here) 
 
(Figure 5.12 about here) 
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(Table 5.8 about here) 
 
(Figure 5.13 about here) 
 
(Figure 5.14 about here) 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Privatizing the administration of public policies through contracting with for-
profit and non-profit service providers is a popular tool of governance, yet the 
implications of contracting decisions in human support policy remain understudied and 
relatively unknown.  One recent case in need of study involves welfare policy in 
America.  The latest wave of reform legislation devolved administrative authority to 
states and localities that have instituted privatized bureaucratic approaches at the street-
level, in the hopes of achieving improvement in service quality for the poor (Sanger 
2003; GAO 2002; and Winston 2002).  It is well documented that sub-national 
jurisdictions are privatizing welfare implementation under PRWORA, yet researchers 
have accumulated very modest knowledge about how variation in privatized 
administration affects the TANF program outputs experienced by TANF clients.  This 
analysis principally seeks to empirically connect administrative arrangements to TANF 
program outcomes through utilizing methodologically appropriate multi-level models that 
simultaneously incorporate and estimate both individual-level and contextual factors 
within the state of Florida.  The primary expectation throughout this chapter is to observe 
that both client-level factors and administrative arrangements affect TANF outcomes and 
to observe superior program outcomes among clients served under privatized 
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administration vis-à-vis public agencies.  On one hand, the individual-level variables do 
display consistent and expected relationships with TANF outcomes.  Clients that are 
female, single, low educated, and African American are found to generally participate in 
work activities at lower rates, earn less in monthly earnings from employment, and are 
sanctioned at higher rates. 
More often than not, the provider type variables are insignificant to both the state-
level analysis and the pooled multi-level open and closed case models.  Ten of the twelve 
state-level privatization coefficients presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are statistically 
insignificant, while nine of the fourteen privatization coefficients presented in the 
baseline multi-level Tables 5.3 and 5.4 are statistically insignificant. When variables are 
statistically insignificant, the null hypothesis that privatization has no appreciable effect 
on TANF outcomes cannot be rejected.  In short, there is little empirical evidence of 
consistent privatized superiority in these models. 
One possible reason for the prevalence of null findings in the multi-level analysis 
could likely pertain to the system of transparent performance-based contracting that 
exists within the state of Florida.  Although RWBs within Florida are at liberty to 
contract welfare administration to private sector stakeholders, they are not at liberty to 
craft unique contracts that outline desired localized performance objectives.  Performance 
benchmarks related to work-participation rates and wage ratios, for instance, are centrally 
and uniformly developed at the state-level by the Florida Department of Children and 
Families.  Regardless of administrative ownership, all welfare providers in Florida are 
held to uniform performance standards, and performance outcomes are publicly 
scrutinized in quarterly “red” and “green” reports that rank how various regions are 
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performing in terms of work participation and the like47.  The uniformity of performance 
pressures inherent in the Florida contracting system likely mitigates any main effects of 
administrative ownership.  When public agencies and non-profits must compete 
alongside profit-seekers for similar performance-based contracts, the efficacy of 
privatized ownership is seemingly muted.  Privatization alone is not an administrative 
panacea. 
Recent qualitative evidence on the Florida welfare system gathered by Soss, 
Fording, and Schram (2011) further highlights the weaknesses of welfare privatization, 
especially for-profit privatization, without proper contracting processes and institutional 
accountability.  Profit-seeking entities were increasing their presence in Florida over the 
time period examined in this dissertation, but increased presence failed to materialize into 
consistent implementation successes for welfare clients.  Why did privatization fail to 
yield consistently superior performance?  There are several potential culprits.  Perhaps 
most importantly, Soss, Fording, and Schram report that the TANF contracting process in 
Florida lacked open transparency.  Although Florida has a history of broad “sunshine 
laws” when it comes to the activities of state-level departments, compulsory transparency 
does not extend to localized RWBs, whose activities operate in secrecy.  Details about the 
particular contracting process or details within contracts are inaccessible to advocacy 
groups, researchers, or even state officials. 
Along with a absence of contractual transparency, the loose collection of public-
private RWBs in Florida lacked the proper capacity to adequately monitor the activities 
                                                      
47 Top performing regions are put in the “green” while underperforming regions are put in the “red”, and 
these summary TANF performance reports are distributed throughout the state.  Having performance 
publicly scrutinized likely incentivizes welfare providers to optimize program outputs, irrespective of 
organizational form and ownership.   
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and results of welfare providers.  The paradox of privatization is that shedding direct 
responsibility of administrative activities requires more intensive and comprehensive 
accountability mechanisms from government (Van Slyke 2002). In other words, 
government monitoring and oversight has become increasingly important as 
administrative activities flow to third-party providers.  However, instead of instituting 
strong forms of public oversight and institutional accountability, Florida RWBs allowed 
welfare providers to self-report their results, inducing incentives to inflate performance 
numbers. Audits into several for-profit providers painted a damning picture of 
malfeasance in which corporations received performance bonuses with fabricated 
employment data (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).   
The client-level data examined in this dissertation consists of administrative data 
voluntarily provided to the DHHS from state officials in Florida and found that profit-
seekers are unlikely to improve the outputs and outcomes of TANF clients.  In other 
words, private providers may not have been performing as highly as they were reporting 
publicly.  Unknown contracting procedures, weak contracts, loose oversight, and self-
reporting results likely doomed welfare privatization in Florida.  Indeed, since 2008 some 
thirteen RWBs have completely terminated privatized contracts and have opted to retain 
welfare services in-house.  Welfare privatization was popular for the 2000 – 2005 time 
period examined in this dissertation, but quickly fell out of favor with both clients and 
public officials.   
When the privatization variables are statistically significant in the analyses 
presented in this chapter, there is a persistent pattern of superiority among non-profit 
welfare providers vis-à-vis profit-seeking and government controlled delivery.  Non-
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profit TANF contracting is positively associated with TANF work participation rates at 
the state-level.  In the open case multi-level models non-profit contracting was wholly 
unrelated to the superiority of TANF outcomes, but in the closed case models (Table 5.4) 
clients are more likely to exit welfare due to employment and less likely to exit welfare 
due to sanction.  These findings comport with Crew and Lamothe’s study in that non-
profits were found to be more successful in employing TANF clients.  Lastly, African 
American and low-income clients are intermittently achieving superior outcomes among 
non-profit provision.  The social mission of non-profits to assist poverty populations and 
transform individual behavior could drive superior workfare performance all other things 
being equal.  Non-profits have a long history of assisting in poverty governance and the 
evidence here suggests that non-profits should continue to operate alongside public 
agencies in human support provision.  Including this dissertation, there is evidence from 
state-level, county-level (Crew and Lamothe 2003), and multi-level analyses that non-
profits outperform other organizational forms in welfare implementation. 
Future research should proceed in several directions.  This analysis presented here 
utilized dummy variables (0 to 1 coding) to denote administrative ownership but there are 
likely other agency-level variables that matter to TANF employment outcomes.  Factors 
found within different welfare agencies, such as organizational culture or managerial 
expertise, could theoretically influence TANF program outcomes.  This dissertation 
assumes that privatized ownership entails flexible and innovative management systems, 
but data on specific managerial operations across providers were not analyzed.  
Administrative ownership may or may not be indicative of managerial styles and 
effectiveness, but more research will need to uncover these potential relationships. 
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Next, researchers should work to better understand how the decisions shaping 
initial contracting decisions can also potentially shape bureaucratic activities at the street-
level.  The multi-level analysis pursued in this dissertation assumes that Florida locales 
decide to contract with non-profits and for-profits at random, but that is all but assuredly 
not the case.  For instance, certain organizational forms could be under or over 
performing because they are serving systematically different types of clients in 
systematically different geographical settings.  A preliminary examination of Florida 
contracting patterns is ambiguous.  Non-profits and for-profits are spread across both 
urban and rural settings and high unemployment and low unemployment counties.  An 
initial logit analysis suggests that population size and ideology are also not significant 
predictors of contracting patterns in Florida.  The analysis does suggest that for-profits 
are potentially more likely to serve Latino and black populations than non-profits and 
public agencies, but more research is needed to confirm any definitive associations. 
Future research would also benefit from moving beyond the state of Florida.    All 
current quantitative studies connecting TANF administration to employment outcomes 
are undertaken in Florida, thus the generalizability of any findings is incomplete until 
other states are examined.  This research expands and largely confirms Crew and 
Lamothe’s previous assertions about the inadequacies of TANF privatization in Florida 
and corroborates the more recent work by Soss, Fording, and Schram, but researchers and 
policymakers require a more general understanding of the relationship between 
contracting and outcomes.  This can only be accomplished by extending multi-level 
statistical analyses to other state-level contexts. 
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Although privatized welfare providers are not found to consistently induce 
superior employment outcomes among the general TANF population in Florida, the 
evidence in the final section of this chapter suggests that privatizing welfare 
administration also does not have particularly deleterious effects on disadvantaged 
clientele.  Vis-à-vis government agencies there is no consistent pattern of pronounced 
inferiority among for-profit providers, while non-profits are found to routinely 
outperform both public agencies and profit-seekers when serving particularly 
disadvantaged populations. For-profits regularly outperform government agencies in 
serving historically troubled clientele but rarely outperform non-profit organizations. 
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Table 5.1.  TANF Privatization and Performance Outcomes Across the American 
States, 2001 
IVs Participate   S.β.     Employment     S.β.      Sanction       S.β.     Earnings
Privatization 
TVPrivate 
 
 
 .264            .104         -.036           -.096        -.069          -.122         -1.92     
(.282)                          (.085)                          (.110)                         (1.74)      
Service Supply 
Log-Pop 
 
Log-Bus 
 
Log-Nprof 
 
Urbanism 
 
 1.30            .227           4.73            .361         15.78         .682        -127.68   
(26.63)                        (15.33)                         (12.96)                     (157.22)  
 5.88            .266           6.61            .381         1.32           .129        -142.64   
(5.28)                           (7.61)                          (7.24)                       (108.22)  
-.901          -.148           2.78            .303        -24.33        -.959         188.33   
(27.21)                        (16.72)                         (14.34)                     (157.82)  
 .084            .013          .305**         .473         .069           .107           1.23     
(.210)                           (.150)                          (.131)                         (2.08)     
Policy Tools 
WorkRequire 
 
SanctSeverity 
 
 
 2.27            .051           1.13            .053         -1.86         -.159          48.41    
(5.16)                           (2.92)                          (2.70)                        (35.03)   
-.039          -.069          -.018            .075          .087**       .321         -.763     
(.061)                           (.038)                          (.043)                          (.623)    
Client Traits 
AA-Caseload 
 
Unmarried 
 
-.257**      -.373          -.112*         -.367          .066          .269            1.54    
(.119)                            (.066)                          (.068)                         (.932)    
 -.054         -.151          -.051           -.148          .056          .158          -.517     
(.079)                            (.048)                          (.061)                         (.803) 
Socioeconomics 
Unemployment 
 
Poverty 
 
  5.57           .243          -.162           -.039          2.87*        .258          68.41    
(4.66)                            (2.24)                          (1.67)                        (62.36)   
-2.22*        -.376          -.249            -.381         .848          .232         -17.28    
(1.22)                           (.626)                           (.571)                        (11.97) 
Politics 
GovtID 
 
Governor 
 
 -.228*       -.312            .062            .156         -.001          .003           2.10    
(.122)                            (.065)                           (.059)                        (2.07)    
  1.39           .074          -.871           -.029          -1.45       -.077          36.12    
(7.28)                            (3.51)                           (3.56)                       (49.02)   
Mississippi  
 
-21.70        -.169            3.98            .049          16.20*      .227          36.04 
(16.93)                          (7.76)                           (8.39)                     (128.02) 
N 
R2 
   50                                 50                                 50                              50      
 .397                              .364                              .480                           .505     
Note: OLS coefficients in bold, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  All dependent variables are 
measured for the year 2001.  TVPrivate is measured as the percentage of TANF funds awarded to 
private entities.  The Participation dependent variable is measured as the percentage of TANF caseload 
that is currently participating in at least 30 hours of work preparation activities.  The Employment 
dependent variable is measured as the percentage of the TANF active adult cases that were employed 
in 2001.  The Sanction dependent is measured as the percentage of the TANF caseload that was closed 
due to sanction (work related or other reasons) in 2001.   The Earnings dependent variable is measured 
as the average monthly earnings for active adult TANF cases.  **p < .05; *p < .10. 
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Table 5.2.  TANF Privatization and Performance Outcomes Across the American States, 
2001 
IVs Participate    S.β.      Employment     S.β.      Sanction       S.β.      Earnings 
Privatization 
ForProfit 
 
NonProfit 
 
 .028             .161        -.781**         -.518         -.106         -.222          -1.32      
(.557)                           (.203)                             (.272)                        (4.45)    
 .354*           .298        -.037             -.068          -.054        -.085          -1.37 
 (.210)                          (.087)                             (.075)                        (1.29) 
Service Supply 
Log-Pop 
 
Log-Bus 
 
Log-Nprof 
 
Urbanism 
 
 6.70             .127          13.29            .559          16.16        .595         -135.02   
(27.74)                         (13.01)                            (13.57)                    (193.28)   
 7.12             .146         -22.81          -.421            2.38        .079         -140.09   
(6.35)                            (8.00)                             (7.11)                      (111.19)   
-9.45           -.179          -8.10           -.212          -24.82      -.828          195.39   
(29.77)                         (13.11)                           (14.83)                     (201.83)   
-.107           -.229          .370**         .575             .074        .084            1.01      
(.221)                            (.150)                             (.133)                        (2.10)     
Policy Tools 
WorkRequire 
 
SanctSeverity 
 
 
 3.52             .032          .421             .049            -1.93      -.126          49.62      
(5.66)                            (2.79)                             (2.67)                       (34.72)    
-.015           -.017         -.018            -.037           .086**     .321           -.771     
(.067)                            (.032)                             (.042)                        (.618)     
Client Traits 
AA-Caseload 
 
Unmarried 
 
-.205*         -.301        -.122**         -.401            .063         .232           1.50      
(.111)                           (.057)                              (.067)                        (.949)     
-.023           -.012        -.027             -.219            .058         .221          -.523      
(.082)                           (.042)                              (.060)                        (.800) 
Socioeconomic 
Unemployment 
 
Poverty 
 
 5.62             .222         -.326            -.031            2.78*       .241          66.83     
(4.79)                            (2.27)                             (1.60)                      (62.36)     
-2.24**       -.383          -.296           -.077            .838         .056         -17.89     
(1.06)                            (.557)                             (.526)                       (11.97) 
Politics 
GovtID 
 
Governor 
 
-.139           -.296           .093             .007             .003        .026           2.09      
(.144)                            (.055)                              (.059)                       (2.02)     
  3.37            .013          -3.02           -.004            -1.78      -.028         -38.96     
(7.75)                            (3.31)                              (3.57)                      (50.85)    
Mississippi  
 
 -26.03*      -.192           9.63             .261            16.09**   .234           9.79 
(13.94)                          (6.61)                              (7.05)                     (116.17) 
N 
R2 
   50                                 50                                    50                             50       
 .414                              .443                                 .483                          .511      
Note: OLS coefficients in bold, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  All dependent variables are 
measured for the year 2001.  TVPrivate is measured as the percentage of TANF funds awarded to 
private entities.  The Participation dependent variable is measured as the percentage of TANF caseload 
that is currently participating in at least 30 hours of work preparation activities.  The Employment 
dependent variable is measured as the percentage of the TANF active adult cases that were employed in 
2001.  The Sanction dependent is measured as the percentage of the TANF caseload that was closed due 
to sanction (work related or other reasons) in 2001.   The Earnings dependent variable is measured as 
the average monthly earnings for active adult TANF cases.  **p < .05; *p < .10. 
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Table 5.3.  Pooled HLM Analysis of TANF Privatization and Client Outcomes for 
Open Cases in the State of Florida, 2000-05 
IVs WorkPart   Odds       Employ     Odds        Sanction     Odds        Earnings    
Individual   
Female 
 
LTHS 
 
Single 
 
Black 
 
Latino 
 
-.605***     .525         -.069         .944           .345**        1.42            -15.02* 
(.143)                          (.047)                          (.171)                            (8.94) 
 -.591***    .556         -.519***   .582            .099*         1.10          -52.42** 
(.002)                          (.115)                          (.053)                           (15.05) 
-.786***     .456         -.147         .863           -.097          .908             -4.94  
(.071)                          (.113)                          (.241)                            (4.80) 
 -.244***    .783          -.041        .959            .708**       2.03              4.12   
(.077)                          (.127)                          (.279)                            (5.30) 
  .162           1.17          .237         1.27            .357           1.43              3.14 
(.101)                          (.159)                          (.423)                            (7.12) 
Contextual  
ForProfit 
 
NonProfit 
 
Ideology 
 
Unemploy 
 
BlackPct 
 
LatinoPct 
 
-.266**       .766         -.243**     .785             .202          1.22             -9.38*    
(.072)                          (.118)                          (.547)                            (4.94)     
-.035           .966         -.083         .992             .094          1.09             13.86   
(.162)                          (.249)                          (.242)                           (11.36) 
-.084           .919          .064          1.01             .032         1.03              3.98 
(.098)                          (.074)                          (.144)                            (3.10) 
-.029           .971          .028          1.03            .187*        1.24             -2.79 
(.046)                          (.040)                          (.102)                            (2.45) 
-.014**       .986         -.020         .979             .017          1.03            -.623 
(.006)                          (.011)                          (.021)                            (.447) 
 .031***     1.03          .018**      1.02           -.030**      .970              .335 
(.004)                          (.006)                         (.015)                             (.268) 
N 
μ0 
Chi-Square 
 4340; 67                   4340;67                      4340;67                         4340;67  
 .364                             .145                            .370                              13.46 
 213.20***                  60.76*                       74.06*                            94.89* 
Note:  Cell entries are multi-level maximum likelihood coefficients/odds ratios (WorkPart, 
Employ, and Sanction models) and regression coefficients (Earnings model) with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. The WorkPart, Employ, and Sanction dependent variables are all measured 
dichotomously indicating whether an open case client was engaged in full-time work participation 
activities, was currently employed, or was currently sanctioned at the time of being surveyed 
(coded 1 if participating, working, or sanctioned and 0 if otherwise).  The Earnings dependent 
variable is measured continuously and represents total monthly earnings from the previous month 
of employment. ***p < .001; ** p < .05; *p < .10. 
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Table 5.4.  Pooled HLM Analysis of TANF Privatization and Client 
Outcomes for Closed Cases in the State of Florida, 2000-05
IVs Employ       Odds             Sanction      Odds              Earnings   
Individual  
Female 
 
LTHS 
 
Single 
 
Black 
 
Latino 
 
-.024           .976               .626***        1.87                -41.86**   
(.145)                               (.132)                                   (16.28)      
-.258***     .981               -.111            .895                 -37.77**   
(.086)                               (.072)                                   (14.51)      
.082            1.09                .023             1.02                  15.79       
(.066)                               (.073)                                   (10.71)      
-.239**       .787               .174**          1.19                  -3.52       
(.079)                               (.068)                                   (.13.94)     
-.017           .983               .023              1.02                  -5.78       
(.072)                               (.077)                                   (16.18)      
Contextual  
ForProfit 
 
NonProfit 
 
Ideology 
 
Unemploy 
 
BlackPct 
 
LatinoPct 
 
-.025           .971              -.131              .877                   5.80       
(.093)                               (.098)                                   (16.06)      
.355**        1.43              -.270**          .764                  23.64      
(.142)                               (.130)                                   (20.99)      
-.109           .897              -.079              .924                  -4.29       
(.062)                               (.073)                                     (7.88)      
-.062*         .940               .006              1.02                   7.99 
(.033)                               (.004)                                   (10.03) 
-.005           .986              -.010              .990                   .784       
(.094)                               (.011)                                     (1.26)      
-.012**       .988               .001              1.00                   .314       
(.019)                               (.005)                                     (1.23)      
N 
μ0 
Chi-Square 
4624; 67                          4624;67                                4624;67    
 .156                                  .224                                       36.99 
 72.95*                            91.96**                              106.40***
Note: Cell entries are multi-level maximum likelihood coefficients/odds ratios (Employ 
and Sanction models) and regression coefficients (Earnings model) with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. The Employ and Sanction dependent variables are 
measured dichotomously indicating whether a case was closed due to 
employment/earnings or closed due to sanction (coded 1 if case closed due to 
employment/earnings or sanction and coded 0 if case closed for other reasons). The 
Earnings dependent variable is analogous to the open case estimations and represents 
total reported monthly earnings from the previous month of employment.  ***p < .001; 
**p < .05; *p < .10. 
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Table 5.5  Pooled Interactive HLM Analysis of TANF Privatization and Client Outcomes 
for Open Cases, 2000-2005 
IVs  WorkPart    Odds          Employ     Odds          Sanction    Odds      Earnings   
Individual   
Female 
 
LTHS 
 
Single 
 
Black 
 
Latino 
 
-.611***       .524           -.069          .944            .341**       1.40          -18.63     
(.102)                             (.050)                            (.118)                           (7.23)     
-.586***       .557          -.519***     .595            .140           .881        -10.85**   
(.060)                             (.114)                            (.243)                           (4.29)     
-.786***       .456          -.161*         .852             .091          .917             3.61      
(.081)                             (.098)                            (.245)                           (4.26)     
-.540**         .583           -.076          .927             1.01***    1.75           -8.73      
(.196)                             (.112)                            (.272)                           (7.82)     
 .194              1.21           .227           1.26             .346          1.41            7.87      
(.143)                             (.163)                            (.994)                           (7.81)     
Contextual  
ForProfit 
 
NonProfit 
 
Ideology 
 
Unemploy 
 
BlackPct 
 
LatinoPct 
-.017             .983          -.305**       .737             .456           1.58           -6.71     
(.138)                             (.145)                            (.342)                           (7.70)     
-.035             .965          -.001           .999            -.158          .854          -13.68     
(.231)                             (.191)                            (.768)                           (9.78) 
 -.079            .924           .038           1.04           -.057            .945            2.35 
(.090)                             (.073)                            (.144)                            (5.20) 
-.029             .971           .029           1.03             .185*         1.25           -2.93 
(.045)                             (.040)                            (.102)                           (2.48) 
-.007             .993          -.016           .985            .014            1.01          -.481 
(.011)                             (.011)                            (.019)                           (.592) 
-.013*           1.01          .015*          1.02           -.029**        .971          -.169 
(.008)                             (.007)                           (.013)                           (.276)
Interaction  
Prof * Black 
 
NonPr *Black 
.281              1.32           .199            1.22           -.510            .601           7.63      
(.105)                             (.171)                           (.377)                            (7.82)     
.482**          1.62           .186            1.20           -.482            .618          20.55     
(.042)                             (.364)                           (1.56)                            (8.92)     
N 
μ0 
Chi-Square 
 4340; 67                      4340;67                        4340;67                        4340;67
 .361                               .156                               .389                              14.24 
 211.19***                    64.72*                           79.29*                        96.78**
Note:  Cell entries are multi-level maximum likelihood coefficients/odds ratios (WorkPart, Employ, and 
Sanction models) and regression coefficients (Earnings) with robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
WorkPart, Employ, and Sanction dependent variables are all measured dichotomously indicating 
whether an open case client was engaged in full-time work participation activities, was currently 
employed, or was currently sanctioned at the time of being surveyed (coded 1 if participating, working, 
or sanctioned and coded 0 if otherwise).  The Earnings dependent variable is measured continuously 
and represents total reported monthly earnings from the previous month of employment.   ***p < .001; 
**p < .05, *p < .10. 
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Table 5.6  Pooled Interactive HLM Analysis of TANF Privatization and Client 
Outcomes for Closed Cases, 2000-2005
IVs  CloseEmpl    Odds        CloseSanct    Odds             Earnings     
Individual  
Female 
 
LTHS 
 
Single 
 
Black 
 
Latino 
 
-.022              .978           .629***         1.87                 -41.98**   
(.166)                              (.132)                                    (19.09)      
-.248***        .780          -.109               .896                -37.13**   
(.060)                              (.072)                                   (14.61)       
 .074              1.08            .022               1.02                 15.32       
(.066)                              (.067)                                    (10.74)      
-.562**          .570          -.008               .991                -38.87       
(.072)                              (.132)                                    (16.54)      
 .121              1.13            .014               1.01                -.537         
(.089)                              (.092)                                    (20.56)      
Contextual  
ForProfit 
 
NonProfit 
 
Ideology 
 
Unemploy 
 
BlackPct 
 
LatinoPct 
-.101             .904            -.275*            .760                -17.53       
(.141)                               (.145)                                   (20.37)      
 .068              1.08           -.348**          .706                 -2.12         
(.162)                               (.162)                                   (27.88) 
 -.110*          .896            -.086              .918                 -5.60 
(.068)                               (.073)                                    (8.28) 
-.074**         .928            -.007              .993                  7.51 
(.035)                               (.039)                                   (10.18) 
-.005             .994            -.011              .989                  .652 
(.007)                               (.011)                                    (1.26) 
-.013*           .987             .001              1.00                  .297 
(.006)                               (.005)                                    (1.16)
Interaction  
Profit * Black 
 
NonProfit *Black 
 .322**         1.39             .276              1.32                 46.14**    
(.105)                               (.156)                                   (26.18)      
.708***        2.04             .138              1.15                 47.09**    
(.042)                               (.176)                                   (26.91)      
N 
μ0 
Chi-Square 
4624; 67                         4624 ;67                              4624 ;67
  .199                                 .223                                      37.47 
 82.22*                             91.41**                             108.09***
Note:  Cell entries are multi-level maximum likelihood coefficients/odds ratios (Employ 
and Sanction models) and regression coefficients (Earnings model) with robust standard 
errors in parentheses. The Employ and Sanction dependent variables are measured 
dichotomously indicating whether a case was closed due to employment/earnings or closed 
due to sanction (coded 1 if case closed due to employment/earnings or sanction and coded 0 
if case closed for other reasons). The Earnings dependent variable is analogous to the open 
case estimations and represents total reported monthly earnings from the previous month of 
employment.  ***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .10. 
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Table 5.7  Pooled Interactive HLM Analysis of TANF Privatization and Client Outcomes 
for Open Cases, 2000-2005 
IVs WorkPart    Odds        Employ    Odds          Sanction     Odds        Earnings    
Individual  
Female 
 
LTHS 
 
Single 
 
Black 
 
Latino 
 
-.615***      .524          -.068         1.06            .342**        1.42          -18.97**   
(.102)                            (.047)                          (.121)                             (7.23)     
-.558***      .572          -.396**     .673            -.031          .970           -10.16*     
(.082)                            (.112)                          (.375)                             (5.72)     
-.787***      .455          -.162*       .851            -.085          .919              3.30       
(.082)                            (.098)                          (.218)                             (4.26)     
-.205**        .814          -.023         .984             .736***     2.09             3.33       
(.077)                            (.096)                          (.257)                             (4.27)     
 .138            1.15            .268*       1.31             .278           1.32             5.21       
(.149)                            (.141)                          (.348)                             (8.13)     
Contextual   
ForProfit 
 
NonProfit 
 
Ideology 
 
Unemploy 
 
BlackPct 
 
LatinoPct 
 .002            1.00           -.001        .999              .231           1.26            -4.24      
(.153)                            (.158)                          (.321)                           (10.01)     
-.077            .926           -.118        .889            -.557           .573         - 30.89**   
(.238)                             (.238)                         (.615)                           (10.46) 
 -.073           .930            .052        1.05            -.049           .952              3.57 
(.088)                             (.085)                         (.139)                             (4.62) 
-.029            .971            .032        1.03             .185*         1.25             -2.80 
(.045)                             (.043)                         (.102)                             (2.39) 
-.009            .991           -.014        .986             .014           1.01            -.525 
(.011)                             (.012)                         (.019)                             (.559) 
 .014*           1.01           .013*       1.01          -.028**        .972             -.041 
(.008)                             (.007)                         (.013)                             (.285) 
Interaction  
Prof * LTHS 
 
NonPr *LTHS 
-.076            .927          -.467*       .627            -.224          .799             -5.74       
(.142)                             (.259)                         (.414)                            (9.36)      
.139              1.15           .505         1.66             .220          1.26            40.01**   
(.207)                             (.469)                         (1.17)                           (13.73)     
N 
μ0 
Chi-Square 
4340; 67                       4340;67                      4340;67                        4340;67 
.365                                .149                            .369                              12.98 
213.37***                     60.82*                       73.27*                           93.49* 
Note:  Cell entries are multi-level maximum likelihood coefficients (WorkPart, Employ, and Sanction 
models) and regression coefficients (Earnings) with robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
WorkPart, Employ, and Sanction dependent variables are all measured dichotomously indicating 
whether an open case client was engaged in full-time work participation activities, was currently 
employed, or was currently sanctioned at the time of being surveyed (coded 1 if participating, working, 
or sanctioned and 0 if otherwise).  The Earnings dependent variable is measured continuously and 
represents total reported monthly earnings from the previous month of employment.  ***p<.001;   
**p < .05; *p < .10. 
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Table 5.8  Pooled Interactive HLM Analysis of TANF Privatization and Client 
Outcomes for Closed Cases, 2000-2005
IVs  CloseEmpl   Odds         CloseSanct    Odds            Earnings    
Individual  
Female 
 
LTHS 
 
Single 
 
Black 
 
Latino 
 
  -.014            .987             .632***       1.87              -41.96**    
  (.181)                              (.132)                                (19.13)      
  -.319**        .727            -.128            .896              -45.13**    
  (.115)                              (.094)                                (22.28)      
   .096            1.10              .033            1.02                17.17        
  (.067)                              (.066)                                (11.78)      
  -.233**        .792             .178**         1.19                -1.49        
  (.072)                              (.068)                                (14.09)      
  -.018            .982             .022             1.01                -4.50        
  (.072)                              (.077)                                (15.99)      
Contextual  
ForProfit 
 
NonProfit 
 
Ideology 
 
Unemploy 
 
BlackPct 
 
LatinoPct 
  .036             1.04            -.117             .760                16.28       
  (.141)                              (.142)                                 (22.98)     
  .229             1.26            -.328**         .706               -10.35       
  (.152)                              (.138)                                 (35.99) 
  -.110*          .899            -.080             .918                -2.89 
  (.063)                              (.072)                                  (8.67) 
  -.062*          .940             .005             1.03                  8.34 
  (.033)                              (.038)                                 (10.17) 
  -.005            .995            -.010             .989                 .693 
  (.007)                              (.011)                                  (1.34) 
  -.012*          .988              .001            1.00                 .513 
  (.005)                              (.005)                                  (1.20)
Interaction  
Profit * LTHS 
 
NonProfit *LTHS 
  -.011            .989            -.029             1.32                -9.86       
  (.158)                              (.150)                                 (22.82)     
  .205*           1.23              .098             1.15                37.51      
  (.127)                               (.102)                                (28.40)     
N 
μ0 
Chi-Square 
 4624; 67                          4624;67                              4624;67
  .156                                   .225                                   37.97 
 73.36*                               92.11**                          109.04***
Note:  Cell entries are multi-level maximum likelihood coefficients/odds ratios (Employ and 
Sanction models) and regression coefficients (Earnings model) with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The Employ and Sanction dependent variables are measured dichotomously 
indicating whether a case was closed due to employment/earnings or closed due to sanction 
(coded 1 if case closed due to employment/earnings or sanction and coded 0 if case closed 
for other reasons). The Earnings dependent variable is analogous to the open case 
estimations and represents total reported monthly earnings from the previous month of 
employment.  ***p < .001; **p < .05; *p < .10. 
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Figure 5.1. Predicted Decrease in TANF Work Participation Rate
Across Poverty, Race, and Ideology, 2001
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Figure 5.2.  Predicted Change in TANF Employment Rate 
Across Levels of Urbanism and Race, 2001
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Figure 5.3.  Predicted Increase in TANF Sanction Rate Across 
Sanction Severity and Unemployment Levels, 2001
162 
 
For‐Profit
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Figure 5.4. Predicted Decrease in TANF Employment Rate 
Across For-Profit Contracting Levels, 2001
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Non-Profit
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Figure 5.5. Predicted Increase in TANF Work Participation Rate 
across Non-Profit Contracting Levels, 2001
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Figure 5.6.  Predicted Decrease in Odds of TANF Work 
Participation and Employment among For-Profits for 
Open TANF Cases in Florida, 2000-2005
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Figure 5.7.  Predicted Increase or Decrease in Odds of 
TANF Work Participation, Sanction, Closure Due to 
Employment, and Closure due to Sanction for Black TANF 
Clients in Florida, 2000-2005
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Figure 5.8.  Predicted Increase or Decrease in Odds of 
Employment and Sanction among Non-Profits for 
Closed TANF Cases in FL, 2000-2005
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Note:  The x-axis represents the predicted increase or decrease in odds of work participation,          
employment, or sanction for open case African American clients. 
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Figure 5.9.  Predicted Increase or Decrease in Odds of TANF 
Work Participation, Employment, and Sanction for Open 
Case Black TANF Clients in Florida, 2000-2005
ForProfit
NonProfit
Public
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         Note:  The x-axis represents the predicted increase or decrease in odds of closure due to 
              employment/earnings or sanction for African American clients. 
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Figure 5.10.  Predicted Increase or Decrease in Odds of 
Closure Due to Employment/Earnings and Sanctions 
for Black TANF Clients in Florida, 2000-2005
ForProfit
NonProfit
Public
169 
 
 
               Note:  The x-axis represents the predicted increase or decrease in monthly income 
               for both open and closed case African American clients. 
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Figure 5.11.  Predicted Gain or Loss in Monthly 
Income for Black TANF Clients in Florida, 2000-2005
ForProfit
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            Note:  The x-axis represents the predicted increase or decrease in odds of work participation, 
              employment, or sanction for open case clients that lack a high school diploma. 
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Figure 5.12.  Predicted Increase or Decrease in Odds of 
TANF Work Participation, Employment, and Sanctions 
for Open Case Low Educated TANF Clients in Florida, 
2000-2005
ForProfit
NonProfit
Public
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             Note:  The x-axis represents the predicted increase or decrease in odds of closure due to 
                employment/earnings or sanctions for clients that lack a high school diploma. 
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Figure 5.13. Predicted Decrease in Odds of Closure 
Due to Employment/Earnings and Sanction for Low 
Educated TANF Clients in Florida, 2000-2005  
ForProfit
NonProfit
Public
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             Note:  The x-axis represents the predicted increase or decrease in monthly income for  
                both open and closed case clients that lack a high school diploma 
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Figure 5.14.  Predicted Loss or Gain in Monthly 
Income for Low Educated TANF Clients in Florida, 
2000-2005
ForProfit
NonProfit
Public
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CHAPTER SIX 
Conclusion and Direction for Future Research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
  Privatizing the administration of public policies through contracting with for-
profit and non-profit service providers is a popular tool of poverty governance in 21st 
Century America and increasingly across the globe, yet the implications of contracting 
decisions across human support policy remain especially understudied and relatively 
unknown.  One recent case in need of clarity involves welfare policy in America.  The 
latest wave of reform legislation instituted staunch work requirements, time limits, and 
sanctions, and devolved administrative authority to states and localities that have 
instituted privatized bureaucratic approaches at the street-level, in the hopes of achieving 
improvement in service quality (GAO 2002; Winston 2002; Crew and Lamothe 2003; 
Sanger 2003).   
It is well documented that sub-national jurisdictions are privatizing welfare 
implementation under PRWORA, yet researchers have accumulated modest knowledge 
about patterns in privatized administration and how administrative ownership affects the 
TANF program outputs experienced by participating clients.  This dissertation attempts to 
augment the welfare privatization literature through systematically examining both the 
antecedents and consequences of privatized welfare delivery.   
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Chapter Three examined patterns in welfare contracting across the American 
states.  Utilizing GAO privatization data from the year 2001, the statistical analysis 
uncovered numerous statistically and substantively significant relationships at the state-
level.  Firstly, the state of Mississippi was found to be a statistical outlier.  It was the only 
state that contracted a majority of TANF outlays and was found to be over five times 
more privatized than the average state in 200148.  With Mississippi excluded from the 
analysis and with logarithmic transformation of the GAO privatization measures, states 
were found to be more likely to contract TANF dollars to private entities when fiscal 
capacity is weak, populations are more urbanized, welfare rolls are disproportionately 
comprised of African Americans, and when more non-profit organizations are existing in 
operation.  Examining patterns in welfare contracting across states represents an 
important first step in understanding the antecedents of make-or-buy administrative 
decisions, but substantial room exists for future research.   
On one hand, minimal numerical or qualitative data exists on welfare contracting, 
thus future research should focus on systematic data collection that can broaden our 
scholarly horizons beyond merely the single year 2001.  PRWORA has operated as the 
law of the land for fifteen years and privatized administrative structures likely continue to 
serve welfare clients, yet data collection efforts are essentially nonexistent.  On another 
front, while contracting differences across states represents important variation in need of 
exploration, “second-order devolution” can extend administrative decisions to the local 
level inducing intrastate variation in administrative ownership within states.  Future 
research should aim at better understanding county-level approaches to welfare 
                                                      
48 Similar to Mississippi, Washington D.C. also contracted a majority of TANF funds with private 
organizations but was excluded from the statistical analysis because it lacks statehood.   
175 
 
contracting and more localized sets of determinants.  Just as state-level contexts can 
influence administrative structuring, local social and economic contexts can also play a 
significant role in shaping approaches to welfare implementation, especially in states that 
devolve policy authority to lower levels of governance. 
 Secondly this dissertation endeavored to better understand the effects of 
privatization on the implementation outcomes of TANF clients using a mixture of 
statistical methodologies and producing a mixed bag of results.  State-level performance 
models included aggregate indicators of TANF performance and suggested that 
privatizing welfare delivery is anything but an administrative panacea.  For-profit 
contracting is not found to induce superior TANF outcomes and is negatively associated 
with employment rates, while non-profit contracting is also oftentimes statistically 
insignificant but is found to be positively associated with TANF work participation rates.  
Examining state-level patterns of privatization and performance improves generalizability 
and represents an appropriate launching point for the statistical analysis, but ultimately 
TANF outcomes occur amongst individual TANF clients, not states, thus this dissertation 
introduces multi-level models from the state of Florida that incorporate both individual 
clients and county level measures of TANF privatization to improve internal validity. 
 The multi-level analysis presented in Chapter Five of this dissertation largely 
confirms the “mythology” of contracting in social services (Van Slyke 2002).  There is 
minimal systematic evidence to suggest that private, especially for-profit firms are 
inducing superior TANF program outputs and outcomes among impoverished clientele.  
More often than not, the statistical models return statistically insignificant privatization 
coefficients suggesting that administrative ownership has minimal direct effects on the 
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quality of program results.  When the privatization results are statistically significant the 
multi-level evidence mirrors the state-level findings in that clients served under non-
profit organizations are achieving higher rates of employment and lower rates of sanction 
or fewer policy punishments for non-compliance with program rules.  Under non-profits, 
TANF clients are working more and being punished less often.   
As discussed in Chapter Two, the findings concerning non-profit superiority are 
not without theoretical merit.  Non-profit organizations operate as charitable 
organizations uniquely dedicated to achieving altruistic social missions as opposed to 
achieving maximum profits.  Non-profits are centered on community activism and the 
potential of transformative change in individuals and society (Drucker 1990).  Focusing 
on transforming individuals and changing individual behavior sits at the heart of both 
welfare reform policy in America and the center of non-profit functioning.  This research 
suggests that the mythology of contracting in social services could most especially fall 
upon profit-seeking firms.  There is minimal evidence found in this dissertation or 
elsewhere that profit-seeking firms can deliver welfare services consistently better than 
non-profit or government-run alternatives.  Atomized profit-seeking and charitable 
support servicing among the impoverished represent strange commercial bedfellows, and 
could ultimately hinder the success of welfare clients in becoming fully employed and 
self-sufficient members of society.  Public assistance implemented by for-profits is 
centered ultimately on the bottom-line and enriching shareholder value instead of 
focusing on supportive human development tasks and the overall well-being of 
America’s poor, and thus commercial incentives could have potentially negative effects 
on the life outcomes of the needy. 
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Future research examining the efficacy of privatized service delivery in social 
policy implementation should proceed in several distinct avenues.  First as a general 
matter, more rigorous, systematic, peer-reviewed research in the social policy arena is 
needed.  Likely because privatization strategies in policy implementation traditionally 
favor hard services, the bulk of privatization research centers on functions like garbage 
collection, building construction, and asphalt laying.  Apart from a burgeoning academic 
literature investigating prison privatization there exists a paucity of research on 
contracting arrangements within social service programs.  Arguably, even within the 
growing prison privatization arena, the scholarly community knows little about why 
privatized structures arise and the implications of privatization on the quality of program 
outcomes remain equally murky.  Federal, state, and municipal governments continue to 
privatize public services and engage in public-private partnerships in 21st Century 
America, and it thus researchers should maintain commitment to studying privatized 
administration.  Private sector entities funded with taxpayer dollars will continue 
impacting American lives on the front lines of public service, and a better understanding 
of the costs and benefits of contracting arrangements can improve administrative 
effectiveness and quality of life outcomes.   
Apart from increasing investigative frequency, future research should proceed in 
several directions.  First, future research should examine the intersection between 
performance management and contractual incentives that can potentially affect the 
behavior of private firms and could theoretically influence the quality of TANF program 
outputs.  Performance-based systems of organizational rewards were uniform in the 
Florida case examined in this dissertation, but there likely exists interesting variation in 
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performance-based contracts across states and counties.  Different jurisdictions possibly 
structure welfare contracts around various policy dimensions and performance 
benchmarks (Winston 2002).  Understanding how administrative ownership and profit-
seeking motivations respond to performance-based contractual incentives, and how 
incentivized behavior affect TANF program outcomes will provide researchers with 
insight into both organizational behavior in welfare implementation and the most 
effective ways to structure privatized arrangements contractually.   
For instance, Soss, Fording, and Schram (2011) theorize that performance-based 
contracts in the state of Florida induce perverse incentives among for-profits to sanction 
clients at a higher rate than other forms of administrative ownership.  Because state 
performance benchmarks in TANF contracts reward employment ratios and income 
levels of TANF recipients, these researchers argue there are organizational incentives to 
pursue sanctions so that difficult, non-complying clients will be removed completely 
from the denominator of the employment-based benchmark measures.  Performance-
based contracts shape the incentives of managers and front-line workers and incentivized 
organizational behavior can have ramifications on program outputs.  In the interactive 
analysis of African American clients, this dissertation did find that for-profits sanction 
this clientele group with greater frequency, while an earlier pooled analysis found that 
sanctioning is less likely among non-profit providers.  This could be evidence that non-
profit organizations are responding to TANF performance pressures differently than 
profit-seekers.  Research examining how various performance management systems 
influence privatized delivery arrangements and program outputs can enlighten our 
knowledge base. 
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Another avenue ripe for future research involves how oversight or accountability 
mechanisms can potentially influence the effectiveness of privatized welfare 
arrangements and the quality of program achievements.  Several scholars have noted that 
privatizing public services presents a paradox to governmental bodies in that reducing the 
operational functions of government requires increased accountability and oversight 
mechanisms from government actors to achieve success (Van Slyke 2002; Barillas 2010).   
In other words, when government delegates service delivery to private sector actors, the 
government must play an increased oversight function to ensure accountability to 
program goals and taxpayer funds.  Success and failures of privatized arrangements could 
hinge upon the government’s capacity to independently oversee and properly reprimand 
third-party service providers (Barillas 2010).   
The findings of this dissertation indirectly suggest that the strength and design of 
governmental oversight and accountability mechanisms could potentially play a role in 
determining the success of privatized implementation in welfare systems.  The Florida 
context examined in this dissertation provides an intriguing glimpse into the failure of 
government to properly monitor privatized entities, and the failures of anemic oversight 
mechanisms.  In many ways, TANF implementation in the state of Florida arguably 
lacked proper supervision over the providers operating at the street-level.  Welfare 
providers in Florida are financially rewarded for self-reported performance numbers that 
are rarely if ever verified by the various RWBs, and thus profit-seeking entities delivering 
services had reasons to inflate numbers without actually improving client outcomes 
(Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011).  The RWBs themselves are statutorily comprised of 
local business leaders that were likely sympathetic to corporate goals of revenue 
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enhancement and failed to demand accountability and honesty from street-level corporate 
welfare providers.  Lastly, welfare contracts and accountability mechanisms in Florida 
lack transparency.  “Sunshine laws” do not extend to the contracting activities of RWBs 
and operations continue to function under shrouds of secrecy.  The Florida Governor, 
state legislature, Department of Children and Families, journalists, academics, civic 
associations, churches, and the public likely have a difficult time keeping RWBs and 
welfare providers accountable due to these inadequate oversight mechanisms.  Future 
research should continue to investigate how the capacity and strength of government 
oversight functions affects the quality of privatized bureaucratic arrangements.   
This dissertation attempted to expand and improve upon existing welfare 
privatization research, and set empirical foundations for future research.  The exploration 
presented here has illuminated our understanding of various dimensions of privatized 
welfare delivery, but future research must continue to explicate the antecedents of 
welfare contracting decisions and the consequences for welfare clients and American 
society. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Chapter Three Data and Measures, Tables 3.2 and 3.4 
Variables Definition (Sources) Mean S.D. Min-Max 
TVPrivate 
 
Total-value of TANF contracts to private 
service providers as % of total TANF spending. 
(GAO 2002) 
15.16 16.31 0-74 
 
NonProfit 
 
 
ForProfit 
Total-value of TANF contracts to non-profit 
providers as a % of total TANF spending. 
(GAO 2002) 
Total-value of TANF contracts to for-profit 
providers as % of total TANF spending. (GAO 
2002) 
13.72 
 
 
3.88 
16.13 
 
 
5.69 
0-63.25 
 
 
0-17.75 
LogPop Log (base 10) of state population.  (University 
of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research state-
level database. 
6.15 2.27 5.69-7.54 
LogBus 
 
 
LogNprof 
Log (base 10) of service business 
establishments. (Statistical Abstract of the 
United States) 
Log (base 10) of number of organizations filing 
a 990 Form with the IRS. (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics) 
2.27 
 
 
3.82 
0.491 
 
 
0.391 
1.44-2.94 
 
 
3.15-4.73 
Urbanism 
 
 
FTEPerCap 
 
 
GovtID 
% of state’s population that resides within a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. (U.S. Census 
Bureau) 
State government’s full-time equivalent 
employment per 10,000 population. (Statistical 
Abstract of the United States) 
Government liberalism Berry et al (1998) 
72.25 
 
 
558.62 
 
 
44.45 
15.27 
 
 
68.06 
 
 
27.06 
38.2-94.4 
 
 
420-806 
 
 
5.38-97.5 
Governor Party identification of the state governorship, 
coded 1 if Democratic Governor and 0 if 
Republican Governor. (Statistical Abstract of 
United States) 
0.38 0.49 0-1 
Capacity Fiscal capacity index developed by Yilmaz et 
al. 
101.96 20.56 54-149 
CasePop % of state population that is receiving TANF 
benefits 
0.681 0.421 0.11-2.87 
Unmarried % of TANF caseload comprised of unmarried 
recipients (TANF Annual Report to Congress) 
 5.46 45.8-62.3 
Poverty Poverty Rates (U.S. Census Bureau) 12.11 3.22 6.1-20.3 
Unemploy Unemployment Rates (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics) 
4.41 .845 2.8-6.2 
UC-Turnout 
 
 
AA-Caseload 
% of the upper-class that voted divided by the 
percentage of lower-class that voted. (Avery 
and Peffley 2005) 
%  of state TANF caseload headed by African 
Americans. (DHHS TANF Characteristics and 
Financial Circumstances) 
172.23 
 
 
34.57 
20.04 
 
 
27.12 
129.09-
216.87 
 
0.3-83.8 
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Table A2. Chapter Five Data and Measures, Tables 5.1 and 5.2 
Variables Definition (Sources) Mean S.D. Min-Max 
TVPrivate 
 
Total-value of TANF contracts to private 
service providers as % of total TANF spending. 
(GAO 2003) 
15.16 16.31 0-74 
 
NonProfit 
 
 
ForProfit 
Total-value of TANF contracts to non-profit 
providers as a % of total TANF spending. 
(GAO 2003) 
Total-value of TANF contracts to for-profit 
providers as % of total TANF spending. (GAO 
2003) 
13.72 
 
 
3.88 
16.13 
 
 
5.69 
0-63.25 
 
 
0-17.75 
LogPop Log (base 10) of state population.  (University 
of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research state-
level database. 
6.15 2.27 5.69-7.54 
LogBus 
 
 
LogNprof 
Log (base 10) of service business 
establishments. (Statistical Abstract of the 
United States) 
Log (base 10) of number of organizations filing 
a 990 Form with the IRS. (National Center for 
Charitable Statistics) 
2.27 
 
 
3.82 
0.491 
 
 
0.391 
1.44-2.94 
 
 
3.15-4.73 
Urbanism 
 
 
GovtID 
Governor 
% of state’s population that resides within a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. (U.S. Census 
Bureau) 
Government liberalism Berry et al (1998) 
Party identification of the state governorship, 
coded 1 if Democratic Governor and 0 if 
Republican Governor. (Statistical Abstract of 
United States) 
72.25 
 
 
44.45 
0.38 
 
15.27 
 
 
27.06 
0.49 
 
38.2-94.4 
 
 
5.38-97.5 
0-1 
 
Sanction 
 
WorkReq 
 
Percentage reduction in TANF benefits for an 
initial sanction 
Coded 1 if require work before federal 
requirement of 24 months 
44.54 
 
.471 
36.23 
 
.505 
0-100 
 
0-1 
Unmarried % of TANF caseload comprised of unmarried 
recipients (TANF Annual Report to Congress) 
68.17 26.78 0-90.16 
Poverty Poverty Rates (U.S. Census Bureau) 12.11 3.22 6.1-20.3 
Unemploy Unemployment Rates (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics) 
4.41 .845 2.8-6.2 
AA-Caseload %  of state TANF caseload headed by African 
Americans. (DHHS TANF Characteristics and 
Financial Circumstances) 
34.57 27.12 0.3-83.8 
Participate % of TANF caseload participating in work 
preparation activities (DHHS TANF 
Characteristics and Financial Circumstances) 
48 19.13 18.1-92.4 
Employ 
 
Sanction 
 
Earnings 
% of TANF caseload currently engaged 
employment 
% of TANF caseload currently sanctioned for 
work-related or other reasons 
Average monthly earnings from employment 
among TANF caseload 
23.71 
 
8.45 
 
602.17 
8.48 
 
9.71 
 
141.1 
5.7-41.2 
 
0-33.2 
 
215.52-
800.04 
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Table A3. Descriptive Statistics for Open TANF Cases, Tables 5.3, 5.5, and 5.7 
Independent Variables Mean Standard Error Min Max 
Client-Level (Level-1) 
Female  
Single 
Black 
Hispanic 
LTHS Education  
Participation 
Employment 
Sanction 
Income 
 
 
.93 
.77 
.52 
.19 
.54 
.41 
.18 
.12 
127.41 
 
.25 
.47 
.50 
.39 
.50 
.49 
.29 
.13 
145.85 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2,416 
County-Level (Level-2) 
For-Profit 
Non-Profit 
Public 
Political Ideology 
Black Percentage 
Hispanic Percentage 
Unemployment Rate 
 
.51 
.33 
.17 
.438 
12.63 
18.83 
3.98 
 
.50 
.48 
.38 
.221 
7.70 
20.04 
1.73 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.1 
1.5 
1.90 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
57.1 
57.3 
11.10 
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Table A4. Descriptive Statistics for Closed TANF Cases, Tables 5.4, 5.6, and 5.8. 
Independent Variables Mean Standard Error Min Max 
Client-Level (Level-1) 
Female  
Single 
Black 
Hispanic 
LTHS Education  
Employment/Earnings Closure 
Sanction Closure 
Income 
 
.93 
.76 
.52 
.21 
.60 
.22 
.29 
111.69 
 
.25 
.43 
.50 
.41 
.49 
.42 
.46 
316.81 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2,655 
County-Level (Level-2) 
For-Profit 
Non-Profit 
Public 
Political Ideology 
Black Percentage 
Hispanic Percentage 
Unemployment Rate 
 
.54 
.32 
.15 
.426 
13.42 
18.62 
3.96 
 
.50 
.42 
.36 
.237 
9.45 
20.04 
1.73 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2.1 
1.5 
1.90 
 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
57.1 
57.3 
11.10 
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 Table A5. Correlation Matrix of State-Level Variables, Table 3.2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PRIV LGPR POP BUS URB LGNP AA MBZ FCAP GOV ID UE POV PW 
Private 1.00              
LgPrivate 0.85 1.00             
LgPop 0.08 0.22 1.00            
LgBusiness -0.15 0.04 0.29 1.00           
Urban 0.18 0.38 0.42 0.49 1.00          
LgNonPr 0.04 0.15 0.83 0.37 0.44 1.00         
AAcase 0.33 0.37 0.44 -0.02 0.31 0.45 1.00        
Mobilize 0.04 0.01 0.11 -0.09 0.10 0.11 -0.22 1.00       
Fiscal Cap -0.34 -0.31 -0.24 0.53 0.06 -0.11 -0.34 -0.24 1.00      
Governor -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 -0.14 -0.22 -0.08 0.11 -0.25 0.06 1.00     
GovtID 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.15 -0.06 -0.04 0.60 1.00    
Unemploy 0.19 0.18 0.34 -0.13 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.24 -0.30 0.16 0.04 1.00   
Poverty 0.04 -0.07 0.12 -0.48 -0.35 -0.03 0.20 0.29 -0.62 0.09 0.04 0.44 1.00  
PubWork 0.23 0.03 -0.34 -0.21 -0.16 -0.32 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.10 1.00 
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Table A6.  Determinants of TANF Contracting 
Across the American States, 2001 
IVs   MS              S.E.             S.β.   
Competition 
Log-Pop 
Log-Bus 
Log-Nprof 
Urbanism 
RegionNE 
RegionMW 
RegionS 
RegionW 
 
-23.29          (17.34)         .259   
  2.41           (15.33)         .106    
 22.21          (18.02)         .276    
  .331*         (.201)           .284    
  7.61          (6.15)            .283 
 -6.10          (5.89)           -.209 
 -3.84          (7.41)           -.121 
(omitted) 
PubEmploy 
FTE PerCap 
 
 .030           (.031)             .092   
Politics 
GovtID 
Governor 
 
 -.047          (.071)           -.112   
 -1.31          (4.12)           -.011   
Capacity 
FiscalCap 
 
 -.209          (.156)           -.312   
Demand 
CasePop 
Poverty 
 
 -.305          (.228)            .259   
 -.788          (.889)            .206   
Mobilization 
UC-Turnout 
 
  .088          (.112)            .129    
Minority 
AA-Caseload 
 
  .152*        (.089)            .233  
Mississippi 
MSDummy 
 
 52.32***   (5.35)            .546 
N 
R2 
    50                                        
  .619                                 
Note: OLS coefficients in bold, with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. The Private1 dependent variable is measured as 
the total percentage of TANF funds awarded to private 
providers and all 50 states are represented.  ***p < .01;  
**p < .05;  *p < .10.   
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